


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OUTLINE OF A COURSE IN
THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION



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
OUTLINE
OF A COURSE IN
THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

EDUCATION 205-206—PHILOSOPHY 181-182

BY

JOHN ANGUS MACVANNEL, Ph.D.

PROFESSOR OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION
IN TEACHERS COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY



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
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PREFACE

THE present outline is a revision and extension of a syllabus in the philosophy of education for some time in use in a class in Teachers College, Columbia University. In it is embodied a paper on the principles of education submitted to a meeting in Louisville, February, 1906, of The National Society of College Teachers of Education. The outline was prepared primarily for the use of my classes: its publication in its present form was an afterthought. The nature of its origin and preparation will explain in part, perhaps, much of its unevenness and many of the *lacunæ* in its make-up. It is an attempt to indicate some of the important lines along which educational reconstruction at the present time seems to be converging, and to suggest a method for the organization of educational ideas.

JOHN ANGUS MACVANNEL.

TEACHERS COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY,
January, 1912.



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OUTLINE OF A COURSE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

Education 205-206 — Philosophy 181-182

THE rough notes and suggestions furnished in this outline are but words along the way. They merely attempt to indicate a point of view for the consideration of the general problem of education conceived in a philosophical spirit and yet in accordance with scientific method. It is hoped that they may afford the student some aid in two directions: (*a*) in enabling him to follow the general progress of a course in the Philosophy of Education, and (*b*) by a little classification to systematize his knowledge to a degree. What is offered in this outline may smooth the ground somewhat; anything further would be valueless unless it were worked out with a completeness altogether beyond the scope of a syllabus. Its purpose is to guide and here and there offer rough notes of criticism or interpretation. It is recognized that in several sections indulgence in generalization has destroyed thoroughness in detail. A syllabus, at best, is only provisional. The outlines and references may prove suggestive in some directions; they are not intended to be exhaustive in any direction whatever. The effort to be immediately practical is postponed in favor

of a study of what education has meant in the past and its significance in the intellectual and spiritual life of the present — in other words, in favor of a study of the *idea* of the educational process in its organic wholeness.

“Education as a subject for college and university study is in a condition which is at once beset with difficulties and at the same time hopeful in its possibilities. The difficulties arise from the complexity of the factors involved and the number of special scientific disciplines which must be called upon for methods and results. When the purpose of education could be settled by metaphysics, or its data and methods by psychology alone, the task of the theory of education was comparatively simple. But with the recognition and demand for biological, sociological, and physiological aspects, as well as for the reconstruction of the ethical and psychological aspects of the problem, the task is far more difficult. It is precisely this need of reconstructing, this demand for recognition of broader aspects, which makes the situation full of interest and promise. It is this which should make the study of educational principles one of the most stimulating and broadening of subjects. It is just this which should give such deep significance to the work of education, as a whole, as to awaken first of all teachers, and through them the larger public, to its importance.”¹

¹The above paragraph, and some others in the body of the Outline, are reprinted from *The College Course in the Principles of Education*,

These words of Professor Tufts may be taken to indicate the point of view from which the present study of the general problem of education and its method of treatment as a whole is undertaken. It is written in the conviction that the most fruitful study of education consists in treating it as an integral part of a wider philosophy of society, while not ignoring the necessities of scientific treatment. Since education is primarily a form of social activity, the science of education would seem to be fundamentally a social science. This conception commends itself as on the whole the most satisfactory, and, indeed, if education is to be seen in its right relations in human experience, as the only one possible in the long run.

Following the treatment offered in several of the more recent works in education, the present outline attempts to indicate in a schematic way how the educational process may be given a distinct and vital relationship to the facts of organic and social evolution. In so doing, it is assumed (*a*) that the educational process and the general life-process are both subservient to the general law of evolution as the largest generalization yet made in scientific views of the world, and (*b*) that, as a fact of experience, the educational process is a part of the wider

published in *The School Review*, February, 1906. The outline as a whole is a reprint, revised and extended, of a *Syllabus of a Course in the Philosophy of Education*, published in the *Teachers College Record*, September, 1904.

life-process. The doctrine of evolution is now regarded as the legitimate scientific method in the search for reasonableness in human experience. While the method has by no means been given its adequate philosophical interpretation, nevertheless it is accepted as the best working hypothesis in the organization of the facts of educational theory and practice. The partial application of the method already made has given rise to a new appreciation of the significance of education in human life and its possibilities in the process of spiritual evolution. It has developed a new attitude of intelligence to the nature of man and a clearer insight into the sources of human well-being. The thoroughgoing application of the doctrine to the concrete problems of education, its aims, its subject matter and its method, is a work of the future.

I. THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

§ I. The Relation of the Sciences to Philosophy.

1. *The nature and purpose of science.* — The term 'science' is employed to designate: (a) knowledge, *i.e.* a body of systematized judgments gained through certain methods; (b) knowledge as instrument of control, *i.e.* as a body of methods controlling our judgments concerning particular groups of facts; (c) and, therefore, as mediatory from one stage of experience to another. Progress in science (as in philosophy) depends on the observation and multiplication of data: it depends no less on the development of methods in dealing with data. The criterion of knowledge is for the present taken to be availability or use; knowledge answers the questions which arise in experience; it is power in some relation or life-situation. It is power of interpretation.

2. *The problem of philosophy.* — Philosophy, on the other hand, as a reflective study of experience, aims: —

(a) to give a comprehensive view of reality as revealed in experience. This element of universality, of unity and synthesis, is perhaps the fundamental characteristic of philosophy.

(b) to furnish a systematic interpretation or criticism

of the presuppositions of human experience. The science assumes the possibility of real knowledge: philosophy, as theory of knowledge, takes upon itself to inquire into the truth of such an assumption.

(c) to become an art of life, based upon scientific principles.

Philosophy is an outcome of man's perennial desire to discern the meaning of things; to gain such a unitary and consistent world-view as will satisfy the demands of intelligence and give coherence and significance to his practical activities as well. It is a comprehensive theory of experience; its material is human experience; its instrument is reason. Philosophy is at once an organism of thought, a method of thinking, and an attitude of mind.

3. *Science and philosophy.* — Philosophy has been named the mother of the sciences, and only by slow degrees has there grown up the family of the sciences. Now it is their fashion to dispute her authority in the household of knowledge. The future progress of both science and philosophy, however, will be through complementary service. Both deal with human experience. The various sciences differ not so much as dealing with different facts of experience, but rather as dealing with experience as a whole in so far as it can be studied from different points of view. Philosophy attempts to coordinate the results of the various sciences, to introduce

a principle of proportion, and to exhibit the organic unity of the experience-process. Philosophy, therefore, is not a mere aggregate of the sciences, but the organism of thought or knowledge of which the various sciences are the organs. It does not aim so much to bring to light new facts as to reveal the significant connections of the facts brought to light by the various sciences. Philosophy gives significance to the sciences, while the sciences in turn vitalize and give concreteness to philosophy. In making use of the principle of proportion in its synthesis of the facts of science, philosophy in a sense becomes the critic of the sciences. *Divide et impera* is the motto of science, and the scientific specialist, finding an hypothesis suited to the explanation of the phenomena which he has examined, is under the continual temptation of making use of it as a measuring line for higher, or, indeed, for all orders of existence. This is perhaps one of the greatest dangers of contemporary science, the analogous application of accepted principles from one order of existence to another. An important function of philosophy must be to examine such a principle or hypothesis, understand it, and indicate to what extent it affords an explanation of phenomena of another order, and wherein it fails. Philosophy is thus through very criticism a synthesis of the sciences, but through a higher medium than the sciences themselves explicitly recognize.

§ II. The Possibility of a Science of Education.

1. *Is there a science of education?* — The answer to this question would imply a statement of: (a) the nature and purpose of science; (b) the relation of science to philosophy; (c) the tributary sciences — history of education, physiology, psychology, and sociology. Science as a form of human activity arises within experience; the science of education arises within our experience in education, and is therefore a function of educational practice. Is there a science of education? is a question based upon a special interpretation of the meaning of science. It does not appear that the search for a methodical treatment of education is to be abandoned, even though perfection has not been attained at this early stage. The science of education is the method thus far established of controlling experience so far as it is concerned with the educational process. The theory of education should set forth, not a set of educational categories or principles independent or isolated from one another, but an interrelated system 'within which every assertion entitles us to other assertions, and to which we are entitled only through other assertions.' The science of education aims at securing the method by which the educational process may be increasingly controlled.

2. *The twofold aspect of education as a science — (a) the psychological, and (b) the sociological.* — A feature

fundamental in the present outline is the conception of the organic unity of the individual and society. The study of the growth of consciousness, whether in the race or child, points to the conclusion that the real self is always a social self; that the nature of the individual is essentially social; in other words, the individual's relations to his fellows are not external attachments of his personality, but the source of its inmost content and reality. The completely isolated individual, uninfluenced by social forces, does not exist as a fact of experience. The process of education, therefore, is conceived as essentially a process of social interaction between the two factors of the experience-process, society and the individual.

§ III. The Science and the Philosophy of Education.

It is doubtless true that, in a systematic and thoroughgoing treatment of education, two main divisions would be found — divisions, however, which are not separate, but rather stages in the movement of intelligence in its attempt to come to a conscious realization of the educational process in human experience: (a) the science dealing with the main features of the area which the subject comprises; (b) the philosophy, dealing with its boundaries, or its place in the territories of knowledge. The science, to a degree, isolates in order to organize; the philosophy unifies in order to adjust and interpret. The science of education, in other words, has to do with the

theory of education as isolated by itself; the philosophy, while presupposing the science, is the theory of the relations of education to the other sciences and to the known world in general. The philosophy of education is logically bound up with the actual progress of the sciences which it presupposes. It differs from the science of education not so much in its materials as in its standpoint and in its more persistent endeavor to indicate the real nature of these materials, their meaning because of their organic unity, the possibility and implications of the educational process, and the continuity of human experience.- Philosophy aims to combine the analytic movement of science and the synthetic movement of art in one intellectual endeavor. In such a process the science inevitably undergoes partial transformation and reconstruction. At the present time, owing to the fact that education draws its materials from so many sciences, and owing to the remarkable development of these sciences in recent years, there has resulted a species of intellectual anarchy in educational theory. The single science, by itself, is frankly individualistic, and only unconsciously organic at best. On the one hand, the psychologist with educational leanings is sometimes prone to assert that his special discipline is the sole arbiter in educational theory; in other words, that educational theory, in so far as it can be made scientific, is simply 'applied psychology.' The sociologist, on the other hand, when his inclination

takes a practical turn, is equally determined that educational theory shall become a part of the more comprehensive theory of society. It is not, however, a question of identity, or of subordination, but of coöperative and complementary service. The worker in the philosophy of education must accept the aspects of truth brought to light by the sciences which it presupposes. He must be mindful, moreover, that it is not in its positive contribution to human knowledge, but rather in the organization of that knowledge, that the true justification of philosophic inquiry consists. With the advance of the sciences which his inquiries presuppose, his task still remains imperative — to regulate the proportion which the contributions of the different sciences may assume, to coördinate and interpret the new materials, to unify them not only with one another, but with the other aspects of man's experience, and thus to restore to him a view of the educational process as a whole which is comprehensive, articulated, and wherein the different factors have free play.

§ IV. The Nature of Philosophic Method.

1. Philosophy presents itself as an ever abiding problem, a phase of the life-problem, which, it would appear, is in the largest sense the maintenance and furtherance of the life of reason. The problem of philosophy in its deepest aspect is the conscious realization of life as problematic. The issue of each attempted solution (in phi-

losophy, so called), serving to further organize man's intellectual and moral experience, is a reorganized or reconstructed logic, metaphysics, and ethics.

From one point of view the problem of philosophy continually arises in the conflict between two opposing and, it would seem, permanent tendencies in human nature:—

(a) the naturalistic, arising out of the preoccupation of man with his outer environment and his need of control over it.

(b) the idealistic, the aspiration of mind which has its basis in the belief in possibility, which in turn is conditioned by change within reality. Faith in present and future conditions of life (the personal or social situation) has its foundation in the survival of certain typical achievements of the past. The present era of transition seems to many at times discouraging through its very apparent insensitiveness to spiritual needs and values, — perhaps its temporary hesitation in its assertion of conscious mastery. In such a time it may be that the only remaining resource is the Everlasting Yea or Nay. It may be, indeed, that the assertion and realization of freedom in an individual is not only an essential, but the fundamental, element in his view of the world and his reconciliation to life.

2. "Metaphysics," says Bradley, "is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct, but to find

these reasons is no less an instinct." Every method of 'finding reasons,' observation, experiment, historical investigation, reflection, speculation, has been at some time or other in the lifetime of philosophy acknowledged and welcomed. Idealism, realism, empiricism, rationalism, naturalism, pragmatism, have been ways to the finding of reasons, ways of thinking, — ways to the organization, the description, and interpretation of human experience. Together they constitute an attempt on the part of the human spirit to interrogate experience as such from the standpoint of a distinct and legitimate human interest.

3. Though, historically, philosophy has existed as a number of apparently separate and separately originated methods, it does not and cannot exist as a mere aggregate of these. It exists now to remove their separateness and effect their reorganization. Such organization of methods does not imply that their differences are to be obliterated, but rather that these are to be discovered and made apparent; thus they are to be reorganized in a new philosophical method commensurate with the ever developing variety of human experience, which it attempts to unify. We cannot hope fully to understand living things except through a study of their growth and development. The methods of philosophy, as the ideas of the mind, are in no wise an exception to the law of growth and change. Philosophy as a progressive critique of human experience is coming to

recognize more and more fully that idealism, realism, rationalism, and empiricism, instead of forming self-complete and self-inclosed systems or methods, are limiting, but mutually coöperative. Fundamentally they are not absolute but only relative opposites.

4. The type of philosophic criticism herein maintained is not of the type which aims merely to destroy, but which, through discovering the spiritual continuity of the principle, intelligence or reflection, inherent in the manifold forms of its expression, aims to preserve it. It would maintain, then, in brief:—

(a) that the historic philosophical methods are complementary phases of a single method of intelligence — phases for the purpose of examination, for emphasis, mode of operation, special attitude or interest, separable; in reality, inseparable. No one of them can furnish a complete characterization of experience as reality.

(b) that the meaning and significance of such methods is relative to those levels of experience in which they exist, and in which they do their work. Within the experience process, everywhere a unity of the actual and the possible, they together constitute an ascending effort of intelligence as philosophy.

5. Just here, then, may be summarized certain principles of philosophic (and scientific, since both philosophy and science work towards reasoned knowledge) study or thinking:—

(a) Reality—the object of both philosophy and science—is one (not numerical singleness merely). This implies that nowhere in nature do we find elements absolutely disparate, elements incapable of being connected as part of our experience, — believed to be incapable of being worked over sooner or later into the unity of experience. Of course, whether such a unification of experience is yet attained, is a question of fact.

(b) In attempting, therefore, to reach a working solution of the problems of philosophy (and of education) it is to be remembered that no divisions within human experience are absolute. Aspects or factors within a particular field may be separated for purposes of examination (science) because of some particular interest or the adoption of some particular point of view.

(c) The peculiar or intimate nature of problems in philosophy (and education) is to be determined by finding out what experience (either personal or social) says about them. Philosophy is thus essentially a critique of experience. Reflection is fruitfully employed only on the concrete material supplied it in experience, individual or social, in all its manifold forms, — common sense, scientific, moral, æsthetic, religious.

§ V. The Content of the Philosophy of Education.

1. *The materials of the philosophy of education.* — The philosophy of education is to be regarded as part

of the philosophy of mind. The materials for a philosophy of education are found in human experience. Experience is ultimately constituted of thought, feeling, action, and may be either (a) individual, personal, or (b) vicarious. The philosophy of education is dependent for its content on educational experience. Taking a sufficiently wide basis of induction as its foundation (and here it depends for coöperation especially upon the history of education, on psychology, on sociology, and ethics), it aims to present the system, the presuppositions and implications of educational experience.

2. *The problems of the philosophy of education.* — The aim of the philosophy of education may be variously stated: (a) to discover the place and significance of education in human experience; (b) to furnish a systematic interpretation of the presuppositions and results of educational experience; (c) to furnish a progressive organization of the principles presupposed and ascertained by the sciences in their relation to educational experience; (d) to trace the relations of education to the other activities of civilization; (e) to determine the relation of the educational process to the process of reality; (f) to become the theory of the nature and development of educational experience; (g) to become the system or organization of the principles of education.

Or, in summarized form, the philosophy of education aims: —

(a) to trace the significance of education in its main outlines as a conscious, historical effort towards human evolution; in other words, to trace the relations of education to the other activities of civilization;

(b) to determine the meaning and purpose of the educational process in its functional relation to the wider intellectual and social process of the present and to the general process of life and reality;

(c) to formulate an educational ethics.

REFERENCES. — Of Introductions to philosophy any one of the following would furnish the preparation necessary to a course such as is outlined in the present syllabus: Mackenzie, *Outlines of Metaphysics*; Marvin, *Introduction to Philosophy*; Paulsen, *Introduction to Philosophy*; Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics*; Watson, *An Outline of Philosophy*. The more important sources of material for the philosophy of education will be indicated in connection with the respective chapters. The various lists make no pretension to completeness. A few of the works which would naturally form the nucleus of source-material are the following: Alexander, *Moral Order and Progress*; Aristotle, *Ethics*, and *Politics*; Bagley, *The Educative Process*; Baldwin, *Mental Development*, I-II, also, *Development and Evolution, Thought and Things*; Bosanquet, *The Psychology of the Moral Self*, also, *The Philosophical Theory of the State*; Bryant, *Educational Ends*; Butler, *Meaning of Education*; Caird, *The Social Philosophy of Comte*; Davidson, *A History of Education*; Dewey, *School and Society*, *Educational Essays*, *The School and the Child*, also, *Influence of Darwin on Philosophy*; Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*; Green,

Prolegomena to Ethics; Harris, *Psychologic Foundations of Education*; Hobhouse, *The Theory of Knowledge, Morals in Evolution*, also, *Mind in Evolution*; Höfding, *History of Modern Philosophy*; Horne, *The Philosophy of Education*; Mackenzie, *Introduction to Social Philosophy*, also, *Lectures on Humanism*; Monroe, *Cyclopedia of Education*; Münsterberg, *Psychology and Life*; Nettleship, *Lectures on Plato's Republic*; O'Shea, *Education as Adjustment*; Paulsen, *A System of Ethics*; Plato, *Republic*; Rosenkranz, *Philosophy of Education*; Royce, *The World and the Individual, Psychology*, also, *Art. Is There a Science of Education? Educational Review*, January and February, 1891; Santayana, *The Life of Reason*; Sidgwick, *Philosophy, its Scope and Relations*; Sinclair, *The Possibility of a Science of Education*; Spencer, *Sociology*; Stout, *Analytic Psychology*; Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*; Welton, *The Logical Bases of Education*, also, *The Psychology of Education*; Windelband, *A History of Philosophy*; Wundt, *Ethics*, I-III.

FURTHER PROBLEMS FOR STUDY. — 1. The need of a philosophical basis for educational theory. 2. Phases of the historical relations of philosophy and the sciences. 3. Educational theory as influenced by special sciences. 4. The philosophy of education as a criticism of educational categories. 5. Problems of philosophy or education in their relation to the social consciousness of a period.

II. THE PERSISTENT PROBLEMS OF EDUCATION

§ VI. The Relation of Theory and Practice.

1. Energy, life, mind, are forms of one vast movement of organization and development. Human life is everywhere controlled by habit, by belief, by principles, or by ideals. Experience is ever in advance of thought; interests and activities precede their interpretation and organization; behavior goes before its intelligent regulation in accordance with general principles. Life in so far as it is human seeks rules and principles; it needs the guidance or control of belief, of law, of the lessons of experience. Such laws and principles are always in the last resort extracted from life itself, not imported from without. Life increasingly takes on form, habit, organization. Yet these are never the end of change or movement. Experience is one ceaseless process of reorganization, ever reshaping, ever reconstructing itself for fuller and freer activity. When, through its organization, human experience has become common property, it breaks through that which seems to thwart its free movement, but only to demand a new synthesis, a new organization. Experience is ever

forcing upon men a sense of the inadequacy of each generation's way of looking at things. The old is not false; it is inadequate. Reflection — experience emerging as reason — is urged forward by inner necessity to know itself, to learn anew the method, the values, and the economy of its own existence. As life moves on to life, it becomes the task of science and philosophy, of literature, of art and religion, — energies emerging within life, — to make experience more harmonious and ideal. Their task is not to add to human nature, but rather to understand and illumine it. They are life's own ministers, coming in the fullness of time to clear consciousness of their true work, — the service of life. With them education may one day become a theory of experience, — a criticism of life.

2. *The function of theory.* — Reflection is an integral part of all worthy activity; it is such in the sense that it is a natural part. Action in the higher human sense includes theory for the reason that it includes consciousness. Theory and practice are interrelated aspects of a unitary process, — the life of reason. Human experience is fact and idea in one; it is action with some realization of its meaning, some consciousness of its significance. Consciousness, then, does two things for action: (1) it gives meaning, and (2) it gives control. Theory, from this point of view, is fundamentally *the realization of the method of practice*; it is to practice what consciousness

is to experience in its entirety. It liberates the meaning and therewith secures control. It renders practice more concrete, more truly natural. Theory, moreover, which does not issue in action is abstract, unnatural; it is only partial theory. On the other hand, for an individual to try to understand any form of human activity, in which he is to any degree personally interested, does not necessarily separate him from that activity, making him, as is so often said, a mere theorist; normally it brings the activity home to him more vitally. Through understanding it he secures control of the technique of the activity; he is enabled to act with clear consciousness of what he is doing. The function of theory is to reconstruct and economize practice. The study of any line of human interest and endeavor does not imply separation from them; it means getting closer to them. Theory, it is true, whenever it becomes dislocated and divorced from the needs and activities of life in which it arises, soon becomes partial, incomplete. When kept close to life, it continues productive and originative.

3. *The nature of an educational principle.* — The study of education seeks to describe and interpret, to lift to the level of idea and principle a particular phase of human experience. Its study is an organic part of the larger problem of theory and practice, of knowledge and life. Educational experience, in whatever form, is part of life-experience, and its principles are conscious formu-

lations of tendencies which are moving spontaneously in social life before being given expression in forms of thought and imagery. Educational theory is an attempt consciously to realize and bring home to intelligence the facts of educational experience. In this experience educational principles are disclosed to reflection, and their destination lies in reshaping and reconstructing this experience. Thus they mediate from one level of experience to another; out of experience they issue, into experience they proceed. They are educational experience raised to the level of an idea, an idea which in turn furnishes not only a standard but a means of control for further experiencing. Educational principles, then, are the formulated truths of educational experience.

4. *The distinction between a rule and a principle of action.* — In doing his work, in so far as he acts from rule or precept, an individual's full personal preference is not accorded. There is some element within him forced, coerced. The rule may help him once, and, indeed, many times, but he is not perfectly free. The rule is in a sense a prescription for his activity; it is commanding, fixed, imperative. A principle, on the other hand, is experimental, rather than something fixed; it is a method for or of action, rather than a prescription for it. The study of educational principles interests itself with principles as working forces, operative in educational experience, rather than as fixed forms which have been separated

from practice and so hardened that their influence tends to mold rather than to free the worker in education. Every renewal of life in education must proceed, not through a mere formulation of precepts of action, but through intelligent and growing insight into the nature of education as a whole. An educational principle is, as was said above, the organization for thought of previous educational activities; but, in being this, it may have already become more, — it may have become a method of insight, a formative, dynamic energy in the mind of the teacher, by means of which further organization and interpretation may be made, experiments tried that will not be merely at random, an increasing control and a deepening appreciation secured by him who is interested in the organization of life whether within or without the school. However important for the individual are so-called rules or precepts, — and they are important, — they must become organic to that freeing of his life which comes through knowledge in the form of principles, a knowledge wide and deep, personal and vital, of the real nature, the possibilities, the relations of the materials and forces with which he deals.

5. *The function of reflection.* — Reflection is not something imported into experience from without; it is intelligence or reason itself making inquiry concerning the meaning and value of the various experiences which go to make up life. Through such reflection the individ-

ual may rise above the seeming dualisms of theory and practice, of fact and idea, of knowledge and life, and come to realize their significance as inseparable elements in the movement of experience. It lifts human action above the level of instinct and habit. Reflection is an organic part of human activity above this level. Practical life is the medium of realization for reflection; it is the expression of reason; it is the life of reason. The task of study, of reflection, is twofold, 'What is the meaning of human experience?' and 'How is this knowledge transformed into purpose?' — What is worth while, and how shall we locate and possess it? These two questions form the inclusive task of reflective inquiry. "It is better," said Joubert, "to discuss a question without settling it, than to settle it without discussing it."

§ VII. The Educational Situation.

1. To the problems of philosophy and of the philosophy of education, simply because they arise in the life-process and are continuous with a growing, changing experience, there is not and cannot be any immediate or definite answer. Through reflection and analysis we may gradually, however:—

(1) discern transient from more permanent elements or conditions of a problem or situation;

(2) come to recognize the factors as factors in a working problem;

(3) acknowledge a tendency and its consequent danger to intellectual activity, the tendency to become more interested in solutions to problems than in methods of finding solutions. If the problems were more definitely solved, they would cease to exist. Whatever the age or period, there are involved (a) the particular, peculiar, or special needs of the present; (b) standards, the lessons of the past, the methods used in the past; (c) tentative syntheses, readjustments, continuous reorganization.

The theory of education (in any age or period) centers about the answer to the question, 'What is *potentially a human being?*' In the field of history in its manifold forms Plato holds that we may discover the essential qualities of the social man as well as the fundamental conditions of human life. For here we will find revealed with increasing clearness the picture of the growing realization of that *system of life proper to true human nature*. In both history and history of education we at first feel confronted merely with hopeless variety of opinion and experiment.

2. The present outline aims to distinguish the particular area of human experience in which the so-called factors of educational activity are systematically related and organized. If there is continuity and growth in human experience (educational as well as social), it follows that the past is the condition of the present and the

present is the key to that which has gone before. How, then, do we identify the 'educational situation'? What is the situation, whether in primitive, oriental, Grecian, medieval, or modern life, to which we apply the term 'educational'? What are the characteristics which mark it off from, *e.g.* an economic, a political, a moral, or a religious situation?

3. By the *psychology of the educational situation* is meant a systematic and critical examination of its nature and contents, — an examination such as will disclose the meaning and value of the various factors within the whole by showing their genesis and function within the entire situation.

Educational theory aims to determine the meaning and purpose of the educational process in its functional relation to the general intellectual and social process. This implies a synthesis of whatever facts may throw light on the nature and meaning of the process and assist us in reaching a definite point of view in estimating its significance in the general scheme of life and reality. What do the fundamental factors in the educational process represent? How are they related to one another and to that wider life of which they are a part? How do they interact within and evolve in the inner necessity of that life? What seems worth while to know concerning them in their inner nature and in their mutual relations?

4. The term 'educational' implies 'a group of factors in a special type of social situation capable of being located and defined, *i.e.* abstracted and conceptualized. 'Educational' may be used to designate a distinct variety of human experience, a variety permanent yet changing, whose common nature is discovered in the presence and interaction of its factors. These factors are found to be from the very beginnings of society to some degree systematically related and organized. Reflection upon it shows that provisionally we may say that the persistent factors in the educational situation (historical or contemporary) are: (a) *the child* — the immature individual; (b) *the achieved culture of the race* — civilization; (c) *the medium of interaction* — some form of institutional life. Analyzing (schematically) the educational situation of the present, we find: (a) educational factors (those just named) with a concrete existence and a history; (b) a body of educational experience, together with certain sciences (psychology, sociology, and philosophy) which serve to regulate and organize our knowledge concerning the factors in educational activity; (c) standards or norms (social and individual) which serve as canons of criticism of educational experience. In other words, we find a unitary process of practice and theory, of fact and idea, embodying within it a definite type of organization.

5. From the historical point of view the educational

situation of any period is a process of a certain form, a definite type of organization, but containing within it the promise and potency of continuous reorganization, looking to a higher level of activity. Following the terminology of the evolutionary method, it is a process of organization through the continuous differentiation and integration of its elements.

What, then, are the conditions of this change, of this continuous transformation and reorganization of the educational situation? What are the factors, subjective and objective, in the evolution of the educational process? We seek not the particular ways in which these interacted, but the universal factors which would inevitably focus attention upon one or other of the persistent elements within the educational situation, — the child, the achieved or inherited culture of the race, the medium of interaction, serving to bring about the differentiation and integration of the process. It will be recognized, then, how educational theory must more and more presuppose and unify the results of all the other sciences, since its purpose is to work out on the basis of experience, reflection, and experiment the method of social transition and progress through education. The gradual organization of such a method of conscious evolution is philosophy of education.

§ VIII. The Factors in the Educational Process.

1. It was stated above that the fundamental factors in the educational process are:—

(a) the child — the immature individual;

(b) the inherited or achieved culture of the race — civilization;

(c) the medium of interaction — some form of institutional life, the home, the school, the vocation, the church, the state.

2. These fundamental elements exist in a dynamic process of evolution or development. The problem of education is the problem of the continuity of the process in relation to its special and individual factors and their interaction.

3. The objective factors which serve to stimulate and direct educational development at the present time are the following social activities, chiefly: (a) the economic, (b) the political, (c) the religious, (d) the intellectual, and (e) the social.

4. The persistent problems of educational theory are therefore:—

(a) *The organization of the personal life.* — This involves the gradual integration of impulsive with ideational and emotional activities and the gradual emergence into a coherent individuality. (See Chapter VIII.)

(b) *The organization of the cultural life.* — This would

involve the organization of an intellectual order of the school, implying in turn the evaluation and selection of such cultural materials as are available in the intellectual activities of the social mind of the period, and the determination of a method of procedure consonant with the nature of true social action. (See Chapter XI.)

(c) *The organization of the national or social life.*— This involves the whole relation of democracy and education, and demands: (1) a consideration of the place of education in the wider organic and social process; (2) an analysis of the democratic-industrial ideal; (3) a determination of the function and extent of vocational education; (4) a formulation of what may be designated a national policy of education. (See Chapter IX.)

§ IX. Education as a Human Institution.

For the purpose, then, of the present outline, *education as a social institution may be defined as the method by which a particular generation endeavors to incorporate the vital elements of its civilization or culture into the life of the generation that succeeds it.* The persistent educational problem appears to consist in deriving from the political, economic, and social conditions, and from the scientific, artistic, and religious tendencies of a people the principles of a system of education appropriate to it. A method, therefore, independent of experience is not sought, but rather the integration of methods already operative

within experience. How are these to become more fully conscious of themselves, and not merely collectively, but in such a way as to become correlated and organized into an intelligent method of social and educational reconstruction?

REFERENCES. — (a) Concerning the relation of theory and practice, consult: Dewey, *Educational Essays (Psychology and Social Practice)*, also, *Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality*, in The Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago; Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*; Mackenzie, *Manual of Ethics*; Muirhead, *Philosophy and Life*; Palmer, *The Field of Ethics*; Welton, *The Psychology of Education*. (b) On the educational situation, consult: Butler, *The Meaning of Education*; Brown, *Present Problems in the Theory of Education*, in Congress of Arts and Sciences, Vol. VIII; Dewey, *The Educational Situation*; Laurie, *The Training of Teachers*; Harris, *Psychologic Foundations of Education*; Raymont, *The Principles of Education*; Scott, *Social Education*; Young, *Scientific Method in Education*.

FURTHER PROBLEMS FOR STUDY. — 1. The genetic relation between theory and practice. 2. The control of ideas by facts. 3. The material of thought. 4. The nature of the idea. 5. The meaning of 'principle' in 'principles of education.'

III. THE PLACE OF EDUCATION IN HUMAN EXPERIENCE

§ X. The Doctrine of Evolution as a Scientific Generalization and as a Working Hypothesis.

1. The intellectual and spiritual vitality of every age as well as of every individual is due to the dominating and fructifying influence of some one comprehensive idea. The dominant thought in the intellectual life of the present is the principle of evolution, — an idea which is fast becoming the atmosphere of all inquiry in the domain of science, art, religion, and education. As is true of all great ideas, this one in some form has been in the world from the first beginnings of thought. The conception in its present fullness has been slowly developed in the environment of the advancing human knowledge of twenty-four centuries. Evolution is no longer a theory merely; it has become a creed; and it now lends such a living interest to the past development of all organisms, institutions, and beliefs that it is a difficult matter to adequately appreciate the standpoint of those who were without the idea. No longer can the saying of Goethe be accepted without reservation that the history of the

past is a book with seven seals. As the theory of Copernicus enabled man to reconstruct the alphabet of his relationships in space, so has the doctrine of evolution forced him to reconstruct his knowledge of his relationships in time. "After centuries of intellectual conquest in all regions of the phenomenal universe," wrote Romanes a generation ago, "man has at last begun to find that he may apply in a new and most unexpected manner the adage of antiquity, — 'know thyself.' For he has begun to perceive a strong probability — if not an actual certainty — that his own living nature is identical in kind with the nature of all other life, and that even the most amazing side of that nature — nay, the most amazing of all things within the reach of his knowledge — the human mind itself — is but the topmost inflorescence of one mighty growth whose roots and stems and many branches are sunk in the abyss of planetary time."

As was noted in the introduction, the doctrine is now regarded as the legitimate scientific method in the search for reasonableness in human experience. Its fruitful influence in the study of nature and human life is freely acknowledged; the far-reaching nature of the effects of its application to the entire domain of human experience, however, cannot well be foreseen. Only very gradually, and in many instances but imperfectly, has education in theory and practice responded to the implications of the doctrine. Until within recent years the influence of

inherited educational ideas and the naturally conservative character of educational practice have tended to hinder its application as a method of study in this field. Even at the present time its application has too often amounted to little more than a vague use of biological analogies and terminology.

2. Because of the very increase of so-called educational facts there is perhaps a tendency on the part of many workers in the field to doubt the value of an attempt at present to present any new synthesis within the educational area. There is a danger, too, arising from a well-founded belief in the value of implicit obedience to the command *divide et impera*. The man of science must know the facts and operate only within the restricted area or the single division. This becomes a center for his attention and a point for emphasis by him; yet there is the danger of over-emphasis and unfairness to the other aspect of the movement of science or of knowledge. The movement of knowledge or of science is brought about through the coöperation of two tendencies which are opposites only on the surface, namely, the perception of the new fact and the discovery of the new relation: the one is the movement towards integration, synthesis; the other the movement towards differentiation, expansion. Together they are complementary aspects of the one organic movement of intelligence in the experience-process. The hypothesis or the generalization

makes for increasing facility in the control, the ordering, of the more complex group of facts. The new fact is a stimulus to a new synthesis or reorganization. The fact, in turn, is seen in a new relation; it submits to a new control. Evolution is the name given to the largest generalization yet made in scientific views of the world. As a scientific idea it maintains that the manifold phenomena of the universe develop in accordance with ascertainable laws, — namely, (1) of differentiation, and (2) of integration; the two making for more complex organization. Development, whether in nature or in knowledge, means, fundamentally, continuous reorganization or reconstruction.

In the present section the attempt will be made (*a*) to indicate what seems to be the content of evolution conceived as a working hypothesis (in its educational reference, primarily), and (*b*) to note certain features of the progress which is being made in giving the educational process distinct and vital relationship to the facts of organic and social evolution.

3. If the doctrine of evolution was the peculiar contribution of the nineteenth century, and that of the eighteenth its deep-rooted belief in the liberating power of clear and distinct ideas, it would appear that one phase at least of the task of the twentieth century will be the fuller definition of the evolutionary method and its further reconstruction as the organic principle of think-

ing. As itself a product of evolution the idea of evolution is slowly gaining content through its continued illustration, and through the criticism coming to it in its very contact with fact. Taking present-day thought in cross-section, the theory of evolution seems to imply the following factors:—

(a) *The organic oneness of all things in spite of the great contrasts in the spheres of mechanism, chemism, organism, and spirit, and the genetic connection of these orders of existence.*

In an evolutionary process is implied (1) change, (2) identity through change, and (3) some kind of progress toward some end, whether good or bad. It is a dramatic process involving some level taken as a starting-point, that is, a beginning from which to measure or estimate, a middle point, and an end. Evolution assumes an orderly sequence of changes, and the order and direction of these changes is dependent upon determinate conditions. In the genetic process, therefore, or the process of becoming, there is not mere continuous change in the quantitative distribution of the elements which make up the process; there is the emergence of the qualitatively new. It is now taken as a presupposition of all scientific procedure that the changes going on throughout the universe are not chaotic nor unrelated, but follow an intelligible course. The existence of the one and the many, the determinate and the as yet un-

determined, are facts of experience. Things and ideas have their existence in a process of change, or becoming, from one stage of existence to another. At every stage science assumes the rationality of things, and each new determination by thought is in confirmation of its assumption. Thought demands meaning or relationship among the elements of experience and in the satisfaction of its demand lies the possibility of control. The progress of science — in other words, the increase of control — is an evidence that the system of thought is not wholly inadequate to the system of things.

(b) The emergence of the qualitatively new is by means of forces resident in the coöperating elements of the process, — forces which work according to fixed laws of variation and under determinate conditions; more particularly, the course which any developing process — organic, psychical, social — follows is one of differentiation and integration.

Progress, then, through increasing differentiation and integration is disclosed in the movement towards (1) greater fullness of expression, (2) increase in power of adjustment, (3) liberation from so-called forces of environment, and (4) completer development of the psychical life, culminating in the self-conscious activities of men. There is implied, then, a unitary process of reality, *natural, self-evolving, and free from so-called transcendental intrusion.*

(c) In every process of development there are present the

two interrelated and coöperating elements, (1) the individual existence in which the development takes place or is located, and (2) the situation, medium, or environment which afford the stimuli or conditions through which the development takes place, the latter also, in turn, undergoing change or evolution.

A process of development is not a mere *unfolding* from within; it is also an *enfolding* from without. In the process involution is as necessary as evolution. The concept of evolution implies, therefore, the presence of individuality in the subject of the process. On the other hand, in an analysis of the process, it is to be remembered that the *individual apart from environment is an unreal abstraction*; the same is true of *environment apart from the coefficient of environment*. The individual and the environment, the agent and the situation, are parts of a unitary process, for purposes of examination separable; in reality, inseparable.

(d) *In organic or social processes new formations or structures, whether vital, intellectual, or social (for example, the eye, consciousness, or some special institution), are to be conceived as instruments or methods of adaptation or adjustment to specific environmental conditions.*

Taken together, these instruments or methods, organic, ideational, and institutional, may be said to *constitute the mechanism of organic and social evolution*.

4. The true significance of the doctrine of evolution

can be realized only when its results and its implications are gradually brought into relation with the other elements of experience and there submitted to the testing and trying process of reflection, criticism, and the demands of life itself. As a working hypothesis in the educational theory of the present it has become indispensable. In the scientific area by which education is encompassed there is an ever increasing body of evidence that it points in the direction along which truth lies; the justification of any hypothesis is found in the existence of facts inexplicable without it.

If it can be done without the sacrifice of essential truth, it would appear but reasonable to accept in an even more thoroughgoing way than has yet been done the doctrine of evolution as a plan of action in education, together with its responsibilities intellectual and moral. The theory purports to be a statement of the mode of operation whereby the physical, intellectual, and moral nature of man has come to be what it is.

According to it the natural and social orders are parts of one organic process, and, in some way or other, form one cosmos. Man's living nature, therefore, is related to the nature of all life. In thus making man in his entire nature subject to evolutionary law an advantage is presented to the cause of education. Man is viewed as the outcome of the creative process of the world, and education becomes the last and highest form of evolution.

If this be granted, the doctrine of evolution becomes a means whereby the theory of education may be brought into relationship with the facts of the wider organic and social process.

5. What is there in the process of education as a fact of our experience by means of which educational theory may be brought into definite relationship with the facts of organic and social evolution?

(a) In man as compared with the lower animals there is found (i) a more completely organized nervous system, (ii) a more complex psychical life, (iii) a corresponding lengthening of the period of infancy. An adequate interpretation of the meaning of infancy was not forthcoming prior to the rise of the doctrine of evolution as a scientific method.

(b) The presuppositions of the life-process in organic and social evolution are *organism* and *environment*. In both spheres the life-process is a process of adapting the organism to its environment.

(c) Education, in its widest sense, is a process of adaptation, made possible and necessary because of the period of infancy in the individual, and in this way has formed an integral part of organic and social evolution. The lengthening of the period of infancy renders education at once possible and imperative.

To have indicated the significance of infancy in the social and educational process seems to have been Fiske's

special contribution to the doctrine of evolution. It had long been recognized that the period of infancy in man is immensely prolonged as compared with the same period in the strictly animal kingdom; and the lower we descend the animal scale, the more completely organized do we find the physical life of the newly born organisms to be. The young of the lower orders of life are brought into the world able to cope with the conditions of their environment; they breathe, digest, react immediately in response to stimuli, have no complex nervous systems corresponding to those found in the higher orders of life; each lives practically the life of its parents, dies and leaves no history. In examining such animals anatomically we find that there is no complex nervous system such as is found in the higher orders of the animal kingdom, and most of all in man; all the organization needed by these being that for such psychical actions as are purely reflex or instinctive. Taking the prolongation of infancy as an empirical fact, it occurred to Fiske to ask these questions: What is the meaning of the fact that man is born into the world more helpless than any other creature, and needs for a much longer season than any other living thing the tender care and wise counsel of his elders? It is one of the most familiar of facts that man, alone among animals, exhibits a capacity for progress. That man is widely different from other animals in the length of his

adolescence and the utter helplessness of his babyhood is an equally familiar fact. Now between these two commonplace facts is there any connection?

Fiske's thesis is briefly this: There is a strict causal connection between man's capacity for progress and the length of his period of infancy. In other words, it is the lengthening of the period of infancy which has given man the supreme place he occupies in the scale of life. The argument by which he supports his thesis may be outlined as follows. In man as compared with the lower animals there is found, as was noted above, (1) a more completely organized nervous system, (2) a more complex psychical life, (3) a corresponding lengthening of the period of infancy. The period of infancy is a period of plasticity. The career of the individual is no longer wholly determined by the careers of its ancestors, and he therewith becomes capable of education. What the child inherits is not acquired characteristics but nervous plasticity and consciousness: in other words, the capacity of being adapted or of adapting himself to his environment. The lengthening of the period of infancy, accordingly, makes possible and imperative the control of the process of adaptation to environment. In so doing it makes education, as the process of control, an integral part of organic and social evolution.

The notion of adjustment (conceived as dynamic, not static) expresses sufficiently well for the present the social

nature of the educational process. This notion is developed more fully in later sections. Here it is enough to note:—

(a) that the aim of education cannot be found outside the process itself. One purpose of education is the personal realization of his environment by the individual.

(b) that we must more fully define environment before we can indicate that which the individual is to realize or become adjusted to.

(c) the method in education is fundamentally the mode of the individual's behavior in the realization of some phase of his environment. Herein we gain a point of view from which to recognize the unity of educational aim, of educational materials, and of educational methods.

6. A complete treatment of a philosophy of education would necessitate the indicating in a general way some of the larger implications and the more significant of the effects of the application of the doctrine of evolution to those sciences from which, as was indicated in Chapter I, the philosophy of education in large measure derives its data — psychology, sociology, history, the economic and political sciences, ethics, epistemology, and philosophy. The effects of the application of the doctrine might also with profit be traced in the group of sciences dealing with race, language, and religion. In the present outline are noted the main lines along which changes have been taking place in (1) psychology, (2) sociology

and ethics. Briefly it may be said that in both directions *the influence of the doctrine of evolution is in the increasing domination of the conception of law and order.* Natural selection as a fundamental aspect of the method of evolution comes more and more to be recognized as a principle of nature and finds its application in the sciences of life and mind.

(1) *Psychology.*

(a) The mind is essentially a process within the wider process of nature, in organic relation, therefore, to a physical basis and a social environment.

(b) Mind is known through its vital functions and operations. Its normal method of action is a process of experimentation, of trial and error, by the survival through selection in habit and idea of such variations as prove their fitness in the organization of life and experience. Objects, accordingly (the so-called objective world, indeed), are not things to be observed, imitated, or copied merely, but things, rather, to be used as the materials of an individual or social purpose. Ideas, in turn, are fundamentally dynamic—actual forces, not merely representations, copies, or descriptive in their character. Expression of ideas is fundamental to their possible survival and selection.

(c) The type-form of mental function in the individual and the race, is the organization of life through the correlation of its parts. This is effected through

(i) the realization of meaning, (ii) the adjustment of means to an end, (iii) social coöperation. The evolution (in the race) and development (in the individual) of mind consists in the increasing comprehensiveness and deepening of the correlation of the parts of life through which mind gradually raises itself upon the foundations laid in heredity.

(2) *Sociology and Ethics.*

Some of the more important implications of the doctrine of evolution, to which attention is being especially directed in the social theory of the present, may be briefly indicated:—

(a) The essential unity of all life, and the continuity of all progress (in so far as progress takes place).

(b) The ultimate identity of the individual and the common good. The doctrine of evolution makes the presupposition of an individualistic ethics untenable.

(c) All human values, intellectual and moral, in that they are ultimately socially derived, are ultimately socially serviceable. The welfare of society thus becomes the ultimate test of utility. (See Chapter VI.)

§ XI. Pragmatism and the Theory of Education.

1. Notwithstanding its success in the extension of human knowledge and control it will perhaps be admitted that the true significance of evolution as a philosophic method has not yet been completely understood nor

appreciated. Such significance can be realized only when the doctrine is itself submitted to the interpretation put upon it by philosophy; that is, when its method of operation as well as its results are brought into relation with the other elements of our experience. By philosophy as here used is not meant any abstract or arbitrary court of appeal; rather it is used in the sense of experience become self-critical. In this sense the nature of philosophy was discussed to some extent in Chapter I. Philosophy is criticism, and the essence of criticism is the adjustment through reflection of a partial element to unity with the whole. In this case the unity is the unity of experience.

2. Professor James described pragmatism as "a new name for some old ways of thinking." There is already a reasonably well established conviction that it is something more. It would appear to be undeniable that pragmatism is as yet the single whole-hearted attempt to make an interpretation in its more important bearings of evolution in the Darwinian as well as in the Spencerian sense. Professor Dewey finds it best to regard pragmatism "as part and parcel of a general movement of intellectual reconstruction." It is a generalization and a raising to consciousness of interests which have for many years existed as tendencies in the intellectual and social life of the western world. As is to be expected in any new theory, there has been considerable variation

in statement and emphasis concerning the precise import of pragmatism. Professor James appears to have emphasized its practical significance for human life. Dr. Schiller seems to emphasize especially the fact that the new movement gives some place to religious faith and feeling in determining our beliefs; while Professor Dewey sees in it a demand for a philosophy having its only possible basis in thoroughgoing scientific method. In these three directions, perhaps it is fair to say, have been the particular emphases of these three leaders in the new philosophy. Unfriendly interpreters of the doctrine have contended that it too readily allies itself with individualism or subjectivism on the one hand and utilitarianism on the other. The adherents of the doctrine maintain that such charges are but incidental to the first formulation of a new and pregnant view.

3. On all sides, whatever else it be, pragmatism, it seems to be agreed, is regarded as (a) *an intellectual attitude, a method of thought, rather than as a specific philosophical creed or doctrine*; (b) *a method of inquiry in philosophy in line with the method of the sciences*. Its disciples hold that it is the only view or method capable of taking account of the possibilities of reality. In its development, as was indicated above, the conception of evolution is made central. The 'pragmatic standpoint' has been taken to mean the attempt to interpret all forms of mental activity in terms of the process of

adaptation of an organism to its environment. Writing in the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, Vol. V, p. 85, Professor Dewey remarks, "Pragmatism, according to Mr. James, is a temper of mind, an attitude; it is also a theory of the nature of ideas and truth; and finally it is a theory about reality." In the following points there seems to be a reasonable consensus of opinion: —

(a) Theory arises out of practice and is incapable of truly independent existence; knowledge is incomplete without action. Pragmatism means the effort to discern philosophic truth by submitting hypotheses and beliefs to the test of practice. It is an attempt towards a new theory of experience; as such, accordingly, it would seem to be of fundamental importance in educational theory.

(b) Ideas are not in themselves true or false, but become so according to their success or failure in a strained mental situation. Truth is dynamic, not static. It is a product of the volitional activity. Truth is a valuation and relative to some application and purpose.

(c) A human interest, accordingly, is a vital condition of truth; *i.e.* to have 'consequences' is to have them for some being.

(d) The nature of consciousness can be understood only by taking into account the situation or environment in which it arises and functions.

(e) Man's integral nature must be the premise of philosophy, and man's complete satisfaction the conclusion philosophy must aim at.

4. It seems convenient to group the various tendencies of pragmatism under the threefold classification:—

(a) *Its instrumental theory of knowledge.*— By instrumentalism is meant the tendency to apply the evolutionary method to logical problems — to problems concerning the origin and validity of knowledge. (See Chapter IV concerning the *functional view of mind.*)

(b) *Its motor theory of truth.*— In his book *Pragmatism* Professor James says: “The pragmatic method is primarily a method of settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable. . . . The pragmatic method in such cases is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences” (p. 45). “Theories thus become instruments, not answers to enigmas, in which we can rest” (p. 53). It is “the attitude of looking away from first things, principles, ‘categories,’ supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts” (p. 54). “Ideas (which themselves are but parts of our experience) become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience” (p. 58). “Truth is *one species of good*, and not, as is usually supposed, a category distinct from good, and coördinate with it. The true is the name of whatever proves to be good in

the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons" (pp. 75-76).

(c) *Its humanistic theory of reality.* — In his account of Reality (*as that which is in general what truths have to take account of*) Professor James remarks, "In our cognitive as well as in our active life we are creative. We add both to the subject and to the predicate part of reality. . . . For pragmatism it (*i.e.* reality) is still in the making, and awaits part of its complexion from the future" (pp. 256-257).

So far as a philosophical interpretation of evolution is concerned, it is perhaps possible to rest in some such conclusion as that of Professor Mackenzie, and with which certain convictions of the present outline seem most in agreement. "On the whole, therefore, we seem to be led to the conclusion that some form of humanism is the only possible method of making our universe intelligible to ourselves. That it can be somehow made intelligible, is a conviction from which it is hardly possible for us to escape, in view of the continuous progress that has been made in our knowledge of the world around us, and of the development of our own conscious experience. It is hardly possible for us really to doubt that our universe must somehow be an intelligible system. At the same time, it is obvious enough that the attempt to understand the whole must be surrounded with difficulties of a very different order from those that are

encountered when we are only trying to understand some particular part in relation to others. We can hardly hope that a philosophical system will be completed as a rounded whole, in the sense in which a system of geometry or geology may conceivably be completed. It must probably always be of a somewhat more tentative character, and liable to more constant changes through the growth of our general experience of the world.' But this need not, I think, drive us to skepticism or agnosticism, or to any dark revelations that are hardly distinguishable from these. We need not despair of seeing a philosophical system sufficiently completed to become a guide, a power, and an inspiration to our lives. If we are right in believing that life is essentially a process, it is certainly not surprising that we cannot attain to everything at once. We might even say, with Mr. Balfour, 'What would be a world which we could understand?' And we might add (if, indeed, it is anything different), what would be a world which we could at once apprehend as being complete and perfect? But to any such question I think we should add some such comment as that of the late Professor Wallace. Admitting that a world 'which we had thoroughly understood' (and which we were not, for that very reason, recreating for ourselves by sharing in the process of its growth) would be for us 'a world, clearly, without interest; the den of listlessness and dumb despair; or rather the ice-age

of humanity, when to be or not to be would for once be absolutely alike'; we may yet go on to ask further, 'But, on the other hand, what were a world which we did not understand, had not in any measure understood? A world full of fears rather than hopes; a perpetual uncertainty, a grisly mystery. . . . The world which reason claims is one where she may go forever on and never die; a world where nothing can be called utterly unknowable, though much may remain forever unknown; a world where, as humanity accumulates more and more its intellectual and spiritual capital, we shall move about more and more freely, *i.e.* more and more wisely.' This seems to me to express very well the ultimate attitude of a sound philosophy; and it is an attitude which, in a certain large sense, admitting all the qualifications that have been urged, may still quite fairly be described as humanistic." (*Lectures on Humanism*, pp. 241-243.)

§ XII. Certain Implications of Evolution for Educational Theory.

To attempt to indicate the significance of evolution for the theory of education is the task of subsequent sections of the outline. In the present connection it may be well to indicate briefly some of the more important implications of the general interpretation of experience advanced in the preceding sections.

(a) Man, apart from nature and society, is an unreal abstraction.

(b) Education as conscious evolution is a carrying on, on a higher level, of the wider evolutionary process.

(c) The objects of nature are not things merely to be observed and studied in themselves, but are things to be used as the materials of human purposes.

(d) Expression of ideas, of individual interests and purposes, rather than the mere receptivity or suppression, becomes the ruling principle of teaching method.

(e) Ideas are dynamic, not static, elements in the knowledge process. Knowledge is mediatorial, not merely descriptive, and truth is relative and undergoes development and reconstruction.

(f) The mind works by a process of experimentation, by trial and error, by the survival through selection of such variations as serve for the guidance of life and the mastery of environment.

(g) Self-realization, rather than renunciation of individuality, is the ideal of the evolutionary process.

(h) The values of experience or the values realized in the process of development, since they are socially derived, have their true significance only when socially shared.

(i) As a working hypothesis in social theory we have the right to postulate the unity of self-development or self-realization and social service.

- REFERENCES. — (a) On the doctrine of evolution, consult: Angell, *Psychology*; Armstrong, *Transitional Eras in Thought*; Baldwin, *Development and Evolution*, also, articles in *Dictionary of Philosophy*; Butler, *The Meaning of Education*; Clodd, *Primer of Evolution*; Cope, *Primary Factors of Organic Evolution*; Darwin, *Origin of Species*; De Laguna, *Dogmatism and Evolution*; Dewey, *Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, and Other Essays*; Eucken, *Fundamental Concepts of Modern Philosophic Theory*; Fiske, *Excursions of an Evolutionist, The Destiny of Man*, also, *Through Nature to God*; Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, also, *Mind in Evolution*; Höffding, *The Problems of Philosophy*; Howison, *The Limits of Evolution*; Huxley, *Evolution and Ethics*; Mellone, *Philosophical Criticism and Construction*; Mendola, *Darwinism and Spencerianism*; Kidd, *Social Evolution*; Miller, *The Psychology of Thinking*; Osborne, *From the Greeks to Darwin*; Pearson, *The Grammar of Science*; Royce, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, also, *The World and the Individual*; Santayana, *The Life of Reason*; Schurman, *Ethical Aspects of Darwinism*; Seth, *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, also, *Two Lectures on Theism*; Seward (Ed.), *Darwin and Modern Science*; Sorley, *Ethics of Naturalism*; Spencer, *First Principles*; Thomson, *Darwinism and Human Life*; Watson, *An Outline of Philosophy*.
- (b) On pragmatism and humanism, consult various articles, by many writers, in the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, Mind*, and *The Philosophical Review*, during the last decade; Baldwin, *Darwin and the Humanities*, also articles in the *Dictionary of Philosophy*; Bawden, *The Principles of Pragmatism*; Dewey, *Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, and Other Essays*; James, *The Will to Believe, Pragmatism, The Meaning of Truth, A Pluralistic Universe*,

also, *Varieties of Religious Experience*; Mackenzie, *Lectures on Humanism*; Moore, *Pragmatism and its Critics*; Pratt, *What is Pragmatism?* Schiller, *Humanism*, also, *Studies in Humanism*; Sturt (Ed.), *Personal Idealism*; *Essays Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of William James*.

FURTHER PROBLEMS FOR STUDY. — 1. The relation between the natural and the social order. 2. Is education a natural science? 3. The categories of potentiality, purpose, change, individuality, activity. 4. The implications of evolution for educational theory. 5. The influence of the doctrine of evolution upon educational theory. 6. The doctrine of pragmatism. 7. Pragmatism and educational theory.

IV. THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF EDUCATION — PERSONALITY AND ENVIRONMENT

§ XIII. Philosophy of Education as a Critique of Educational Presuppositions.

EDUCATION is one element within experience. As a fact of experience it is concerned with the relation of an individual to his environment. In a philosophy of education it is not sufficient merely to assume the possibility of the educational process; some account must be given of the necessities of thought prior to and presupposed in that process. In order to answer the question, 'What ought education to aim at?' the prior question, 'What is a person, both in himself and in his environment?' must be dealt with. What, then, does the mind do? What is the method of its operation? What is the nature of the material operated upon? What are the mutual relations of personality and environment?

§ XIV. Personality as a Presupposition of Education.

The outline of a doctrine of personality which follows is based upon three points of view: (a) experience an *organic* unity; (b) the *functional* view of mind; (c) the

social origin of the distinction between the self and not-self.

1. *Experience as an organic unity.* — It is, perhaps, most satisfactory to approach the question through a consideration of several typical statements of the nature of mind and its relation to the outer world: —

(a) *The Cartesian conception of mind.* — For Descartes the dualism between mind and matter is absolute; it is the presupposition with which he starts. The mind and the world, consciousness and matter, are absolute dispartes. The mind is an entity by itself, with its own peculiar nature, its formal faculties, and peculiar modes of operation. It may be studied in and by itself, quite apart from its relations and surroundings. The world, or nature, is the absolute opposite of mind, a purely material thing, at best a mere object for intelligence or spirit; but in itself, or in its own structure, neither embodying nor reflecting intelligence or spirit.

(b) *Leibnitz's view of mind.* — Against this dualism a twofold reaction set in: (1) empiricism, e.g. Hobbes, Locke, and Hume, minimizing the work of mind, attempted to show how the mental world is but a part of the material world; something, indeed, gradually built up through the agency of this wider material world; (2) rationalism, e.g. Leibnitz, on the contrary, proceeded to show how the material world is a gradual evolution in consciousness. According to Leibnitz, every

monad or individual soul contains the world implicitly. Its knowledge does not come to it from without, since, fundamentally, it cannot be influenced by any other substance. It produces its knowledge entirely from within. While the view of Leibnitz is a more satisfactory explanation of the facts than empiricism, it nevertheless appears deficient in at least two respects: (1) because of its virtual denial of the relative dependence of the internal upon the external, the inner on the outer, the spiritual on the material, reducing the latter, as Berkeley would do, to a mere subjective phenomenon; (2) because it treats the relation of the two, the spiritual and the material, in a purely mechanical or external fashion.

(c) *The result of the Kantian analysis.* — The fundamental significance of the 'Critical' theory of knowledge consisted in its attempt to mediate between the extreme position of empiricism and dualism on the one hand, and of rationalism on the other, — in other words, to show that, in the development or creation of the mind, involution is as necessary as evolution. According to Kant's view the natural system of objects (matter) is one element in a spiritual system of experience which includes and transcends it. The fact that the mind comes to itself through a consciousness of the external world would indicate that this very consciousness of the externality of things is itself an element in the spiritual unity

of the world. In other words, in order to attain any valid explanation of knowledge or experience, Kant insists upon the *organic* relation between mind and matter, intelligence and the world. The outcome of his criticism, then, is this: Neither matter nor mind are ready-made, self-existing entities, isolable from each other. The mind is not something equipped with faculties to appropriate the world; nor is the world preëxisting and all prepared to be appropriated. Both the mind and the world are the outcome of a unitary process, and only when we isolate through abstraction the terminal aspects of that process, and forget its unitary character, do we have the dualism of mind and matter, intelligence and the world. The argument may be stated in slightly different form. Kant held that the natural system of objects is one element in a spiritual system of experience which includes and transcends it. In other words, the 'objective world' may be regarded as the environment in which the self realizes itself. It is interesting to compare this epistemological doctrine with the Spencerian doctrine of life. According to Spencer, the life-process is one through which an individual maintains its identity in change by means of an external (so-called) environment which makes the change necessary. In both the psychical and the biological process the 'environment' is relative to the nature of the individual environed. In neither case, therefore, can it be viewed merely as

something 'outside,' or as an external determinant of the psychical or biological individual, but rather and fundamentally as an element in the process of the individual's self-maintenance and self-development.

2. *The functional view of mind.*

(a) In the preceding chapter, where the attempt was made to bring the educational process into harmony with the life-process, it was found that the essential elements in the latter are (1) thing, and (2) environment. As a fact of experience, the educational process presupposes (1) a *self* or *person* that behaves, and (2) an *environment* in which it behaves. As will be indicated in a subsequent section, the emphasis must in many cases be on *function* rather than on *self* or *environment*, *agent* or *situation*. It is impossible to consider the self apart from its environment, or, in turn, environment apart from the coefficient of environment. The difficulty with the so-called faculty psychology, as well as with the Cartesian view of mind, was that of taking the mind as a completely equipped self-existing entity, afterwards brought into contact with an environment. There was also, on the other hand, the tendency to go to the other extreme and maintain that the self in the beginning was practically *nil*, environment was self-existing, a sort of *thing-in-itself*, capable of generating mind in some way. The process of the individual life is a unitary thing, in which an ideal distinction may be made

between the self and its environment, the agent and his sphere of action. It is a process of interaction, the factors of which are for purposes of examination separable, in reality inseparable. Without a complete departure from reality, consciousness cannot be abstracted from its relations. Experience, as we know it, is dynamic; it is process. Experience is 'activity'; activity is the unit of psychical life. The self or subject as *agent*, the object as *situation or conditions* (environment), are correlative aspects of experience. There is no 'self' that is not an effort directed to the accomplishment of something. The self, then, has reality as a center of experience, the bearer of the concrete life of an individual. The synthesis of knowledge and of conduct which composes that content arises from the self's own activity and in its own degree expresses the intrinsic character of the individual. Pragmatism, as did voluntarism, accordingly, regards the entire conscious life as gathered up and most completely manifest in activity. According to this view, experience is dynamic; the activity is the self in *functional* relation to its *object*. This identification of the activity with the self, the activity by which the self expresses itself and comes to consciousness of itself, constitutes the ethical view of freedom.

(b) In the present outline it is implied that for an interpretation of individual or social activities, such as will be of most value in educational theory, recourse

must be had to a functional or evolutionary psychology, according to which the psychical life, whether in the individual or society, is to be interpreted as a function of the wider life-process. For a functional psychology the fundamental and central element of the psychical life is not sensation or idea, but an activity. Back of this unit of psychical activity,—namely, of the individual self, or of society,—we cannot go. In each of these, however, in the individual and in society, *the one universal activity is that of living*, or the life-activity. As a concrete reality, then, the individual or the social is revealed to us as a teleological process, a system of means and ends, the unity of which is found in the general end of control over the conditions of life. All minor activities within experience are to be interpreted as partially or completely unified or harmonized activities within the larger process of life-activity or realization. The general position of a functional psychology is that in determining what consciousness is, recourse must be had to an examination of what consciousness does. It attempts to escape the extreme positions of both (1) empiricism, according to which the mind is conceived as a product rather than a principle, and of (2) rationalism, which in one form or other conceives of the soul as a preëxisting spiritual entity, endowed with capacities or faculties; in some way, prior to the exercise of such faculties or capacities, existing behind these as a kind of

(transcendental) substance or substratum, and before the objective world has as yet disturbed the pure unity of its essence. The view of evolutionary psychology is not that the mind is mere product or epiphenomenon, nor a mere transcendental spiritual substance which (so far as actual experience is concerned) is a pure abstraction, but that it is a concrete specific activity constantly directed to the accomplishment of something and not only the bearer of the experience-processes, but an efficient agent in its furtherance. From this general conception it follows:—

(1) That in the mental life, as an organic unity, consciousness cannot (without a complete departure from reality) be abstracted from its relations. Prior to and apart from the objective experience, consciousness is an illusion. It will thus be apparent how necessary it is in the analysis of experience to keep in mind its organic unity; in other words, the organic relation between consciousness and its object, the agent and the situation or conditions in which the activity proceeds. (See paragraph above, in which a possible comparison is suggested between the Kantian epistemology and the Spencerian doctrine of life.)

(2) That just as the life-process is a continuous co-ordination or functioning of the two elements, organism and environment (compare the act of breathing, which is a functional coördination of the lungs as organ, and

air, as environment), so the mental life is a continuous coördination or functioning of two elements, self and environment. Herein is seen the difficulty in the empirical and rationalistic positions. Just as some biologists would identify function with organ alone, making environment purely external, or with environment alone, making the organ simply a product, so the empiricist would make the self a product and not a principle, while the rationalist would make the soul a principle existing prior to its contact with the objective world, and, at most, maintaining only occasional or incidental relations with the latter. On the other hand, the evolutionary view of mind maintains that the relation of consciousness or self to objective experience or environment is absolute and intrinsic. An isolated consciousness is no consciousness at all; it is a self-contradiction.

(3) Since the mental life is not the outcome of a predetermined self upon an external environment, or of the adjustment of the self to a predetermined environment, neither the self nor the environment are eternally fixed in themselves, but both change in the movement of the life-process. In the functional movement of the mental life, both the self and the environment are modified and determined. Both are essentially transitional, a continual process of becoming. The self is real only in so far as it continues to act, to become, to progress.

(4) Self-consciousness is not a subsequent or higher

growth of consciousness, but in rudimentary form at least is a quality of all consciousness. It is consciousness with *the emphasis on the subject rather than the object, the agent rather than the situation.*

(c) *The place of knowledge in experience.*—A brief note may serve to indicate more adequately the line of treatment of the place of knowledge in experience, from the point of view of a functional based upon a genetic psychology. All knowledge involves both percepts and concepts, sensations and ideas, or their combination. These may be briefly discussed from the point of view of (1) origin, (2) content.

Sensations.—(1) The biologist maintains that the organs of sense had their origin in the problem of the life-process. Such variations as were of service in the life struggle were selected; others, offering no positive contribution, were discarded. The sense-organs were thus in their origin organs of adjustment, methods of economy; through natural selection their increasing perfection meant more and more perfect adjustment, *i.e.* increasing self-maintenance on the part of those possessing them. Thus, biologically, the knowledge mediated by the sense-organs had its origin in the needs of the life-process; it was an instrument of control, *e.g.* in securing food or escaping danger. (2) In the child, again, activities in the form of inherited instincts and impulses precede sensations. His characteristic is impulsiveness; he is

essentially a motor being. The child's curiosity is preparatory to some activity, a prelude to behavior. It is ever in the interest of some experiment on the part of some bodily organ, usually the hand or mouth. For him the objects of his environment are the particular activities which they suggest, and distinct sensations are the sensible news of his behavior. (3) In the adult consciousness, likewise, the sensation is a sign, and has significance only as part of a larger whole. When do we have sensations? Examine such experiences as taking the car, looking at your watch, the clock's ceasing to tick, walking over an unaccustomed road, moving the ears, etc. It will be found in such experiences that sensations either regulate activity, or are signs within the experience circuit, *i.e.* the *retrospective* reference; or through their appeal to attention they furnish the materials of a new problem, *i.e.* their *prospective* reference.

Ideas. — The concept or the idea, as is true of sensation, has a retrospective as well as a prospective reference. It is (1) *a register of past experience*, a habit, a method of ordering sensations. On the other hand, an idea embodies (2) *a plan of action*. Its function within experience is not only to organize experience, but to institute or furnish the method of future experience. Its function, therefore, is essentially mediatory, instrumental. Thus the definition of idea is in terms of its function, of its

position in the movement of experience. It is the instrument of the growth of experience from the less rich, the less definite, to the richer and more definite, the more completely organized and controlled forms. To illustrate, take the judgment, "The pencil is sharp." 'Sharp' is an idea, but sharpness does not exist in reality; only as a quality, emphasized within, or abstracted from experience. Why, then, form the idea or concept of that which does not exist? Simply because the idea, so emphasized or abstracted, will furnish a sign, a plan, a method of future action. The idea 'sharp,' then, is ultimately instrumental to a larger experience process, *e.g.* that of writing. Ideas, then, in providing a method or plan of action made for economy within experience enable us to anticipate, and thereby control, future experiences. They are thus constructions of the past and of the future. Herein is their kinship with science. Ideas are plans of action. Laws of science are constructions of the past and future behavior of those realities with which man has to deal. Ideas and sciences are thought-constructions for the registration and control of experience. Sensations, ideas, science, are thus seen to be regulative and mediatory in the conduct of life.

From the point of view of a functional psychology all phases of psychical activity may be grouped about two fundamental types — habits and accommodations.

Activities once successfully performed tend to be selected, to persist, to become habits. Just as soon as experience becomes problematic, however, *i.e.* as soon as some break occurs in the adjustment process (consequent upon the failure of some habit in the individual, or of a custom or institution in social experience), thought, in the form of discrimination, attention, and association, emerges to secure a new accommodation, and thus repair the break in experience through the establishment of a new habit. So long as habit (individual, social, racial) suffices — in other words, so long as experience flows smoothly, there is no occasion for the exercise of thought, since there is no problem to solve, no sense of failure, and consequently no search for a better method — *i.e.* a better accommodation or adjustment. From this point of view the function of thought is mediatory between experience and experience; in other words, between some habit, experience, activity, which has failed to satisfy, and some new accommodation (which, if successful, will be selected and become habit) which will restore harmony to experience once more. Thought, then, as mediatory has a twofold aspect: (1) retrospective, *i.e.* interrogating our present habits, or modes of experience leading to a consciousness of failure; (2) prospective, through consciousness of break in experience, searching for the new accommodation and the more harmonious and satisfying experience. Thought,

then, arises within the experience-process (whether in the individual or the race) out of activity, and is ultimately for the sake of activity. If experience or life were uniform, feeling and instinct would suffice for its continuance. If, however, there is to be progress within experience, thought must emerge as doubt and as inquiry. It must bring order and control into experience, it must expedite the experience-process and eliminate the waste entailed in mere instinct and feeling.

3. *The social origin of the distinction between the 'self' and 'not-self.'* — Just as epistemology insists upon the organic relation between intelligence and the world, social psychology insists upon the organic unity of the individual and society. The study of the growth of consciousness, whether in the race or the child, points to the conclusion that the real self is always a social self: that the nature of the individual is essentially social. In other words, the individual's relations to his fellows are not external attachments of his personality but the source of its inmost content and reality. The completely isolated individual, uninfluenced by social forces, does not exist as a fact of experience. The relative independence we attribute to the individual man is, in reality, the result of later evolution. The child, after the manner also of primitive man, gradually individualizes himself out of a state of social indifference, differentiating his personality in a medium with which he

had hitherto identified himself. In normal personal development, however, there is differentiation only that there may be completer integration; there is self-estrangement only that the earlier unity may be more completely understood. In order, then, adequately to recognize the nature of personal consciousness, it must be studied in the light of its social character and growth. The individual soul appears and lives in the sociality of human beings. Sociality is the law (embodied in language, in morality, in human institutions) of its existence; it is the specific law of personal experience. The life of the individual is thus an organic, functional unity, in a larger functional whole. The life of the individual is its meaning; and its meaning is born for it in the process of accommodation and response to the wider intellectual and moral order which encompasses it. Personal consciousness is, therefore, the result of a constant give and take, an unceasing social synthesis. The experience of the person is at once individual and social. Social, in the sense that the stimulus is always socially initiated and the response socially determined; individual, in the sense that the experience is a realization of the self.

4. Gathering together the results of previous analysis, it may be held that:

(a) The self and the world as the terminal aspects of a unitary process of experience are communicated to us

in inseparable correlation. Because of this interdependence of the spiritual (the self) and the material (object, sphere of action, or environment), the material is everywhere seen to be the indispensable medium through which the self manifests itself. Heredity and environment are, therefore, not 'things-in-themselves' set over in mechanical juxtaposition against the self. They are, in reality, phases of the actual, concrete, working self.

(b) The self, as including (i) consciousness of self and (ii) consciousness of object, is at once permanent and changing. In the self, in virtue of consciousness, is found a process *returning upon itself* in such a way as to retain its existing quality or individuality. The self, therefore, is permanent because it remains one in its life-process. It is no fixed entity because it is one in and through the unity and continuity of its activity. Thus self-activity is the essence of personality. Man's conscious activity is thus the condition of the possibility of his rationality. The true permanence of the self lies in the process of its growth in a social environment.

(c) The human self is not merely a part of the universe of experience, and conscious of being a part, but it is conscious also of being subject to its laws. It is capable, therefore, not merely of development but also of discerning the law of its development, of returning upon itself, contrasting the ideal with the actual, and thus making progress possible. Thus man as the subject of

education is spiritual; in other words, the fundamental condition of his development and education lies in his capacity as a self-conscious subject, distinguishing himself from the objects he knows and the ends he chooses, to return upon himself and set up ideals to realize. These ideals of possible development, while contrasted with the actual, cannot be in contradiction to the actual; they are rather the actual truly seen, *i.e.* in their ideal nature, as those ends towards which all previous development had been striving.

§ XV. The Nature of Environment.

1. From preceding analyses it will be noted that the distinction between thing and environment arises only in self-consciousness. A very persistent tendency at the present time is to conceive environment as acting upon the individual in a purely mechanical way. Changes of 'function and structure' are said to be 'produced' by environment, in a way quite similar to the account of empiricism. This method of viewing the mind is, in reality, a relic of dualism.

2. On the other hand, if the analysis given in the preceding section be true, it follows:—

(a) The environment of a person is in reality one side of a spiritual process, throughout relative to the specific nature of the person whose environment it is.

(b) It, moreover, is not an unchanging form, but a

changing process. It is changing because the person (whose environment it is) changes. It forms for the self an interrelated whole, or rather, it is in a process of organization, each part existing only in relation to the others.

(c) The self is not merely a part of a material and a social order, but is conscious of this relationship. This consciousness implies, at least to some degree, the consciousness of a wider order, the cosmic, which includes and transcends them. In the deepest sense, then, a man's environment is not merely the material or social world but the entire cosmic order of which he forms a part.

(d) The environment of a person is the medium of his self-realization. Through environment the self works towards its realization. In coming, therefore, to knowledge of and conformity with the order of nature, the life of humanity, the moral order of the world, the person takes the only way to a knowledge of himself, of coming to consciousness of self.

(e) On the basis of this community of nature between the self and its environment the nature and possibility of 'adaptation' or 'adjustment' (so frequently used to describe the educational process) becomes intelligible. The self through its inherent activity is able to maintain itself in a medium that is not alien but fundamentally of one kin with itself. Its activity (*i.e.* its adaptation

as *intelligence* and *will*) is not a consequence of the self, but its essence. Not only is the self able to maintain itself in its environment through adaptation, but through the same process of adaptation to realize itself, for the reason that knowledge of and conformity to the universal order which forms its environment is essentially the process through which the self is realized.

3. *Environment as civilization.*

The development of human life has been a continuous process whereby man, through his self-activity (intelligence, will, consciousness of self), has mastered his environment more and more perfectly. The progress of civilization may be viewed, therefore, either as the development of man's consciousness of the world, or as the development of man's consciousness of himself. The results of this mastery of nature and this gradual self-knowledge and discipline are embodied in civilization. It has its basis in the active molding of his environment by man in the interests of human life. The conditions and materials of human activity and human development are to be found in nature, his physical environment. Civilization is possible because man and nature, activity and material, are not isolated entities, but rather phases of one spiritual movement or process. From the first man and his environment have been functionally related. (See on the content of evolution in the preceding chapter.) An analysis of the

concept of civilization, its content and implications, will be found in the succeeding chapters.

REFERENCES. — (a) Concerning the Cartesian view of mind, consult, Caird, Art. *Cartesianism*, also, *Metaphysics*, in *Encyclopædia Britannica*; Smith, *Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy*; Watson, *An Outline of Philosophy*. Concerning Leibnitz's view of mind, consult: Dewey, *Leibnitz's Human Understanding*; Latta, *The Monadology of Leibnitz*. Concerning the critical philosophy, consult: Caird, *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*. (b) For materials concerning the functional view of mind, consult: Angell, *Psychology*; Baldwin, *Development and Evolution*; Dewey, *Studies in Logical Theory*; Hobhouse, *Mind in Evolution*; James, *Principles of Psychology*; King, *The Psychology of Child Development*; Ladd, *A Theory of Reality*; Münsterberg, *Psychology and Life*; Paulsen, *Introduction to Philosophy*; Schiller, *Humanism*; Stout, *Analytic Psychology*; Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*. (c) Concerning the social factor in the development of self-consciousness, consult: Baldwin, *Mental Development*, I-II; Bosanquet, *The Psychology of the Moral Self*; Muirhead, *Elements of Ethics*; Royce, *Studies in Good and Evil*, *Outlines of Psychology*, also, *The World and the Individual*; Stephen, *Science of Ethics*; Stout, *Manual of Psychology*; Wallace, *Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics*; Wundt, *Ethics*, III. (d) For materials concerning the doctrine of the "self" consult: Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, also, *Ethical Studies*; Caird, Art. *Metaphysics*, *loc. cit.*; Cooley, *Social Organization*; Dewey, *Study of Ethics*; Fite, *Individualism*; Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*; Haldane, *Pathway to Reality*, I-II; Horne, *Idealism in Education*;

Illingworth, *Personality, Human and Divine*; Lotze, *Metaphysics*; Mackenzie, *Introduction to Social Philosophy*; McDougall, *Social Psychology*; McTaggart, *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*; Mellone, *Philosophical Criticism and Construction*; Ormond, *Foundations of Knowledge*; Royce, *The World and the Individual*, II, also, *The Conception of Immortality*; Sturt, *Personal Idealism*; Taylor, *The Problem of Conduct*; Watson, *An Outline of Philosophy*.

FURTHER PROBLEMS FOR STUDY. — 1. Philosophical and educational implications of the evolutionary view of mind. 2. Education as 'world-building.' 3. Critique of Herbart's view of the nature of mind. 4. The meaning of 'experience.' 5. The historical meanings of 'personality.' 6. Implications of the *social* character of consciousness.

V. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HISTORY OF EDUCATION

§ XVI. The Process of History.

1. IN attempting to find an answer to the question, What is the true life of man? Plato says that it is not best to begin with the study of the life of the individual man, but first of all to look at human nature where it can be seen on a large scale, or "writ large," as he says in the broad outlines of history and human society. According to the doctrine of evolution, the individual to be educated is intelligible only as part of a process, and therefore we cannot hope to understand the human being except through knowing the process whereby he has come to be what he is. In the history of civilization is to be found the growing realization of that system of life which is proper to true human nature. To know himself, to consciously possess himself, the individual must learn his presuppositions in nature and civilization.

As the process of civilization is a process within the wider life of nature, so is the educational process within the wider life of civilization. The history of civilization as a growing process is concerned with three things:

(a) the subjugation of nature; (b) the growth of certain social and political relationships; (c) the perfecting of the individual life. The history of education is concerned with the record of man's attempts to perpetuate and extend the methods of control and the values arising within the social experience. It is the record of man's conscious struggle to adjust himself to his environment, or rather to insure the continuity of human adjustment. Dealing with the interrelations of the three factors,—the child, the achieved culture, and the medium of their interaction,—the history of education is the record of man's attempts consciously to control his own evolution. In such attempts may be found a criterion or basis of evaluation for the study of historical facts of whatever kind.

2. In viewing civilization as the progressive articulation and realization of human nature which still persists in the spiritual experience, the intellectual interests, the habits of conduct, the convictions of the men of the present time, it has been assumed:—

(a) that the most satisfactory psychology of race-development is a psychology of action (compare Chapters III and IV); man's ever increasing wants rising into desires and his perpetual efforts to satisfy those wants. The history of man, then, the history of civilization, is the history of human achievement.

(b) that the conditions or materials of human activity are nature. (See *Civilization as environment*, Chapter IV).

From the beginning man has been in some kind of functional relationship to his environment. His life has presented itself to him as a series of problems to be solved. Through the development of economic and industrial life in modern times the dependence of man on nature in the realization of his purposes and the perpetuation of his experience is being more and more acknowledged and understood. Industrial and commercial life are forcing upon the mind of man a newer and higher interpretation of his natural environment, and proving to him how completely human life and progress are involved in the subjugation of nature. Nature is recognized as essentially bound up with the needs, interests, and purposes of human life.

(c) that man's achievements in civilization are social achievements and have therefore been brought about by some form of social action and coöperation. The ultimate social fact, *a fundamental factor in civilization, is that of 'men acting together' for the sake of interrelated ends.* (See Chapter VI, on The Individual and Society). These ends may be protection, wealth, worship, what not; yet back of this notion of men in functional relation to one another and to their environment we cannot go — at least, so long as we speak of the only civilization, the only society we know — the civilization and the society of human experience.

(d) that there is social continuity, which is in turn

made possible by social heredity. Pascal described this continuity of the spiritual life of man in the expression in which he says that "the entire series of men during the course of all the ages is to be considered as if it were one and the same man who has always lived and has been constantly learning."

§ XVII. The Content of Civilization.

1. Civilization, in the largest sense, is the method through which humanity has come to its present level of self-knowledge, the knowledge of its capacities, the possibilities of its fuller growth. In making a tentative analysis, or statement, of the factors of human development, it will be conceded by the majority, perhaps, —

(a) that in the evolution of civilization there has been (1) a continual improvement in the adaptation or adjustment between the individual and his environment, man and nature; (2) the gradual projection of social tendencies into more satisfying social ideals; (3) the growth of human experience through (i) an increase in its objective content, (ii) an increase in the number of its cognizers;

(b) that society or civilization is the medium for the communication and transmission of experience; the mechanism of this transmission is (1) tradition, (2) education;

(c) that the criteria of social values are to be found in

an answer to the question, What are the elements of civilization which have been : (1) *persistent, i.e.* persistent phases of man's interpretation of environment ; (2) *cultural, i.e.* distinguishing man from the animals ; (3) *dynamic, i.e.* in the sense of enabling him to progress independently of mere heredity and natural selection ?

2. Civilization represents the methods of the life-process, *the tools of the mind* invented by man in the course of his experience for the *registration, organization, control, and perpetuation* of his experience. It has thus a retrospective as well as a prospective aspect. In civilization, therefore, as *the organization of human life thus far attained*, there are certain fundamental *methods or norms*, which are inherent in its natural constitution and which reproduce themselves in all its manifold forms. These norms are the habits of action, the standards of thought, the convictions of the heart which form that spiritual organism of which individuals are members. "Different periods of history," says Lotze in the *Microcosmus*, "may be pointed out, in which one after the other, religion, art, science, law, and social problems, have become for the first time so distinctly present to the consciousness of mankind that they seem to have been there first discovered or invented, to the advantage of future ages ; but even in the very beginning of civilization there could not have been altogether absent any one of those activities of the human soul which later

became more clearly differentiated one from another, taking separate paths to various ends.”

These normative elements, *e.g.* science, language, art and literature, institutions, and religion, must be continually viewed as interrelated aspects of a common social experience or activity; they are the general elements of civilization — elements which constitute the real existence of the concrete and organic unity of society. Each of these elements has its retrospective and prospective reference; each represents a *fundamental habit and accommodation* in the life of the race. All together they are functional elements within the social process, mediating agencies in the communication and transmission of experience, instrumental to the spiritual life of man. It will, it is hoped, be made somewhat clearer (Chapter XI) how necessary to any adequate statement of the ‘Course of Study’ is a chart of civilization — what might be called a morphological or psychological presentation of the great methods or norms according to which human experience has been organized, elevated, and expanded. Adequately to state what science, art, religion, means in the movement of the individual’s experience, it is ultimately necessary to trace their significance in the movement of the spiritual experience of the race. They may be called the type forms of human experience and activity. Together they constitute the abiding substance of human life.

3. *The type forms of human culture.*

(a) *Science and industry — science as knowledge and as instrument of control.* — One of man's most important tasks has been the subjugation of nature. In this task his instrument has been some form of work, with the hands, with tools and inventions, or with intelligence. Throughout the entire course of human history, in primitive as well as in modern peoples, the element of industry has been a dominant force in originating, maintaining, and giving its peculiar form to the social structure. "Only a few historians of civilization appear to have grasped all the significance of the productive industry. It is certainly easier to underestimate it than to exaggerate it. Domestic industry is, as it were, the life-center of every form of culture; it influences all the other factors in the deepest and most irresistible way, while it is determined not so much by cultural as by natural factors, such as geographical and meteorological conditions. We might with some correctness call the form of production the primary culture manifestation, compared with which all other phenomena of culture appear derivative and secondary; not, indeed, in the sense that these other branches have grown out from the stem of production, but because, although of independent origin, they have been formed and developed under the overwhelming pressure of the predominant factor. Religious ideas have certainly not proceeded from economical conditions,

yet the form of religious views which rules among a people may for the most part be traced back to the prevailing industry." (Grosse, *The Beginnings of Art.*)

Through observation, invention, coöperation, man is enabled more and more to subjugate nature and make her his ministering servant. The sciences are his systematized knowledge of his adjustments as so far realized. They become methods of controlling the processes of social life. The functions of science may, therefore, be summarized as follows: (1) mediation from one level of experience or activity to another; (2) intercommunication for the purpose of more efficient coöperation; (3) economy of intellectual labor through the formulation of general laws of dealing with typical situations in the environment. In the course of human evolution these functions become partially differentiated from one another. (See also Chapter I.)

(b) *Language.* — In the history of the race, language performs a threefold function: (1) It makes classification of experiences and reasoning possible, and thus, science, philosophy, and history, and (2) it provides a means for the distribution and transmission of experience. It becomes a register of the race-consciousness, — a medium through which the so-called race-copy is handed on from one generation to another. From this point of view all culture and all the history of culture may be regarded as fundamentally implicit in language. (3) It becomes a

unifying influence in national life. "The possession of a common language was always regarded by the Greeks themselves as the most significant and important of the bonds which united the scattered members of the Hellenic nationality."

(c) *Art and literature.* — A study may be made of art and literature as factors in social evolution from the following points of view: (1) Nature and art — the rise and development of the poetic interpretation of nature. (2) Art as a permanent record of the feelings and ideals of mankind. (3) Literature as an interpretation of life. (4) The national element in art. (5) Art as a form of personal and social expression. (6) The relation of the ethical to the æsthetic in art. (7) The educational significance of art and literature. (8) Art and literature the element of idealism in human life.

(d) *Social and political institutions.* — The conception of a 'state of nature' — The theory of 'natural' rights — Is morality the basis of law, or law of morality? — The relation of custom to law and morality — The systematization of custom — What determines rights — Society as maker of 'values' — Justice — The function of institutions in the distribution and transmission of the spiritual possessions of society. (See Chapters VI and VII.)

(e) *Religion.* — As a social phenomenon — As an historical attitude towards the universe — The continuity

of the religious principle — The religious influence of the external world — Nature and social life as sources of religious ideas — Historical relations of morality and religion — Religion and experience.

§ XVIII. **Modern Civilization as affected by the Civilizations of Greece, Rome, and Judea.**

1. *The Greek view of life.* — The ideal of individual freedom in thought and action — The regulative principle in Greek life — The discovery of *method* in thought and action — Greek science and philosophy — Art and idealism in Greek life — The moral element in Greek culture.

2. *Roman life and character.* — The characteristic Roman virtues — The discipline of the will through law and order — Roman imperialism — The Roman *humanitas* — The preparation of the world and the preparation of the spirit.

3. *Judaism and Christianity.* — The natural and the spiritual — The unity and spirituality of God — The Hebrew sense of sin a higher idealism than that of Greece and Rome — The conception of personality — The new synthesis — The Christian view of human nature — Christianity as a religion of reconciliation and adjustment — Christianity and the ideal of service — The social conscience and the social problem as outcome of Christianity — Hebraism — Hellenism — Humanism.

§ XIX. The Philosophy of the History of Education.

1. In a preceding section (Chapter II) it was suggested that a philosophy of the history of education would imply such a systematic and critical examination of the nature and contents of the educational process as would disclose the meaning and value of the various factors within the whole by showing their genesis and function within the entire process. The problem of the philosophy of the history of education is concerned essentially with the continuity of the educational activity in relation to the interdependence and functional relationship of all of its special and individual factors. How may the history of education be studied so that it may be shown how society, consciously and unconsciously, used its own theory and practice, its own ideas and solutions, as instruments, or tools, or methods of social transition and reconstruction? Its function would be to trace the growth of education, its laws and principles, with a view to obtaining a way of thinking applicable to present educational and social conditions and problems for progressive educational development. Some of the factors operative in complicating the present educational situation are these: (*a*) the very complexity of modern society makes the problem not only more difficult of solution than formerly, but of statement as well, (*b*) the growth of democracy, (*c*) the expansion of scientific knowledge,

(*d*) the claims of the humanistic ideal, (*e*) the development of industrial society, (*f*) the development of the sense of human interdependence, and the consequent need of social insight, (*g*) the appreciation of the ethical personality of the individual, and the acknowledged right of the individual to opportunity and enjoyment, (*h*) the rise of the doctrine of evolution, (*i*) the isolation in the school. A study of the genesis and evolution of certain of these factors in the intellectual and social development of the past would afford some background for the understanding of the educational situation of the present.

2. The aim of a philosophy of the history of education is, therefore, twofold, (*a*) to indicate the unity and continuity of the educational process in the wider social process, and (*b*) to trace the parallelism between educational theory and general philosophical theory. The educational problem is always a social condition and a social outcome. Educational theories or ideas are not detached speculations, but are integral phases or expressions of the wider intellectual and spiritual experience. Educational customs and ideas are a function of the entire reflective life of a people. In their development they are continuous with the development of other intellectual and social movements, of literature, of art and science, of economics and industry, of politics and religion. It would seem to be true that transitional eras

in the intellectual, political, and spiritual life were also eras of corresponding changes in educational theory and practice, *e.g.* (*a*) the sophistic movement in Greece, (*b*) the transition to Christianity, (*c*) the renaissance, (*d*) Darwinism and evolution and the process of educational reconstruction in the present. In like manner the dominating philosophical thought of a period has a formative influence, sometimes direct, sometimes indirect and unconscious, in its educational theory. The history of educational theory and the history of philosophy are akin in that both are phases of the wider history of civilization. Both receive their problems and the direction of their solution from the ideas of the general consciousness of a period and from existing social needs. In turn they both give to the period a clearer and deeper realization of its needs, and suggestions for the solution of its problems. Certain typical forms of this parallelism between philosophical theory and educational theory may be named in this connection: (*a*) the ethical individualism of the sophists and the transition from the so-called Old to the New Education in Athens; (*b*) the philosophical and educational theories of Plato; (*c*) the principle of authority in relation to mediæval education; (*d*) the Cartesian dualism and the separation of subject matter and method; (*e*) the solutions of empiricism and rationalism; (*f*) the individualism of Rousseau and education 'according to nature'; (*g*) results of the

Kantian criticism; (*h*) the dualism between subject matter and method in present educational theory.

3. Any detailed consideration of the relations of educational theory and practice to philosophical and social development is beyond the limits of this outline. A history of educational theory such as that suggested need not be conceived as supplying in any sense a substitute for the scientific study of the history of education. The *philosophy* of the history of education aims rather at the interpretation of the facts previously ascertained by the *science*. The science lays stress on the record of events, the philosophy is more an attempt, perhaps, at an exposition of their meaning.

(*a*) *Certain aspects of the Greek contribution to educational theory* may be suggested as follows: (1) The Greeks may be said to have freed the fundamental principles or methods of human activity by abstracting or disclosing the processes embodied in those activities. (2) They raised education from a *fact* to an *idea*. (3) They held that the good of society is something rational and therefore to be discovered by human intelligence. (4) They regarded education as a process of liberating the personal life. (5) They recognized the significance of balance, proportion, symmetry, harmonious development, as features of personal growth and experience. (6) They made some progress in the process of freeing ethics from theology. (7) They formulated, it may be said, an organiza-

tion of the technique and the values (the means and ends) of the life of intelligence.

(b) *The significance of the renaissance for modern education may be briefly suggested:* (1) The first movement in the direction of the renaissance consisted in a mere exchange of authorities — from the church to Aristotle, from Aristotle to the independent choice of authorities, and Reason. (2) The renaissance was a new temper of mind, a new tendency of life which gave rise to new forms of human activity, — a rebirth of the human intellect, — as Symonds significantly calls it, “an accelerated movement of the human mind.” (3) The need of re-learning the world. The discoveries in astronomy (in 1543 Copernicus published *De Orbium Cælestium Revolutionibus*) and geography had revealed new worlds in space; the recovery of the Greek and Latin classics had revealed a new world of ideas. There was, accordingly, a reawakened interest in the sources of the intellectual and moral life. Man was no longer satisfied with habit and tradition. He wanted new answers to old questions, as well as asked new ones. The joy of discovery in the individual and in a people. The awakening of the purely theoretic spirit. (4) Humanism. The general significance of the return to the literatures of Greece and Rome, poetry, philosophy, and history, was that men became aware that beyond the church was an intellectual life, with its history and spirit, the existence of which had

been lost to view. (5) The rediscovery of nature. (6) With the widening of the intellectual life there was an accompanying development of artistic tastes and the creation of a new type of emotions. (7) The national languages, through imitation of classical correctness of form and thought, became the media of new literary and social movements. (8) The growth of the individualistic temper in morals, in politics, and in religion. The growth of new political ideals and the increasing demand for political and social recognition. There was a self-conscious strengthening of political or secular civilization by the side of that of the church. An awakening of new national life. (9) The new interest in humanity and an increase in the sense of the unity of humanity. (10) The reformation in religion.

(c) *The rise of modern educational theory.* — The more important factors in the development of modern educational theory may be stated as the following:—

(1) the determination of the method for science by Bacon;

(2) the determination of philosophic method by Descartes and Kant;

(3) the new method in social philosophy;

(4) the changes and the new methods in industrial life;

(5) the doctrine of evolution.

Bacon, in his opposition to both scholasticism and humanism, attempted to work out (in *Advancement of*

Learning, and *Organon*) a method of investigation, a sure way to the discovery of new truth. For some time men had been giving themselves to the study of nature, and Bacon became the chief representative of this movement; he voiced a tendency. By knowledge, by suggestion and formulation, he was able to recover (Aristotle had formulated the same method before) a scientific method. The method hitherto in vogue had been rather the deductive. We know by induction, declared Bacon. The educational implication, though not developed by Bacon, came to be developed by others at a later period. So far as Bacon helped the advancement of science and to clarify scientific method, so far his system had an effect on education and educational method. Since the time of Bacon it has been a matter of practically universal agreement that the proper study of science has been the field of nature. This has been the point of departure for science. In like manner from the time of Descartes the subject matter of philosophy and of reflective thought has been the attempt to understand the content and implications of human experience. Thus the result of the work of Bacon and Descartes was to set the task of modern intellectual endeavor in its two phases, (1) the discovery of methods for the control of nature, (2) the determination of the rights of the individual in his relation to the principle of authority as operative in political and social institutions. As effects of the gradual intro-

duction of the Baconian method in the study of nature, and of the Cartesian method in the study of experience, the following tendencies may be noted in the modern period: (*a*) a tendency to regard truth as something not given by authority, but something discovered by the individual mind; (*b*) a tendency to give to instruction about things a perceptual basis; the laws of the discovery of knowledge should become the laws of the education of the mind; (*c*) a tendency to look upon knowledge as ultimately a matter of sense-perception; (*d*) a tendency away from formal education to that of a more realistic type; (*e*) a tendency to consider the field of human knowledge, and therefore of educational material, as wide as nature and human experience; (*f*) a tendency to overemphasize the intellectual element in the educational process, a tendency to exalt the power of knowledge in the education of the human mind, leading to the somewhat disastrous effect of confusing *erudition* with *education*. This was an outcome of the renaissance ideal, and of the development of science as well.

Certain features of the modern period arising out of the twofold task set by Bacon and Descartes may, perhaps, be indicated in somewhat dogmatic form:—

(1) The period is marked by a gradual change from mechanical and static to organic and developmental modes of viewing nature and human society. In the place of the atomistic view of things, in politics, philos-

ophy, theology, and education, the organic view of society, of experience, of the entire cosmic process, came to prevail.

(2) The period is marked by attempts at the reconciliation or adjustment of the two elemental human tendencies, that of individual freedom and collective organization. Continuing the spirit of the renaissance, the period was one of struggle for completeness of individuality. This movement at first took the form, for the most part, of reaction against all existing human institutions; gradually, however, the lesson was learned that the individual life in itself is naught; only as a member of the great institutions of the race can the individual become truly human, spiritual, and free.

(3) During the period there emerged a new appreciation of the meaning and significance of civilization, as embodied in art, science, philosophy, literature, and religion, as the means of development and liberation for the individual. Instead of being a hindrance, as Rousseau supposed, it came to be recognized that civilization represents the methods so far organized of the true life of man.

4. As an aspect of the social problem during the period may be noted the gradual change from an individualistic ethics to an ethics based upon the demands of the social whole. The movement towards democracy which gives to the modern period its most distinctive

feature had its origin in the increasing sense of the worth of the individual, his spiritual and social significance, his rights and duties; an appreciation which in turn had its origin in the new movements in philosophy, in ethics, in religion, in science, and the new ideals of social amelioration and reconstruction. (See, further, Chapter IX.)

5. The growth of the democratic impulse was accompanied by a growing recognition of the significance of productive industry and a gradual realization of the dependence of political and social, upon economic and commercial, movements. It has come more and more to be believed that the industrial type of society is the medium through which the further realization of democracy is, in some way or other, to take place. From Pestalozzi on there has been an increasing recognition of the possibilities of education in modifying or ameliorating the conditions of economic and industrial life. The problem of industrial education, perhaps the most important problem in the present educational situation, may, it would seem, be traced back to the conflict between the development of science, initiated by Bacon, and the ideal of humanism and culture of the renaissance.

REFERENCES. — (a) Concerning the general concept of civilization, consult: Bonar, *Philosophy and Political Economy*; Buckle, *History of Civilization*; Caird, *Evolution of Religion*; Crozier, *History of Intellectual Development*, also, *Civilization*

and Progress; Draper, *Intellectual Development of Europe*; Droysen, *The Principles of History*; Dunning, *A History of Political Theories*; Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History*; Guizot, *History of Civilization*; Hegel, *Philosophy of History*; Kidd, *Principles of Western Civilization*; Le Bon, *The Psychology of Peoples*; Lecky, *History of European Morals*; Lotze, *Microcosmus*; Merz, *History of European Thought*; Pearson, *The Grammar of Science*; Santayana, *The Life of Reason*; Spencer, *Sociology*; Temple, *Essays and Reviews*; Tiele, *Elements of the Science of Religion*; Wake, *The Evolution of Morality*; Ward, *The Psychic Factors of Civilization*; Wedgwood, *The Moral Ideal*. (b) On social evolution, consult: Alexander, *Moral Order and Progress*; Baldwin, *Development and Evolution*; Clifford, *Lectures and Essays*; Foster, *The Function of Religion in Man's Struggle for Existence*; Francke, *Social Forces in German Literature*; Grosse, *The Beginnings of Art*; Gummere, *The Beginnings of Poetry*; Harnack, *Christianity and History*, also, *What is Christianity*; Kidd, *Social Evolution*; MacIntosh, *From Comte to Benjamin Kidd*; Nash, *Genesis of the Social Conscience*; Ritchie, *Darwin and Hegel*; Schurman, *The Ethical Import of Darwinism*; Sorley, *Ethics of Naturalism*; Stephen, *A Science of Ethics*; Thomas, *Source Book of Social Origins*; Wallace, *Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics*; Williams, *Evolution and Ethics*. (c) On the contributions to civilization of Greece, Rome, and Judea, consult: Butcher, *Some Aspects of the Greek Genius*; Caird, *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*; Campbell, *Greek Religion*; De Coulange, *The Ancient City*; Forrest, *The Christ of History and of Experience*; Fowler, *The City State*; Gardner, *Exploratio Evangelica*; Gill, *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Empire*;

Hatch, *The Influence of Greek Ideas upon the Christian Church*; Kuenen, *Judaism and Christianity*; Mahaffy, *Greek Life*; Mommsen, *History of Rome*; Pater, *Plato and Platonism*; Renan, *Influence of Rome on Christianity*; Taylor, *Ancient Ideals*; Toy, *Judaism and Christianity*; Watson, *Christianity and Idealism*; Zeller, *History of Greek Philosophy*. (d) On the philosophy of the history of education, consult, Aristotle, *Ethics*; Bacon, *Novum Organum*; Buchner, *Kant's Educational Theory*; Comenius, *The Great Didactic*; Davidson, *A History of Education*, also, *The Education of the Greek People*; Froebel, *Education of Man*; Goethe, *Wilhelm Meister*; Herbart, *The Science of Education*; à Kempis, *The Imitation of Christ*; Nettleship, *Lectures on the Republic of Plato*; Paulsen, *Historical Development of the Universities of Germany*; Pestalozzi, *How Gertrude teaches her Children*; Plato, *Republic*; Quintilian, *Institutes of Oratory*; Rabelais, *Life of Gargantua*; Rashdall, *Universities in Europe in the Middle Ages*; Rousseau, *Émile*; Royce, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*.

FURTHER PROBLEMS FOR STUDY. — 1. Education and the national tradition. 2. Nationality as an element in the evolution of education. 3. The influence of religious ideas in the development of institutions. 4. Theories of knowledge in relation to educational theory. 5. The permanent elements of civilization. 6. Greek civilization and the discovery of 'method.' 7. Plato's educational theory as an outcome of his social philosophy. 8. The psychological basis of Aristotle's educational theory. 9. Scholasticism as a preparation for the Renaissance. 10. The influence of historical systems of philosophy on educational theory.

VI. THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY

§ XX. Philosophy of Education and the Philosophy of Society.

THE process of individual experience arises always and everywhere within the wider process of social life. Apart from this wider process it would remain unintelligible. The normal individual life is life in society, and life in society is the life disclosed in the common life of men, the common life of industry, of communication, of morality, of education. The life and education of the individual proceed only in the presence of human beings; apart from the social medium the individual would never come to himself; only in the presence of other human beings is the meaning and purpose of individual experience disclosed. Since, therefore, the theory of education is an integral part of a larger theory of society, it is necessary to formulate a working conception of the social process, not in detail, but in such outline as may serve to indicate the place which education occupies within the larger unity. For the purposes of a philosophy of education a discussion of social theory would center about three questions: (*a*) the location of the educa-

tional process in the wider social process; (b) the standard of worth for the estimation of social products and achievements; (c) the transformation of tendencies in education into an ideal of human endeavor that would be at once coherent, concrete, and appropriate. Social theory is fundamentally the theory of social activities or functions, and social relations or institutions which provide the conditions in which activities or functions operate. The present section aims, chiefly, to furnish a working statement of the social unity.

§ XXI. Typical Conceptions of the Relation of the Individual to Society.

From the beginning of reflective thought social processes have been viewed as in some way a unity, but concerning the nature of that unity there has not by any means been universal agreement. One of the problems of social theory which has constantly tended to recur in one form or other may be stated in this way: What is there in individuals which so adapts them to one another as to become the ground of union in the manifold forms of human interest? Just as general philosophy may be said to ask, 'How is experience as a whole possible?' social philosophy asks, 'How is the adaptation of individuals one to another in society to be explained?' In other words, social philosophy attempts to raise the fact of human association into an idea. Certain typical

conceptions of the relation of the individual to society, that is, of the nature of the social unity, may be recalled in this connection:

1. *The individualistic or monadistic view.*— This view was based on the assumption that society is an aggregate made up of isolated individuals independent and unconnected save in a mechanical way. According to this conception individuals were the real units, and society was viewed as a secondary product. The theory, the counterpart of nominalism and atomism, insisted that only the particular was real, the individual was an original and indestructible entity, and society was merely an effect. Just as a form of empiricism regarded sensations and ideas as entering the mind and afterwards becoming modified and associated in various ways in mental life, so the individualistic theory regarded the relation between the individual and society: society was an aggregation of individuals. The weakness of the theory came to be felt when the question was asked how such atomic individuals came together to form society. Recourse was had to the notion of a social contract, the notion namely that individuals in order to secure the greater good of self-preservation by resigning their so-called natural rights contracted themselves into freedom and equality: while attended historically with many extravagances, both of theory and practice, nevertheless, the theory of individualism in helping to establish the moral

value of the individual personality, performed an inestimable service for human freedom and progress. As a ruling tendency in social theory it found its completest expression in the philosophy of the enlightenment. While as a theory it has been rendered untenable, as much so perhaps as the doctrine of special creation in biology, yet it represents a strong tendency — perhaps the dominating one — in many lines of social and industrial activity at the present time. It would doubtless not be a difficult matter to recognize many survivals of the individualistic theory in educational practice.

2. *The socialistic or monistic view.* — This view regards society as a substantial existence in some way prior to the individual and which tends to bring all individuality into subordination to its own welfare. Comte, for example, to whom perhaps the definite foundation of the science of sociology is to be ascribed, held that “man is a mere abstraction and there is nothing real but humanity.”

3. *The mechanical or dualistic view.* — This view posits, so to speak, the reality of both the individual and society, and maintains that in a certain sphere of action the individual is supreme, and that in another sphere of action society is supreme. This appears to be the conception adhered to by the everyday practical man. It is the view accepted by perhaps the majority of men. A special phase of this conception is presented

by Professor Huxley in his essay, *Administrative Nihilism*: "The process of social organization," he writes, "appears to be comparable not so much to the process of organic development as to the synthesis of the chemist, by which independent elements are gradually built up into complex aggregations — in which each element retains an independent individuality, though held in subordination to the whole." It is perhaps not a very difficult task to state the customary arguments against pure individualism or pure socialism, but it is another matter to furnish — if such were either possible or desirable — such a positive or working conception of the individual as would be free from either so-called individualistic or socialistic leanings. In much of the thinking of the present time the individual is, implicitly at least, recognized as an independent reality, who, through interaction with other individuals, enters into institutional life, obeys ethical laws, becomes social, or rather assumes the air of sociality on occasion. The theory indeed which seems to form the working scheme of the everyday man, as well as of a considerable number of thinkers and writers on social and educational topics is the dualistic, such a theory as is outlined by Huxley in the essay referred to above.

4. *The organic view.* — The organic theory attempts to adjust the claims of the other three in a way which, on the whole, seems more conformable to the facts.

The remainder of the chapter is therefore given over to a somewhat fuller statement of its meaning and of one or two of its more important implications.

XXII. The Conception of Society as an Organism.

1. The organic conception proceeds on the assumption that society is essentially a psychical organization; in other words, that in the social constitution of human nature is found the factor which adapts individuals one to another in such a way that it becomes the ground of unity in the manifold forms of human interest and activity. The view postulates (*a*) identity of interest between the individual and society in a common good, and (*b*) that the possibility of the development of the individual, and therewith the possibility of his education, lies in participation in the social consciousness and social activities. This principle of the coincidence of individual and social good occupies a place in the sphere of morals and education analogous to that which the principle of the uniformity of nature occupies in the domain of human knowledge.

In the social constitution of human nature, then, is found the basis of the social unity of individuals. Psychologically there is no need of a bond between individuals: together they form one organism. There is a sense in which it would be more correct to say that society exists in individuals rather than individuals in

society. Individuals in virtue of their constitution carry within themselves the perceptions, the conceptions, the dispositions which constitute the fundamental or essential conditions of social life. Society is immanent in individuality. Individuals do not enter society: *individuals* as such *are society*. They adapt themselves to a common environment; they adapt themselves to one another. It is not questioned that force, economic interest, sympathy, religion, and the consciousness of kind have been important influences in the integration of society. No one of them, however, appears to constitute the fundamental explanation or principle of the societary process.

2. *The danger of the biological analogy.* — The term 'organic' as applied to society is frequently explained in the form of an analogy borrowed from the sub-human or sub-personal world. When used in this way, it is to be remembered that the use of analogy can be but preliminary and at best suggestive; it can scarcely be used as a means of real insight into the true nature of the social unity. If society is a unity, it is a unity in itself — not through any parallelism with the unity of the animal body. The question is not primarily, Is society an organism? but, What is an organic society? The interpretation must be made within experience. 'What does experience say of it?' Here reality is known as it is in itself, if it is to be known at all. It is

doubtless true that in biological existence mutual exclusion gives way to mutual inclusion; and this is what especially happens in the spheres of knowledge and morality. Nevertheless, the elements of an organic body are external to one another in a way altogether foreign to those of knowledge and morality. While the analogy expresses or rather suggests the inevitableness of mutual influence, it affords no intelligent explanation in the psychological or ethical sense. It does not explain the possibility of community; it does not touch the essential nature of sociality.

There are at least two fundamental differences between a so-called biological organism and a social unity; differences which are real differences and not mere appearance: (1) The end or the ideal of the social unity is one which, through the fact of consciousness in its members, is capable of appealing to their rational nature and with the growth of society tending to come to clearer consciousness. In a society completely moralized, *i.e.* organized, the social order would not only be realized, but consciously realized under appropriate modifications by each member. In reality, a society is not organic in the true sense, that is, it is not completely moralized until it has as many centers of conscious experience as it has members. (2) The ideal of society is one which the independent or joint efforts of its members, as individuals capable of thought and action, may help to

realize. The truth of the individual life is found accordingly in a fully organized, *i.e.* moralized, society; and of society in a fully realized individual.

3. The organic conception treats *the individual as a functional unit in a larger functional whole*. According to it the two factors, the individual and society, are not two separate modes of being, but are to be regarded rather as two phases of one reality; distinctions of function, of modes of operation within a unity. Society and individuality are not two realities, but one. As a psychological existence, society is essentially a process. The social mind is simply the societary process. In it is found the organic, that is, functional unity of various psychological processes in a single unitary process. The society of which the individual forms a part is within him as truly as he is within it. The attempts toward a social psychology of recent years have emphasized the notion of the immanence of society in individuals. On the other hand, as was suggested above, the organic view has been by many interpreted with biological leanings, and with a tendency to lose sight of the difference between what may be called a social organ and a social member. In the latter, consciousness is present, and it would appear that it is through consciousness that society is organic in the fundamental sense. Apart from society individuals have no life; their purposes can be realized only through realizing the larger purposes

of society. In this lies the meaning of social membership. The parts are what they are in virtue of their relation to the whole; but within the social unity there is relative independence of parts. Such a form of unity has its highest manifestation in and through consciousness.

4. A note on the *psychology of the social process*. In a previous section (§ XIV, 2) it was assumed that for an interpretation of either individual or social activities recourse may be had to a functional or evolutionary psychology. In accordance with that conception activity is regarded as the fundamental datum in social as well as individual psychology. If the general position outlined in the section referred to be accepted as a working hypothesis, we are enabled to see how the actual processes of various psychical realities, whether social or individual, may all be given a functional interpretation. Thus some progress may be made in the employment of the same categories of interpretation in social and race psychology as in individual psychology. In such an interpretation the individual experience-process is no isolable entity, but has its reality in the larger process of social experience, or experiencing, and this in its turn, in the larger process of race life, and thus ultimately within the universal or cosmic order.

Considering briefly the societary process, the question presents itself, Are there psychical categories within

this process which correspond to those noted in previous discussions — sensation, habit, discrimination, adjustment, adaptation, accommodation, etc. In the societary process (the outcome of no mere aggregate but of some kind of social unity, dependent upon common aims, purposes, interests, etc.), according to the evolution-concept, the elementary social fact is the group as a functional unity, — doing something; this social coördination is the fundamental social fact, just as the individual action, or coördination, is the fundamental element within the individual experience-process. As within the individual life, the adjustment or coördination once successfully performed tends to become habitual, so social coördinations or accommodations once successfully made tend to persist as social habits. These, in turn, form the basis of new habits. Habits persisted in become customs, manners, institutions. In time, such usages, institutions, customs, come to be strengthened or rendered stable by particular sanctions. Habits are broken in upon by new environmental conditions, new ideas, by discussion, by the gradual reshaping or formation of public opinion, by the force of personal initiative. In social and race psychology may be noted the same difficulties in the transition from one habit to another as in the individual, only the conflict is more extensive and apt to be more intensive. (Compare the transition in Greece from the old to the new order; the

break-up of the Roman Empire, and the triumph of Christianity; the reformation and renaissance; the French Revolution, and its repeated failures to set up a new and suitable form of social habits, and the intellectual and social transformations going forward in the present era of transition.)

It should be noted again that all consciousness appears when and where the old habits, the so-called organized reactions, break down or need modification. The nature of the personal or social consciousness of a period is determined by the nature of the stimulus, *i.e.* by the sort of obstacle to be overcome. Habit, organized reactions, are the organized aspects of adaptation or adjustment. Adaptation, readjustment, reconstruction, is effected through consciousness. In terms of the social process, habits, customs, institutions, represent the conservative aspect; accommodation, attention, interest, discussion, discrimination, represent the organizing and reconstructing aspect of the societal process. All consciousness is accordingly experience of transition, organization, reorganization, reconstruction. In its work, its activity, what it does, is located the unity and continuity of the conscious process, whether in the individual or in society.

5. *The unifying element in social life.*—If society is a psychical organization, its unifying bond cannot be found in the physical conditions of the external world. What,

then, is the ultimate nature of that inner bond which holds human beings together? Some of the best known theories are the following: (a) force; (b) economic need; (c) religion; (d) 'consciousness of kind'; (e) thought; (f) the idea of a 'common good.' In the light of analyses made in previous sections the notion of a 'common good' is accepted as affording the most satisfactory explanation of the social unity. This, of course, is not to deny the important influences which force, economic interest, sympathy, thought, consciousness of kind, and religion have exerted in the integration of society.

6. *The ideal of a common good as the unifying element in social life.* — The theory which maintains that every society exists through the recognition, implicit or explicit, by its members of a common good may, perhaps, be summarized briefly as follows:—

(a) A mere aggregate of individuals united by no social bond whatever is not a society. Society implies a group of individuals, a more or less complex interdependence among the individuals constituting the group and the group itself as a moving process, rather than as a fixed condition. The adaptation of individuals one to another in society depends on psychological factors.

(b) Society is a life, and activity is the elementary fact; the individual and the group are found doing something in some common or specific way and for a common end

or good. It is this functional relation of its members to one another which constitutes the group or social unity. The social life is a process, a system of means and ends, the unity of which is found in the general end of control over the conditions of life. All its minor activities may be interpreted as unified or partially unified activities within the larger life-process. Society is the organism or organization which develops naturally where there is something to do. In serving to mediate the activities and experiences of its members it provides a medium for the realization of their capacities.

(c) Through consciousness the individual is capable of comprehending what is implied in his activity.

(d) The individual as the organized expression of specific tendencies becomes actualized only in virtue of the objective, that is, social conditions embodied in the various forms of social organization.

7. *The fundamental ethical need of men is self-realization.* The form in which that need has been most completely met in the history of the race has been the identification of a private with some common good; society, in turn, is constituted by such identification. Herein is found the basis of the moral life of man. The individual comes to himself through membership in the social organism, an organism in which an ideal of some common good is recognized by its members. Whenever a man obeys a law, does a so-called virtuous action, or

participates in the life of any one of the various human institutions, he to that degree identifies his own good with the general good, even though he may understand only very imperfectly the significance of his action. This ethical principle, the ideal of a common good, has become embodied in the various virtues, laws, and institutions. The social organism is the incarnation of man's inner life; virtues are the subjective habits of his will, and institutions are their outward embodiment. Through these the individual has realized himself, and has at the same time subserved the realization of others. Morality is thus essentially a language by means of which personal wills have communication one with another.

The fundamental bond of social life is, then, none other than *morality*, which consists essentially in the presence of some phase of the social purpose as a moving ideal before the individual mind; in short, in the social constitution of the individual will or mind, as Aristotle would say. In society, in order to exist, the individual member must to some degree give up his own selfish indulgence for the sake of a common good, for the general will. From the beginning society has been held together not merely by 'economic necessity' and 'consciousness of kind,' but by some leaven of goodness working in it. Conduct is good or bad according as it tends to social well-being or the reverse. From the beginning the individual has felt (often, it is true, dimly)

that his personal satisfaction cannot exclude, but must include, the realization of the social well-being. The bond of unity in social life and civilization is righteousness of life. The form of virtue is constant, the content is ever changing. The moral element as the fundamental social bond is not one inserted suddenly at some point alongside the other elements; nor is it their product. It has been present throughout, though more fully known and realized in the higher stages of civilization. Morality is the law of all life that is truly human.

§ XXIII. Social Membership; the Ethical Doctrine of Personality.

Before concluding the present chapter it may be well, by way of summary, to note its more important implications for *the ethical doctrine of personality*. (See also what has been already said concerning the nature of the self as a presupposition of education in Chapter IV.)

1. The social purpose is the ideal of a social or moral organism in which the capacities of each shall have opportunity for their fullest realization, and in which the perfection of each shall contribute to the perfection of all. The common good, in other words, is identical with the complete development of all the members of the community.

2. The individual good is a common good, and the perfect realization of a man's nature is possible only in

and through the identification of his personal good with the universal good. The measure of morality, therefore, is the actual identification of the private self with the universal self.

3. The social purpose or the *idea* of human perfection as the *moving force in social evolution* has taken form and body in various types of association. Man in virtue of self-consciousness has been enabled to comprehend (to a degree) the meaning of these forms of association in relation to his destiny. Hence it is that human history is largely a record of the progressive changes made in the various forms of social organization.

4. Self-realization is a process in which the self (*a*) comes to be more completely defined, *i.e.* individualized, (*b*) but *defined* through its *membership* in the larger unity. Personality is no self-contained atomic existence. A moral personality is one which is discerning the meaning of, and executing a purpose in harmony with, the moral order, and whose life is being clothed with the wealth of human relationships.

5. Obligation, then, for a moral personality consists not merely in adjusting himself to his environment, but of adjusting his environment to that higher *ideal* towards which his environment is striving. Moral obligation thus compels the individual to the realization of the self and the service of society.

REFERENCES. — For materials concerning the theories of society, consult: Alexander, *Moral Order and Progress*; Aristotle, *Ethics*, and *Politics*; Baldwin, *Mental Development*, I-II, also, *The Individual and Society*; Bosanquet, *The Philosophical Theory of the State*; Bradley, *Ethical Studies*; Caird, *The Social Philosophy of Comte*; Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, also, *Social Organization*; Dewey, *Outlines of Ethics*; Giddings, *The Principles of Sociology*, also, *The Theory of Socialization*; Hobhouse, *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, also, *Morals in Evolution*; Jones, in *Essays in Philosophical Criticism*; Mackenzie, *Introduction to Social Philosophy*; McTaggart, *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*; Santayana, *The Life of Reason (Reason in Society, Vol. II)*; Small and Vincent, *Introduction to the Study of Society*; Ward, *Pure Sociology*; Wallace, *Lectures and Essays in Natural Theology and Ethics*. (See also references on Chapter VIII.)

FURTHER PROBLEMS FOR STUDY. — 1. Is human law the basis of morality, or morality of human law? 2. Religion and the sanctions for social conduct. 3. The psychological basis of social organization. 4. Relations of conduct to social situations. 5. The qualities of the 'socialized' individual.

VII. INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS IN THE EDUCATIONAL PROCESS

§ XXIV. Human Institutions and the Ideal of a Common Good.

1. "IF we would avoid," writes Professor Ritchie, "such scepticism about humanity as would paralyze all serious effort, and make us hesitate to call anything right or wrong, we must admit the fundamental rationality of all institutions or practical beliefs that have been able to hold their ground for some considerable time, and to afford shelter and supply cohesion to considerable numbers of human beings. They must in some way have been advantageous to the society in which they prevailed, — else, on the principle of natural selection, they would not have prevailed; they would have been crushed out along with a society which fed on poisonous stuff. The evolution theory compels those who accept it to regard social cohesion and durability as the proof of some degree at least of ethical value and truth."

The study of human institutions is practically a study of the various forms in which the principle of association is seen to operate in society. Association

is the integration of individuals into the common social process. Society is concentrated in institutions, and an interpretation of institutions would be an interpretation of society. To understand adequately the process of social organization and social progress, it would be necessary to know the human need subserved by each factor in the process throughout its course. The creation of the social order — a mechanism of communication — on an ever growing scale has been one phase of the human problem through history. Institutions have been continually undergoing change and reconstruction in response to the expanding needs of mankind. The significant question for education would seem to be, 'How far and in what ways do institutions make possible the spiritual life of man?' This is the final standard in accordance with which institutions must be judged.

2. The process of socialization, in which the process of education essentially consists, presents the twofold aspect: (a) participation in the experience of others and the gradual recognition of the values of social life; (b) the achievement of power on the part of the individual to express himself in social directions. The child is born into the conditions of society, and in becoming fitted to them he gains the experience of the race. Society or the social process is the organism of which the institutions may be designated the organs, the functional factors in the larger functional whole. Institutions,

accordingly, may be described in this way: (a) they constitute a system of purposes and a meeting point for the functional activity of their members; (b) they are instruments of social control; (c) they are centers for the communication and transmission of experience. The conception of society as a living, unitary process should be emphasized. As in the so-called psychical process, experience is communicated and transmitted by means of the 'psychical mechanism' from one level to another, and continuity thereby maintained, so in the social process there is the continual communication and transmission of experience by means of the social mechanism from individual to individual. This conservation and transmission of experience alone render the continuance of society possible. Society is, in the larger sense, the medium for the development and communication of experience. Experience is projected or embodied in institutions, and institutions serve to link not only individuals one to another, but the generations each to each. Capacity is relative to opportunity; potentiality to actualization; a power to the conditions of its exercise. The various institutions form the system of objective conditions of activity which men working together for the sake of interrelated ends have thus far achieved. They are the embodiments of those relations which men, living together in association for some common good, have found to minister to the realization of human life.

Only in the postulate of the identity of the individual and the common good can a justification be found for the institutions through which men have sought satisfaction for their needs; only in their more perfect adjustment and coöperation will the unity of self-realization and of social service be more completely attained. Institutions are the common substance of the individual and the social mind. Taken in their unity and continuity, they constitute the system of organized stimuli, which persist for the stimulation and consolidation, for the inspiration and liberation, of the personal life.

Keeping in mind, then, these fundamental facts of social psychology, namely, (*a*) that individual capacity or function becomes actualized only in social situations and conditions, and (*b*) that each individual through consciousness is capable of comprehending what is implied in his social instincts, human institutions may be defined as the objective conditions for the realization of the capacities in which the good of man consists. The various forms of social organization thus constitute together the growing community of human life — the vicarious offering of the race to the individual. Society exists not only through the recognition by its members of a common good; it exists, too, for such recognition by its members of a common good.

§ XXV. The Moral Value of Institutions.

The two important functions which institutions perform may, perhaps, be said to be these:—

1. They unify men. To unify men is to moralize them. In prescribing the general methods of response to social situations, institutions exercise an authority and control essential to the realization of the individual. Thus they constitute an objective system of relations, a method of control, formative in the intellectual and moral development of individuals. They are the expression of human interdependence, the realized idea of humanity. Just here is to be found the basis of the doctrine of moral rights. Society is the maker of rights as it is the maker of values. Rights and values are relative possessions. The individual is a part of a social whole; apart from that whole he has no life—no more than the ‘withered branch or amputated limb.’ Apart from society the individual has no rights—and no obligations. Rights and obligations are, from the ethical point of view, strictly correlative. The right to property, to education, to freedom,—conferred upon the individual by society as media or conditions of his realization,—bear with them the corresponding obligations to use them for the realization of the common good. In institutions, then, is embodied the law imposed upon the actual by the ideal self. To some degree the outcome

on the part of individuals of voluntary adaptation one to another, but for the most part emerging first of all without any far-reaching purpose, institutions have conserved the social order and provided the means for the realization of the individual. While it may be freely admitted that in their development the idea of the realization of the capacities of the individual was but seldom consciously presented, yet in the very nature of consciousness there supervened a principle which, however dimly, enabled him to set himself up as an end to be realized — an end involving the realization of others. It is this principle — the social constitution of the individual nature — which, in the progress of the human race, has been the immanent life of individual and social activity. Man is organically related to society, and his willingness to serve the community is the test of his moralization. Its institutional life is the witness of the race to its moral unity. It is in and through his institutional inheritance that the individual is to find the medium for the fulfillment of his will and the assertion of his freedom. By identifying himself with the established laws, virtues, and institutions, though he may not at first have any consciousness of the import of his action, he is identifying himself with the common good; and his rights and duties arise in proportion as he becomes identified with the social system. In other words, he becomes a person in a world of persons. Accordingly, the

moral life of a man may be fitly described as a renunciation of the lower, private, or exclusive self, and the identification of his life with the more inclusive and ever widening realm of spiritual life beyond him.

2. They transmit experience and thus preserve the continuity of the spiritual life of humanity. The doctrine of evolution maintains that nothing in the world is isolated; all is connected. There is nowhere atomism, but unity, relation, participation. In a sense that is very real, society is a party to every thought and every deed of the individual. Just as in nature truly seen, objects are closely united, and all dependent each on each, so are the generations of men united one to the other. Down through the ages there is the tide of spiritual life, slowly accumulating, ever gathering in volume, wider, deeper, stronger. This fund of spiritual life, the slowly garnered experience of humanity, is civilization, and that which constitutes the social environment of men. In the process of social life and social renewal, the inner center is the child.√For the individual at birth this funded human experience exists as his spiritual inheritance; he has not to begin 'at the beginning.' It becomes his spiritual possession in a large and fruitful way only through education. The various human institutions are the conditions through which this educational process is effected: they are the institutions that educate. From the ethical, and therefore from the educational, point of

view, civilization and its institutions are the vicarious offering of the race to the individual to be used, if he will but appropriate them, for the perfecting of his nature, for the rich and varied expression of the personal life.

Just here attention may be called to two general functions which all institutions as educational factors have in common. These functions are (1) the liberation of the individual from himself, and (2) the discovery of the individual to himself. In other words, institutions help to free the individual from the possibility of a merely selfish isolation into the wider life of the community, and also to discover to him the latent wealth of his spiritual nature. "What gives its moral value to the social life," says Edward Caird, "is that it not merely limits the self-seeking of each in reference to the self-seeking of the rest, nor even that it involves a reciprocal sacrifice of each to the others; but that a higher spirit takes possession of each and all, and makes them its organs, turning the natural tendencies and powers of each of the members of society into the means of realizing some special function necessary to the organic completeness of life. A social relation, say the relation of husband and wife, would be an unsanctified unity of repellent atoms through desires which turn them into external means of each other's life, if those who participate in it were not, by the fact of their union, brought into the conscious presence of something higher than their individuality. In fact,

in this most direct union of individuals, nature generally takes care of this by awakening affections, which make the interests of the children (who represent the continued unity of the family) predominant over the separate interests of the heads of the family. Hence, we need not wonder that the first worships of men concentrated round the family *sacra*, and that the desire to keep up the continuity of these *sacra*, as a worship of the family god, became the great determining ideal influence of early morality. The surrender of the individual as a natural being, and his recovery of his life as an organ dedicated to a special social function, is the essential dialectic of morals, which repeats itself in every form of society. It is the 'logic of facts' which redeems man's life from egoism by giving him a higher alter ego, which is yet not the ego of another individual as such."

But institutions serve more than merely to liberate the individual; they serve to reveal him to himself, they assist him to a knowledge of that vast domain of the inner life, they reveal to him his inward resources. An ideal which we deem worthy of attainment did not come to us merely from within; it was awakened within us by the sight of something without, in parent, friend, teacher, or hero. Whatever it was which awakened us into activity, it was a source of enrichment, of liberation, and of self-discovery. A larger life has captivated us, and at once there is a sudden revelation of our inner and im-

perfect life. We come to know the meaning of unselfishness, of affection, of sympathy, of love, of self-sacrifice, by seeing them embodied in other lives, lives to which we respond, are possessed by, and which we possess in being possessed by them. Such qualities have meaning for the child first of all as a member of the family group. Its liberation and self-discovery proceed through its desires and inclinations being gradually brought into conformity with the duties, the affections, the ideals, prescribed in the family life. New occasions teach new duties. More comprehensive institutions, the school, civil society, the state and the church, render possible new ideals through new relations, and furnish further opportunities for the liberation of the individual, and for his increased self-knowledge. The individual mind and heart expands into the life of the people, and there is nourished, enriched, and sustained, gradually discovering that the wider life of the community, far from being a hindrance to his self-realization, is the very substance in which man loses himself to find himself.

§ XXVI. Brief Notes on Certain Educational Aspects of the Various Institutions.

Some of the more important features of a consideration of the educational aspects of the various human institutions is suggested in the following:—

1. *The home.*— In the home there goes forward an

education of both parent and child. It is the earliest form of the social medium, in which is presented to its members the conditions of seeing and living for a common good. The family is not a merely physical organization, nor economic necessity, but a human institution in which those who participate are united by spiritual forces and are working out spiritual results. Historically the family life has been the foundation of the education of the individual. The lack of appreciation of the educational significance of the family is, perhaps, the most deep-seated defect in the systems of Plato and Rousseau, and of a great number of communistic theories of which they are typical. Those who see a decline of family life in the civilization of the present usually ascribe it to one or all of three causes: (*a*) the modern movement towards freedom; (*b*) economic changes, and the growth of large cities; (*c*) the disappearance of the ecclesiastical view of marriage.

Whilst the foundation of education is historically and ethically in the home, yet the home cannot do all. If education has as its aim the leading the individual to participate in the social consciousness of the race, it can be readily seen that the family can achieve this to only a limited extent. There cannot be found in the family the adequate stimulus, nor the adequate community in which, by becoming a sharer of its life, the individual may gradually become aware of his possibili-

ties, be freed from the limitations of his somewhat isolated individuality, and become ready to recognize and perform his function in the community life by which he is surrounded. The school, the vocation, the state, the church, exist, therefore, for the further liberation of the individual. There is no interference: each has its function to perform — a function which cannot be performed by its relegation to any other of the educational factors. The greater the mutual understanding and consequent coöperation between these various factors, the better is the community organized to give opportunity for individual development.

2. *The school as a form of institutional life.* (See Chapter X.)

3. *The vocation.* — By vocation is here to be understood the particular medium of whatever form professional or technical through which the activity of the individual becomes expressed. Through the vocation the personality of the individual is developed and revealed. In it the individual is brought into practical relations with men, and with the industrial and commercial organization of his environment. He is forced to limit himself to a narrow or particular sphere of activity, and in so doing is inevitably forced to recognize his dependence upon his fellow-men. This is the great lesson the individual learns in his vocation — his dependence on his fellow-men for the supply of his wants, natural and

psychical, and his consequent responsibility in the proper realization of his station and its duties. The division of labor is the condition under which the individual can do effective work of a definite kind. Adam Smith in his *Wealth of Nations* makes the remark that "while our whole life is scarce sufficient to gain the friendship of a few persons, man stands at all times in need of the coöperation and assistance of great multitudes." He also declares that the intellectual effects of industrial specialization is in the direction of 'mental mutilation.' The only way out of the difficulty would seem to be through the education of public opinion, the coöperation of the various elements of society, and a greater degree of social recognition among the members composing any community. In all work, whatever be the special vocation through which the personality of an individual is revealed, there is opportunity for honesty, thrift, endurance, self-control, self-knowledge, and struggle. There may be untoward circumstances, there may be many obstructions, the medium may not be completely adequate, yet who can say that the result may not be of high moral value?

4. *The state.* — Its primary function (1) to secure to the individual the external conditions of the good life, (2) to secure the autonomy of the individual — Rights and corresponding obligations — Extension of the sphere of duty — Education through citizenship. (See, further, Chapter IX.)

5. *The church.* — The church in relation to society — The church as the home of the spiritual life — The unity and interdependence of men — The church and the standard not only of outward action but of inward motive — Religion and the idealism of common life.

REFERENCES. — Addams, *Democracy and Social Ethics*; Bosanquet, *Philosophical Theory of the State*; Caird, *Philosophy of Religion*; Coit, *Ethical Democracy*; Dewey, *School and Society*; Ely, *Social Aspects of Christianity*; Fairbairn, *Religion in History and Modern Life*; Freemantle, *The World as the Subject of Redemption*; Green, *Lectures on Political Obligation*; Harris (G.), *Moral Evolution*; Harris (W. T.), *Psychologic Foundations of Education*; Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*; Henderson, *Social Elements*; Hobson, *The Social Problem*; Hyde, *Practical Idealism*; King, *Theology and the Social Consciousness*; MacCunn, *The Making of Character*; Mackenzie, *Introduction to Social Philosophy*, also, *Manual of Ethics*; Mathews, *Social Teaching of Jesus*; McKechnie, *The State and the Individual*; Muirhead, *Elements of Ethics*; Murray, *Introduction to Ethics*; Paulsen, *System of Ethics*; Peabody, *Jesus Christ and the Social Question*; Ritchie, *Natural Rights*; Ross, *Social Control*; Royce, *Religious Aspect of Philosophy*; Schurman, *Ethical Import of Darwinism*; Stephen, *Science of Ethics*; Wundt, *Ethics*.

FURTHER PROBLEMS FOR STUDY. — 1. Institutions as ethical ideas. 2. Character and circumstance. 3. Limits of state interference in the education of the individual. 4. Educational significance of the vocation. 5. The conception of political rights. 6. Education as a state function.

VIII. THE COURSE OF INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT

IN the present outline the subject matter of psychology has been taken to be the mental processes undergoing change in transition, reorganization, or reconstruction in the growth of experience. In a previous connection in noting the significance of the doctrine of evolution it was indicated how in organic and social processes new formations or structures, whether vital, intellectual, or social, are to be viewed as instruments or methods of adjustment or adaptation to particular environmental situations. This functional view of the mental life was accepted as locating and defining the significance of the evolutionary method in the field of psychology and sociology, and was accepted as a principle fundamental to the present outline in its psychological aspect. According to this view (1) the mental life is to be viewed as the instrument through which the adaptations necessary to the maintenance of the organism in its environment are to be secured; (2) so-called mental facts—attention, discrimination, interest, habit, adjustment, etc.—are to be conceived as phases of one continuous process in the interaction of a psycho-physical organism and its environ-

ment. The question of psychology is, accordingly, to discover how and in what ways the various psychical phases of the one continuous process contribute to the adjustment or adaptation process. Throughout the outline emphasis has been given to the activity of mind in the process of adjustment to the exigencies of a physical and social environment.

§ XXVII. The Body as the Instrument of the Mind.

Concerning the relation between body and mind, the physical and the psychical, two well-defined types of theory may be noted: (a) the *ontological*, and (b) the *teleological* (or the evolutionary, strictly interpreted). According to the first, mind and body are disparate and separable entities, each subject to growth and transformation apart from the other; the second regards the body as the organ of, and instrumental to, the mind. The theory of the relation of body and mind assumed in the present outline is the teleological. As said above, it is assumed that the essence of being is one in kind and spiritual. Between mind and body there is no essential antagonism or opposition. The mind is no fixed entity separable from matter. If we are to trust our experience, matter cannot be as foreign to consciousness as is ordinarily believed. If the analysis made in preceding sections be true, the so-called nervous system, body, or matter, *is instrumental to the*

mind, the machinery of its growth and of its expanding life. Many look upon the physical as something set over against the spiritual, something that restricts, confines, enslaves. It is interesting to note that Plato, one of the first to indicate the spiritual significance of physical training, should in his metaphysics look upon body and mind as dispartes, and yet *in his theory of physical education he proceeded on the basis of the teleological conception of mind and body.* For, while he speaks of gymnastics for the body and music for the soul, he is nevertheless very careful to insist that fundamentally *the soul and not the body is the object of gymnastics as well as of music.* For Plato, in his theory of education, body and mind are not simply two opposites, on the same level. In making the body subordinate or instrumental to the mind, he makes it instrumental to a *comprehensive purpose in life*, thus avoiding the one-sidedness which in the judgment of Aristotle made the physical training of many Greek states a failure. For both Plato and Aristotle the aim of physical education does not lie merely in physical training. *Rather its significance, its spiritual quality, is found in its effect upon character.* Our problem is still the problem of Plato, "to blend music with gymnastics and apply them proportionately to the soul."

According to the view expressed here, the physical with its senses and stimuli is the very means whereby we

gain freedom. The child feeling the pain from the finger thrust into the flame, and thereby restraining itself afterward, is not limited by the bodily senses or its nervous system. Rather is its nervous system the very instrument through which its freedom is gained. Moreover, just as the body, and nature itself, are instrumental to the self, and no mere hindrance, in like manner is the machinery of institutions no mere hindrance, but the very medium of escape for the individual from the domination of mere instinct and impulse to conscious self-determination. No adequate statement of freedom as a ready-made faculty or power of mind can be given in a paragraph if at all. Yet when we take the so-called physical and institutional life, *not as mere external and antagonistic opposites, but rather from the teleological and instrumental point of view*, we may realize more fully the significance of the most apparent and the most fundamental fact in experience; namely, that the consciousness of self implies the consciousness of the not-self, and grows with it, and by means of it. Thus conceiving the self and the world as the terminal aspects of a living organic reality or experience, and communicated to us [through consciousness] in inseparable correlation, we can regard neither one as a resultant of the other. Together they constitute a functional manifestation of a unity which is their common and absolute ground. What, then, is enforced in this section is the impossibility of conceiving a soul or

mind in itself, a preëxisting entity, or of a matter in itself, a self-contained existence. Keeping by experience, we recognize that subject and object are never met by us apart. They are distinctions within a unity, but not different or antagonistic entities. And it scarcely need be remarked in passing that the doctrine outlined above is neither materialism nor subjective idealism. It is an attempt to construe teleologically the relation of mind and matter, without obliterating their differences nor reducing one to the other; securing the reality of both in a life whose variety is unity and whose essence is spiritual.

If it be granted (*a*) that there is an organic or instrumental relation between soul and body, psychosis and neurosis, (*b*) that our knowledge of the neurosis must be through the psychosis, and (*c*) that gymnastics or physical training is ultimately for the sake of the soul, it would appear how important is a knowledge of psychology of growth, of physical processes and mental imagery in comprehending the physical stimuli, through play, games, gymnastic exercises best suited to the harmonious upbuilding of the psychical life to which the physical is admittedly organic and instrumental. In other words, our knowledge of the genesis of mental life should, to a large extent, be regulative in the attempt to control the genesis of the physical life. According to the teleological view of the relation between mind and body, the educational purpose is growth of the conscious-

ness of self, and the organization of the body for the utilization and control of environment, and thus the liberation of the self's latent energies. The nervous system, accordingly, is the instrument whose function is the coördinations of the adaptations necessary to the life and growth of the self. For the self, the nervous system (*a*) manipulates environment to its purposes, (*b*) adjusts its organs for the sake of a more complete service. The two phases of the organization of the body as the instrument of the mind by means of the sensory and muscular system are (*a*) the process of differentiation and (*b*) integration. The one fundamental and exclusive function of the nervous system is therefore the coördination or integration of differentiated acts, sensory or motor, to a common end. Assuming, then, for the present the various epochs in psychological development during which this process of physical differentiation and integration takes place, the characteristically play period, for example, may be briefly noted in certain of its more prominent needs: (1) Play is fundamentally a psychological attitude, not an external activity; hence the need of psychological appreciation by the teacher. (2) Since the aim of physical development is differentiation and integration of the body as instrument of the soul, the necessity of selection and adaptation of such physical activities as will assist in giving the soul as complete possession as possible of its instrument. (3) A thorough

study of the *expression aspects of the various parts of the curriculum*, in order to indicate more fully their expression values and suggest means whereby present practice in those parts may be improved.

§ XXVIII. The Nature of Experience.

1. Notwithstanding the remarkable development which has taken place in psychology in recent years, its positive contribution to the study of society and education has been somewhat meager. On the one hand, owing to the prevalence of an individualistic method in psychology, the sociologist has received a very inconsiderable amount of assistance from his psychological studies, and very often indeed the individualistic tendency in psychological investigation has been carried over into the domain of sociology with an effect in certain instances little less than baneful. On the other hand, education has likewise profited but little from psychology. Here again the individualistic method in psychology has in many instances worked against, rather than in behalf of, sound educational theory. But, in addition to this, there is the fact that psychology has been 'structural,' furnishing an anatomy of the adult consciousness, rather than genetic or functional, furnishing what might be called a physiology of the mind in the process of psychogenesis. It is with this psychogenetic process that education is for the most part concerned, and it will be

readily seen that until psychological investigation becomes social, functional and genetic in its method, education will receive from psychology little more than incidental assistance.

2. *The nature of the self.*—In a theory of education an attempt must be made to determine in some degree the nature of the bond or unitary principle which holds together the phenomena of consciousness as such. It must have some doctrine which will indicate the possibility of certain indubitable facts in education and ethics; e.g. continuity of experience, responsibility, progress. It will be remembered, of course, that the nature of anything can be determined only in so far as it is found within experience, and that only on the basis of what a thing does within experience can we form a conception of what it is. Now, in our conscious experience the uniting principle among its phenomena is revealed, not merely as unitary, but as one possessed of a specific character, viz., a self or subject. It will thus be recognized that the self is a basal concept in education. The term might be used as identical with the totality of the experience-process in its unity and continuity — as including both self-consciousness and consciousness of the object. Used in this sense, it is, as has been pointed out, essentially an organic unity. Or we may use it as a terminal aspect of the experience-process, with the emphasis on the agent rather than

on the situation within that process. On the level of sensations we seem forced to regard the self as a principle of activity which manifests itself, as Herbart and Lotze would say, as an internal principle of reaction against that which would impair its individuality. This reaction is not to be conceived, however, so much an act of self-conservation as of self-realization, for the reason that (as has been pointed out in previous sections) the stimulus or environment is not a foreign or alien something, to which the mind is mechanically related, as though mind and matter were distinct entities instead of terminal aspects or phases of a unitary process of experience. According to the present doctrine, a self or person is no mere succession of states of consciousness. Within the self there is admittedly a stream of conscious states, but beneath this continuity of ideas the *functional activity inherent in the experience-process becomes the foundation for that permanence of selfhood which we attribute to a person* — in a continuity of activities rather than of ideas, of instincts and habits rather than of any stream of conscious states. The self is real only in so far as it continues to act, to function, to become, to progress. In the self, therefore, is found a process returning upon itself in such a way as to retain its existing quality or individuality. While changing, it is nevertheless permanent, remaining one, as it does in its life-process, *i.e. one in and through the unity and*

continuity of its activity — its character. A person, therefore, may be defined as a self-conscious subject, distinguishing itself from, yet realizing itself in and through, the objects it knows and the ends it chooses. Self-activity is the essence of personality. Through self-consciousness it can become its own critic, *i.e.* through taking the standpoint of the universal, the self, as an element within experience and as its bearer, or agent, can take up an attitude of approval or disapproval to the factors which have entered into the process. Man's life is progressive because the self-consciousness through which he returns upon himself is not an endowment, but a process. We may, therefore, summarize our conception of a person thus: (a) *self-active principle*, creative in the objects it knows and the ends it chooses; (b) *self-separative, or self-estranging*; in other words, a person is never an exclusive self, but one whose progress consists in a continual transcendence of his exclusiveness and in a realization of himself in and through that which seems at first to be set in opposition to him.

3. *The nature of experience.* — (a) Experience is to be thought of as active, in the sense of 'experiencing,' rather than as passive; in this sense experience is an activity, a realization. The word is really incapable of definition because of its inclusiveness, designating all that of which we may speak, think, or, indeed, be conscious. Frequently (as with Pestalozzi and many empiricists) experience is identi-

fied with a sensation, — as though a sensation were the most concrete thing. On the other hand, a true experience in the sense of 'realization' involves a seeing, touching, doing something with the 'object,' thinking about it; without the assumption of some such practical attitude towards the object there is no true experience in the sense of realization; and for this reason: sensations are fragments; in isolation they supply at best only raw materials; only in connection with a background of experience to which they become related (thought, or felt) do they get meaning, bearing, significance. (See analysis of *Sensations* in the outline on the functional view of mind, Chapter IV.)

(b) "If, seeking for reality, we go to experience, what we certainly do not find is a subject or an object, or indeed any other thing whatever, standing separate and on its own bottom; what we discover, rather, is a whole in which distinctions can be made, but in which divisions do not exist." (Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*.) The mind is not a preëxisting entity which comes to have this or that experience. To begin with such a conception of mind would inevitably force upon us an arbitrary and mechanical view of the experience-process. I distinguish, it is true, between the mind and the pen with which I am writing. One is 'subject'; the other, 'object.' But the distinction is a distinction within the process of a unitary experience; the subject and the object

are the two halves or terminal aspects of the one experience within consciousness. The unitary experience which I have of this pen *is the reality*. There is no mere mind over against a mere matter; no mere thought over against a mere thing. My experience of the pen is neither a mere physical fact, nor is it a mere psychological fact in the ordinary sense of the term. The self and its object are equally the results of a process. Back of the distinction between the self and the thing there is the experience-process. The consciousness of the object and the consciousness of the self issue in their difference from a common source; and the consciousness of the object is an essential element in the consciousness of the self. For reflection only, the two appear as an opposition of elements which are, nevertheless, necessary correlates of each other in experience. As the one aspect of the process takes form and feature, so does the other. Simultaneously with the so-called development of mind, the limits of the 'objective' world recede. The 'development of mind' is thus fundamentally a development within experience by means of the complementary processes of differentiation and integration. Moreover, in this unitary experience we may distinguish between the content or matter of experience and the mode of experiencing it. Uniting this distinction with the one made above, it will be noted that the self is the bearer of the activity through which the 'experiencing' takes

place, while the 'object' is content or material. In terms of educational method, and making use of the Kantian phraseology of 'form' and 'matter,' it may be said that 'experience' is the 'realization' by the self of its matter or content. *Educational method* is concerned, therefore, not so much with ways or means of importing into the vacant spaces of a pupil's mind materials (studies) supposed to be without, but rather in assisting the pupil to realize in its depth and breadth the meaning of the pupil's own experience.

§ XXIX. The Development of Experience.

1. The emergence of the self and its object is the result of a process. We cannot imagine the beginning of this experience-process, but only as begun. To begin with, it would seem akin to what Ward has designated one general *continuum*, in which the differences subsequently appearing are latent. Out of this vague plasmic *continuum* differences emerge through a process of progressive differentiation; the progression resulting from the functional relation between the 'self' and the 'not-self,' the agent and the situation. In the increasing complexity of relationships in the experience-process, sentience becomes differentiated into its threefold aspects — knowing, feeling, doing. The simplest concrete experience is one in which a change of sensation is followed by a change of movement, the connecting link being

the element of feeling. Every change produces a new situation, involving new presentations, new stimuli, new responses, new experiences. A fundamental quality of each experience is its influence in controlling succeeding experience, or 'experiencings.' The essential characteristic necessary to such control is the persistence of the effect of each experience within the differentiating *continuum*. Thus every new experience is cumulative of the effect of all that have preceded, and also determinative in meeting the situation next presented to the self.

Experience is thus dynamic, and follows in its changes the processes of increasing differentiation and integration. A distinction may be made between growth and development of experience or of the mental life: (*a*) by mental growth we understand the expansion, an increase in the stock of our experience; (*b*) by mental development we understand the elaboration or reconstruction of experience into more complex form, and an increasing organization and control of it. In mental development are found the following characteristics: (*a*) an increase in the content of experience; (*b*) an increasing complexity of mental processes; (*c*) an increasing facility and power among the various mental processes; (*d*) an increase in the organic unity and solidarity of experience.

2. *The relation of knowledge to experience.*—Experience is essentially dynamic, moving, progressive; the outcome of the entire self-realizing activity of

the soul. The essential, the inner nature of experience is revealed in its movement, in its realization, and the movement is the outcome of the self-term (or 'terminal aspect,' with its interests, needs, and 'obstinate questionings') of the experience-process, and not the outcome of the content (the intellectual or cognitive aspect). The cognitive aspect, whether as sensation or as idea, is simply a sign. That is to say, in the whole round of any experience, the experience-content is but a sign, a mediating link, in the entire experience. Knowledge is thus one phase of experience, one aspect of a unitary happening. But neither in origin nor in aim does it appear to be the ultimate or fundamental aspect. It has no psychical significance apart from the other phases of the experience-process. In this process its function is indicative, regulative, mediative. The known 'fact' is known only as part of an experience-process, and as bearer of 'sign' or 'significance' is understood only as part of the entire experience. In the realization of the self, therefore, knowledge is not its own end. *True knowledge* is not something hard and solid, but a *vital element, the significance of which lies in its power to direct or control the onward movement of experience.* (See, further, § XIV, 2, (c).)

3. *The forms of ideal construction—education as world-building.*—The fundamental forms or modes of

ideal construction involved in the building up of experience may be stated as (a) perceptual and scientific construction, (b) linguistic construction, (c) æsthetic construction, (d) social or institutional construction, (e) philosophical and religious construction. The impulse to self-preservation and physical well-being gave rise to man's perceptual and scientific constructions; the need and demand of the individual's nature for the communication and transmission of experience resulted in his linguistic construction; his demand for emotional expression lay at the basis of his construction of literature and art; his need for social participation and confirmation became projected into his social and institutional ideals and construction; his need for explaining nature, for explaining and giving coherence to his moral life, and for expressing his feeling of dependence upon the Absolute, gave the impetus to the philosophic and religious constructions of his experience.

§ XXX. The Social Control of Individual Development.

1. *The social nature of individual experience.*—In several preceding sections it has been noted how dependent is the individual on his social relationships. The so-called self is a bipolar unity, the ego and alter, the latter being part of a common 'thought-and-action' content. Thus the individual is in society to the degree that society is in him; the individual appears and lives

in the sociality of human beings. When attention is paid to the social aspect of the course of personal development, the individual is seen to be a social fact, the outcome of a social effort. The individual, to begin with, is an energy, of course, as endowed with inherent qualities and instincts, but these are made his own, are actualized only, through an effort, through an action; the law or principle of this effort, of this actualization, is sociality. In other words, the human soul, the individual, is made only in the presence of other human souls which in turn are themselves in the process of making. The social life, then, or, as it may be designated, the social *continuum* with its subsidiary processes of differentiation and integration is a life manifesting itself through a system of organs, and these organs little by little working their way to consciousness, realizing the community of the social life, come in time to be social members or persons, and the social life becomes integrated and unified only in so far as its members are partakers of the social purpose and yield themselves up to the realization of that purpose.

In illustration of the dependence of the individual on society or of society on the individual, it may be said that the individual provides the 'matter' (in the Aristotelian sense) of experience, while society provides the 'form.' The individual brings instincts and impulses; society brings values and typical activities. Through the social

process, individual activity is given form and shape. The child's impulse to utter sound has stimulus and interpretation in the coöperating conversation of the home. Industry is directed towards the market place. The self-made man makes himself; but only through his recognition and use of the opportunities which society affords him. Experience is the outcome of the two energies, (a) the qualities, impulsive and instinctive, of the individual, and (b) the stimuli and values, interpretative and regulative, of society. It is a false antithesis, therefore, to isolate the individual and social aspects of the experience-process. There is the 'how' and the 'what'; the means and end; the machinery or mechanism of operation, and the ends to which the machinery operates; a psychological aspect and a sociological or ethical aspect. For purposes of examination, for distinction, emphasis, they are separable; in reality they are inseparable phases of a unitary process. In the process of learning to speak on the part of the child, if we lay emphasis on 'the impulse to utter sound,' we think of the psychological phase, the means, the machinery of social experience; if, on the other hand, attention is directed to the end in process of realization, — the spoken word, — the value or interpretation, we have in mind the social aspect. As a fact of experience the unitary reality is 'the talking child.'

2. *The meaning of social membership.*—The ideal of society is one which the independent or joint

efforts of its members as individuals, capable of thought and action, may help to realize. The truth of the individual life, accordingly, is found in a fully organized, *i.e.* moralized, society; and of society in a fully realized individual. The characteristics of the socialized individual may be said to be (*a*) moral insight, (*b*) virtuous disposition, (*c*) consistent action, (*d*) efficiency. Self-realization is a process in which the self (*a*) comes to be more completely defined, *i.e.* individualized, (*b*) but defined through membership in a larger unity. (See also the chapter on The Individual and Society.)

3. *The process of social control.*

(*a*) It has already been pointed out that in the interaction between the individual and the social organism the individual contributes a capacity, a power, an impulse (that through which the movement towards progress takes place); society confers upon the individual a method, a worth, a significance (that through which the existing order is conserved). Experience in the individual is thus the outcome of these two 'energies'; namely, the qualities, impulsive, instinctive, deliberative, of the individual agent, and the stimuli, as norms, convictions, ends, methods, values, interpretative and regulative, of society. Society, as it were, represents the habitual; social evolution or progress is always by means of the individual. The individual, as plastic and imitative, accommodates himself to the social order, but, as

conscious and therefore selective, produces variations which society, deeming valuable, accordingly selects. Thus it is through the individual that variations occur, but variations always on the basis of previous accommodations; otherwise the variations would not be recognized as socially available. They would not accordingly be socially selected and transmitted. Human progress from the first has been for the most part a matter of discovery and invention by the few, and of imitation and assimilation by the many. The average individual comes to know his own capacities and powers through the type set by the leaders or superior men of the group. The individual variation becomes generalized, and socially dynamic and productive. At first education tends to lay emphasis on the plasticity of the individual and therewith the maintenance of the social order. Only gradually, historically, has society come to realize the possibility inhering in the contribution of the individual, and to attempt to devise means to make such contributions available for the furtherance of social progress.

(*b*) The self expresses itself in and through its environment; such expression is always socially controlled. The methods, of which society avails itself for the control of individual development, are (*a*) imitation and suggestion, (*b*) habituation, (*c*) instruction. The entire process of individual development consists in the widening and deepening of the individual's experience, the organizing

of his activities and raising them to consciousness. Its aim may be stated from two points of view: (1) as preparing the individual for effective participation in the social order; (2) as preparing the individual for action with the consciousness and appreciation of its meaning and significance. The adaptation of an individual, made possible through plasticity, makes for social conservation; it is the basis of social solidarity and continuity. The development of capacity to modify or control environment, the strengthening of individuality and initiative, makes for social progress.

§ XXXI. The Ideal as Self-realization.

Throughout the outline it has been taken for granted that the realization of the personal life — in other words, self-realization — constitutes the moral, and consequently the educational, ideal. Social evolution and the evolution of personality are, it is believed, fundamentally the complementary aspects of the same fact; personality is the real presupposition and goal of the social process. The progressive effort of the evolutionary process seems to have been one long discipline in individuality. "The function of society," says Professor Giddings (*Principles of Sociology*, 1st ed., p. 420), "is to develop conscious life, and to create human personality; to that end it now exists."

Gathering together, then, in brief form some of the

results of the preceding analysis of the course of individual development, we may say:—

(a) The realization of the self is attained through an inward movement, by which, while its manifestation becomes manifold, its identity is still preserved.

(b) The progress of the soul's life in its intellectual, æsthetic, and moral aspects is from the level of the instinctive and impulsive, a level in which the self is, as it were, immersed in the material, to the level in which the material has become transformed and organized, according to the thought and purpose of the soul.

(c) The realization of the self is possible ultimately because the principles that are constitutive and regulative in the process of the individual life are the constitutive and regulative principles of the life of humanity. Self-realization is the organization of life in harmony with the moral insight.

(d) The life of the soul, while dependent on an inward energy, is nevertheless a continual process of self-estrangement. Its reality lies in a movement outward, which is at the same time a movement upward. Progress in inner freedom is through liberation to higher forms of being.

REFERENCES. — (a) Concerning the general conception of 'experience,' consult: Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*; Caird, *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*; Dewey, in *Mind* (Vol. XI); Hobhouse, *Theory of Knowledge*; James, *Principles of Psy-*

chology, also, *Will to Believe*; Mackenzie, *Outlines of Metaphysics*; Schiller, *Humanism*; Stout, *Analytic Psychology*; Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*. (b) Concerning the idea of 'self,' consult: Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*; Dewey, *The Study of Ethics*; Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*; Mackenzie, *Introduction to Social Philosophy*; McTaggart, *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*; Royce, *The World and the Individual*; Stout, *Manual of Psychology*; Wallace, *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind, The Logic of Hegel (Prolegomena)*, also, *Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics*. (c) Concerning the topic 'genesis' in the mental life, consult: Baldwin, *Mental Development*, I-II, also, *Development and Evolution*; Bosanquet, *Psychology of the Moral Self*; Harris, *Psychologic Foundations of Education*; Hobhouse, *Mind in Evolution*; James, *Principles of Psychology*; Ormond, *Foundations of Knowledge*; Stout, *Manual of Psychology*. (d) Concerning the 'social' character of consciousness, consult: Baldwin, *Mental Development*, I-II, also, *Development and Evolution*; Mezes, *Ethics Descriptive and Explanatory*; Royce, *The World and the Individual, Outlines of Psychology*, also, *Studies in Good and Evil*; Stephen, *Science of Ethics*; Stout, *Manual of Psychology*; Tarde, *Laws of Imitation*; Wallace, *Lectures and Essays*. (e) Concerning 'self-realization' as the moral ideal, consult: Alexander, *Moral Order and Progress*; Bosanquet, *Philosophical Theory of the State*; Bradley, *Ethical Studies*; Dewey, *Outlines of Ethics*; Duff, *Spinoza's Political and Ethical Philosophy*; Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*; Laurie, *Ethica*; Mackenzie, *Manual of Ethics*; Moore, *Principia Ethica*; Muirhead, *The Elements of Ethics*; Paulsen, *A System of Ethics*; Sorley, *Ethics of Naturalism*; Taylor, *The Problem of Conduct*.

FURTHER PROBLEMS FOR STUDY. — 1. The concept of mental activity. 2. The bearings of pragmatism on educational theory. 3. The nature of experience. 4. Mind as product and as principle. 5. The psychology of the 'ethical' self. 6. Society as a psychological organization. 7. The rational sanction of social service. 8. Correspondence of the processes of individual and social development.

IX. DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION

§ XXXII. Transitional Character of the Society of the Present.

1. THE more important causes tending to modify modern social life are: (*a*) the progress of political democracy, leading to increased political interdependence; (*b*) the great industrial and commercial advance, leading to a unique development of the sciences and in turn tending to produce an almost absolute economic interdependence; (*c*) the progress of social democracy, and the modification of methods in religious and philanthropic activities made in response to the new social needs, and serving to quicken among men the sense of their moral and spiritual unity.

2. The significance of the progress in political democracy — Rise of Western democracy — Interpretation of Maine's statement: 'The modern popular government of our day is of purely English origin.' — The ideals of liberty, equality, fraternity — The fundamental political doctrine of Western democracy assumes the native equality of all men — Strictly understood, the ideal of equality is inapplicable to human beings —

Understood as an assertion of the moral and spiritual worth of an individual as compared with a mere instrument — Equality as part of a social ideal — The individualism of democracy is ethical, not numerical — The justification of movements which make for a greater equalization of ways and means — The extension of the sphere of duty and responsibility — Political democracy depends for its stability on the education of its citizens.

3. The Industrial Revolution.

Certain of the more immediate social results of the Industrial Revolution may be noted: (*a*) the substitution of the factory system for the domestic system of industry; (*b*) growth of the spirit of competition; (*c*) industrial depressions; (*d*) the growth of the science of economics; (*e*) certain socialistic tendencies (as forms of expression of the democratic impulse); (*f*) a tendency to materialism in thought and life.

Of its significance in the transition to democracy, Arnold Toynbee wrote: "The old system is gone never to return. The separation lamented by Carlyle was inevitable; but we can now see that it was not wholly evil. A terrible interval of suffering there was, indeed, when the workman, flung off by his master, had not yet found his feet; but that is passing away, and the separation is recognized as a necessary moment in that industrial progress which enabled the workman to take a new step in advance. The detested cash-nexus was a sign, not of

dissolution, but of growth; not of the workman's isolation, but of his independence. If, however, Carlyle was mistaken in denouncing the Revolution, he was right in proclaiming that isolation is not the permanent relation of human life. If history teaches us that separation is necessary, it also teaches us that permanent separation is impossible. The law of progress is that men separate; but they separate in order to unite. The old union vanishes, but a new union springs up in its place. The old union founded on the dependence of the workman disappears; a new union arises based on the workman's independence. And the new union is deeper and wider than the old. For workman and employer parted as protector and dependent, to unite as equal citizens of a free state. Democracy makes union possible — creates its initial conditions." (*The Industrial Revolution*, pp. 199, 200.)

4. While it must be admitted that in the transition to the new type of social life there has been a quickening among men of the sense of their moral and spiritual unity, yet it would be a task of some difficulty to prove that in the process of substituting the new political and industrial system for the older one the sense of ethical interdependence had kept pace with that of economic or even political interdependence; that the spirit of coöperation, of the labor of men for the good of man, had developed as rapidly as the spirit of competition.

§ XXXIII. The Ethics of Democracy.

1. In the two preceding chapters it has been maintained: (a) that society *as actually constituted* exists for the sake of an end which is fundamentally ethical; (b) that an examination of the fundamental institutions which compose society reveals this ideal at work as a formative influence in every personality that yields obedience to them; (c) that the principle of cohesion in social life and institutions is the ideal of a moral organism in which the capacities of each individual member shall have opportunity for their fullest realization, and in which the perfection of each shall contribute to the perfection of all; (d) that the moral conduct of the individual consists in a free and yet responsible ordering of his thoughts, affections, and desires with a view to the realization of such a moral world. It is now contended that in this conception of the social purpose is found the ethical principle of democratic society. Moral personality is, therefore, the real presupposition and goal of the social process.

2. In the preceding chapters it was maintained that in human society, in the social process, there goes forward a process of differentiation and integration through the emergence of the individual, of the person, on the one hand, and on the other, of his increasing dependence upon the labors of others. From one point of view social

evolution is the result of one individual learning to perform some one function which may enable another to give his attention to something else; it is a division of labor. Society may thus be considered the medium in which this tendency to reciprocity, inherent in human nature, is becoming organized. Thus it implies a fundamental interdependence between its members, an increasing reaction of one upon another, as well as a continual interchange of services among them. There thus emerges a category constitutive and regulative in the social process — that of *vicariousness*, in other words, the conception of the ultimate reality of society as conditioned by *the just interchange of services among its members*. The present social order is stable to the degree in which it secures this just interchange of services among its members: it is insecure, or at least transitional, to the degree that we have as yet only partial interchange of services, and at times an out-and-out repudiation of social responsibilities on the part of some (or perhaps many) of its constituent members. Thus it will be seen how the many phases of the social situation may be analyzed in terms of the inadequate realization of vicariousness. A particular level of society represents a balancing of services between its members. So long as this exchange is real and proportional the social process remains equable. A period of tension arises whenever a group of members feel that the just exchange of serv-

ices is interrupted or arrested. In such a period there is a disturbance of the vicarious relations due to an unfair avoidance of responsibility on the part of some member or class within the social unity. In many cases where there is a disturbance of the social functioning there is undoubtedly a positive shirking of duty; it may very well be, however, that in the majority of instances an individual, or a class within the social unity, has but lost for a time and has not yet regained the moral insight necessary to accommodation or adaptation within the modified social system.

To illustrate briefly: It is a matter of general knowledge how, during the past century, in industrial life the man was in instance after instance displaced by the machine. Production was enormously increased, and may be expected to increase more and more in the future. There certainly seems to be a sense in which, with the increase of productive power, the factor of individual capacity has decreased. It may be at once conceded that the worker's position is in many respects better than before; and yet there may be more than a mere monetary division between rich and poor. The question is rather, What share does the worker have in what he produces? With what interest, what motive, does he do his work? What are the moral and spiritual values for him in the work produced by him, but appropriated by another who has neither the disposition nor the knowl-

edge to give back to the worker some social, moral, or spiritual equivalent of his work? Do the words of Mill, it may be asked, still hold: "The very idea of distributive justice, or any proportionality between success and merit, or between success and exertion, is, in the present state of society, so manifestly chimerical as to be relegated to the region of Romance"?

3. An important phase, therefore, of the social problem of the present may be outlined as follows:—

(1) The ideal of democracy is the union of free persons in a common life. In a society that is completely moralized, *i.e.* organized, the social order would not only be realized, but consciously realized under appropriate modifications by each member. A society is not truly organic, *i.e.* completely moralized, until it has as many centers of conscious experience as it has members. Democracy is therefore endeavoring to develop a moral organism in which there is at once coöperation and scope for individual freedom.

(2) The test of any type of society or civilization lies in its manner of distributing its spiritual possessions, of mediating its fund of spiritual experiences and values: and in its efficiency (by means of institutions, the state, vocations, education) in enabling the individual to enter upon his social inheritance, and thus to accommodate himself to the social system. A modern society cannot long maintain itself unless there is some approach to

justice and proportion in the distribution or the mediation of its spiritual goods and values among all its members.

(3) It must be recognized, further, that the industrial type of society is the medium through which the further realization of democracy is to take place. Through the disturbance of social relationships consequent upon the growth of the modern industrial system, there is danger that, for a time at least, society may be perverted into a mere mechanism for the accomplishment of what is in reality a subordinate purpose of the social process, the accumulation of wealth. The question uppermost in the minds of perhaps a majority at the present is that of the distribution not of the spiritual possessions of humanity, but of wealth. Nor is it always a question of the distribution of wealth; rather it is frequently one of its monopolization by those who have neither proper knowledge nor the desire to render any social equivalent.

§ XXXIV. Education and Social Progress.

1. If education is to become a method of social evolution, then it would seem that a fundamental need of the social mind of the present is such a disciplined social self-consciousness as will gradually express itself in more intelligent and more thoroughgoing methods of social intervention. There need not be any depreciation of the experience of the past, and no honest effort should

be undervalued. Yet any creditable program for social betterment must be based on an adequate investigation and formulation of all the conditions of human welfare. There is real danger when any one of the so-called elements of the social problem is attacked in isolation from the rest. Such an attempt may tend only to increase the popular sensitiveness and irritation. A social theory, issuing in a social method, is essential to any approximately adequate preparation for the study of the problem of social reconstruction. Only through such study—a study in which all the elements are brought together in organic relation—is one enabled to see how social tendencies may be projected into coherent and tenable social ideals. In like manner, lack of clearness concerning the objects at which education should aim, the ways in which educational principles should be applied to the concrete problems of social life, and lack of correlation among the various educational factors in society, are responsible for many of the shortcomings which exist in present educational practice. Education has become the most important method of social intervention. It aims consciously to control the direction of social progress. It is the institution by which democratic society will more and more consciously aim to secure the further realization of its own ideal.

2. Nowhere in the world does there appear to have developed such a truly idealistic and spiritual view of

the possibility of education, and of the rights of the individual to the benefits which education may confer upon him as in America, and nowhere hitherto does it appear that firmer foundations have been laid for the realization of such an ideal than in its democratic institutions, its material prosperity, its elemental interest and desire to preserve and further the common good of its citizens. The educational process in American life has been part of the entire struggle for existence which the American people have been facing from the time of its formation as a nation. While in a study of the concrete educational situation, from a superficial point of view, the great variety of educational programs and devices put forward from time to time would seem to present but hopeless variety of opinion, destitute of any internal coherence or system, yet rightly regarded, these problems and attempted solutions are not accretions, but phases or aspects of the one persistent attempt of educational leaders to adjust the educational system in its constituent parts to the demands and necessities of the expanding social life. This diversity in educational theories and solutions frequently arises from starting from parts taken in abstraction from the whole to which they belong, or in the emphasis of motives apart from their broader significance; that is, their relation to the entire social process. The only solution of the difficulty lies in further experiment and reflection, — a thorough-

going study of conditions, and an increasing willingness to abide by the results of scientific investigation and reflection. This will involve: —

(1) the gradual organization and development of an educational methodology, *i.e.* a way of thinking on educational matters, in which all the elements of the problem will be given recognition in the spirit of the American national purpose and ideal. For such a formulation of a national educational idea or policy a more thorough study will be necessary of the political and social ideals which have molded American life and have constituted, and still constitute, the background of American education.

(2) a completer organization and articulation of the various members of the educational system, primary, secondary, university, technical, professional. This demands a consideration of the purposes and types of each, of their interrelations, and of their function in national education as a whole.

(3) an analysis of the democratic-industrial ideal, and an investigation of methods by which restrictions on individual development due to inadequate economic conditions may be removed or somewhat ameliorated.

(4) a determination of the function and extent of industrial and vocational education. This would necessitate the study of industrial education as a social structure or instrument, developed and developing in response

to the conditions involved in a particular environing situation which demands readjustment. An analysis of its nature can be carried out (*a*) by locating the primary situation in which the instrument had its origin, (*b*) by tracing its successive modifications, due to the tensions, conflicts, needs in the changing media, through which the structure has reached its present conformation, and (*c*) by discovering its efficiency in meeting the problems presented in the successive environmental situations.

(5) a study of means whereby the culture materials in the intellectual life of the period may be made more generally available; a study also of methods by which the agencies of culture — churches, newspapers, periodicals, the theater, etc. — may, through public opinion, be themselves enriched and elevated.

Carlyle asserted that “the universal democracy, whatever we may think of it, has declared itself as an inevitable fact in the days in which we live.” Democracy, as it has taken shape and body in American life, has been no mere theory of government, but has been tested and confirmed as a principle and energy of life immanent in the experience and aspirations of its citizens. To interpret and strengthen this idea American education must become itself more and more an embodiment in its component parts of the social purpose and ideal. For this there must be a quickening and an

awakening of the imagination and thought of students to meet the new situations presented in the emergence of America as a world-power, with its national responsibilities and its consequent opportunities in suggesting and helping to maintain the world peace of the future.

3. A fundamental problem of present society is that of mediating its fund of interests and values in such a way that all its members may gain a deeper consciousness of the social significance of their work. In other words, How can the industrial organization be more completely socialized and spiritualized? How can correct moral values be restored to men as guiding forces in the aims of life, and the sense of the moral and spiritual unity of mankind be made more and more to prevail? Just here is a point of interaction between the problem of social progress and that of education.

This, it would appear, is the *concrete educational problem* of society at the present time, and it is the specific problem which the various educational tendencies moving spontaneously and more or less consciously in the educational situation of the present under the name of industrial and vocational education are attempting to meet. It can scarcely be a matter of doubt that some form of industrial education, municipal, state, or national, is now in the process of organization, and there can be as little doubt that the essential task of educational

methodology is the organization of a program of industrial education such as, while providing for such training of the individual as will make for the maximum of economic efficiency, will at the same time restore to the individual something of the moral and æsthetic values which inhered in the personal and social activities in their more primitive forms, as well as a deeper consciousness of the social and therewith the spiritual significance and sanction of his work.

4. One of the sanctions of social service in the individual and the institution must be a deepening sense of the interdependence of men and the right of each individual human being, up to the limit of his capacity and willingness to contribute to the common fund of human values, to participate in the heritage of spiritual wealth which the generations of men have slowly garnered and transmitted for the enrichment of those who come after. One of the points requiring emphasis in the present period of transition, when the claims of former sanctions are supposedly in question, is a more general recognition of and a deeper responsiveness to human needs — the demand of a wider and deeper *humanism* in thought and life. "The growing good of the world," wrote George Eliot, "is partly dependent on unhistoric acts; and that things are not so ill with you and me as they might have been is half owing to the number who lived faithfully a hidden life, and rest in unvisited tombs."

- REFERENCES. — (a) Concerning the concept of democracy, consult: Addams, *Democracy and Social Ethics*, also *Newer Ideals of Peace*; Alexander, *Moral Order and Progress*; Bosanquet, *Aspects of the Social Problem*, also, *The Philosophical Theory of the State*; Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*; Butler, *Education in the United States, The American as He Is*, also, *True and False Democracy*; Carlton, *Education and Industrial Evolution*; Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, also, *Social Organization*; Cunningham, *Western Civilization*; Davidson, *Education of the Wage Earners*; Dewey, *School and Society*; Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*; Donisthorpe, *Individualism*; Dunning, *History of Political Theories*; Eliot, *American Contributions to Civilization*, also, *Educational Reform*; Giddings, *Democracy and Empire*; Godkin, *Problems of Modern Democracy*; Hadley, *The Education of the American Citizen*, also, *The Relations between Freedom and Responsibility in the Evolution of Democratic Government*; Hobson, *The Social Problem*; Jones, *The Working Faith of a Social Reformer*; MacCunn, *The Ethics of Citizenship*; Mackenzie, *Introduction to Social Philosophy*; Mallock, *Aristocracy and Evolution*; McKechnie, *The State and the Individual*; Mill, *Autobiography*, also, *Dissertations and Discussions*; Ritchie, *Natural Rights, Darwin and Hegel*, also, *Studies in Political and Social Ethics*; Santayana, *The Life of Reason*; Shaler, *The Individual*; Stephen (F.), *Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity*; Stephen (L.), *Social Rights and Duties*; Stubbs, *Christ and Democracy*; Van Dyke, *The Spirit of America*; Vincent, *The Social Mind and Education*.
- (b) On industrial education, consult: Carlton, *Education and Industrial Evolution*; Clark, *The Distribution of Wealth*; Dewey, *Culture and Industry in Education*, in *Educational Bi-Monthly*,

1906; Ellwood, *Sociology and Modern Social Problems*; Ely, *Studies in the Evolution of Industrial Society*; Forrest, *The Development of Western Civilization*; Hobson, *The Evolution of Modern Capitalism, The Social Problem*, also, *The Economics of Distribution*; Huxley, *Industrial Education, its Necessity in the Struggle for Existence*, in *Nineteenth Century*, February, 1888; Mackenzie, *The Relation between Ethics and Economics*, in *International Journal of Ethics*, 1893; Murray, *Philosophy and Industrial Life*, in *Monist*, Vol. IV; Russell, *The School and Industrial Life*, in *Educational Review*, December, 1909, also, *The Trend in American Education*, in *University of Cincinnati Bulletin*; Seligman, *The Economic Interpretation of History*; Simons, *Social Forces in American History*; Smart, *The Place of Industry in the Social Organism*, in *International Journal of Ethics*, 1893; Toynbee, *Lectures on the Industrial Revolution of the Eighteenth Century in England*; Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*.

FURTHER PROBLEMS FOR STUDY. — 1. The contention of Sir Henry Maine that 'democracy is the product of a whole series of accidents.' 2. Equality. 3. Individualism. 4. Morality of competition. 5. Social settlements in a democracy. 6. Lecky's contention that 'modern democracy is not favorable to the higher forms of the intellectual life.' 7. The education of public opinion.

X. THE SCHOOL AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION

“LET us pause a moment,” said Phillips Brooks at the celebration of the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the foundation of the Boston Latin School, “and think what this school-keeping and school-going means: There stands the master, like a priest between the present and the past, between the living and the dead, between the ideas and the life of the world. His is a noble, nay a holy, priesthood. He is the lens through which truth pours itself on young human souls; he is the window through which fresh young eyes look out at human life; and there around him sit his scholars. Like Homer’s heroes they are in the frankness and directness of their life. They make their friendships and their feuds. They meet the old temptations with their sublime young confidence. That school is to them their hill of Ida or their palace of Jerusalem. They are Paris or Solomon in their critical encounters with the nobler and baser allurements of life. Yet for the time they live magnificently apart. The old world roars around them and they do not care, but live their separate life and are in no impatience for State Street or Court Street. In these days School Street and the Common and the

Charles River made their sufficient world. This ever recurring life of the new generations, this narrow life of boyhood opening by and by into the larger experience of manhood, to be narrowed again into the boyhood of their children, and so perpetually, — this makes perpetual inspiration; this makes the rhythmic life of the community. It is the systole and diastole of the city's heart. . . . The most valuable, perhaps, of all things which the new public school represented was that which we may hold to constitute the greatest claim of the public school system in all time to our affection and esteem. It represented the fundamental idea of the town undertaking the education of her children. It is in the loyalty, the gratitude, the educated notion of obedience to the town which has trained them. It is in the dignity and breadth and seriousness which the sense that their town is training them gives to their training that the advantage of the public school boys over the boys of the best private schools always consists. And this was already present from the day that the doors of the first public school were opened, two hundred and fifty years ago. The boys of Pormont and of Woodmansey were dimly conscious of it, and it had influence on them. Who was it that had built their schoolhouse? Who was it that had laid out their course of study and arranged their hours? Who was it that set them their lessons and heard their recitations? Whose were the sacred hands

that flogged them? Who was it that sat, a shadowy form, but their real ruler and friend, behind the master's awful chair? It was their town. That is the real heart of the whole matter. This is the real power of the public school system always. It educates the thought of law and obedience, the sense of mingled love and fear, which is the true citizen's true emotion to his city. It educates this in the very lessons of the schoolroom, and makes the person of the state the familiar master of the subject from his boyhood. Such has been the power of our Latin School for two centuries and a half."

§ XXXV. The Continuity of the Educational Process.

1. The educative process is essentially continuous. The idea fundamental to the process is the realization of the individual through his increasing participation in the knowledge, the interests, and the activities of social life. From the individual's earliest infancy this process of participation is widened and deepened, and always to some degree under the direction and control of the expectations and demands of those who form the social inclosure of his childhood. Family life, no matter how unorganized it may at first sight appear, saturates the child's mind, directs his activity and thus introduces some degree of order into his unregulated impulses. In the school, as at present constituted, is found a more highly organized factor in the process of mediating the fund of

social interests and values and thus securing the social transformation and control of the individual. Yet while the school as a moral institution may perform its task more consciously or more systematically than the family or the other educative institutions, it cannot do so more inevitably or with more permanent or far-reaching effect. As was indicated in Chapter VII the entire environment of the individual as concentrated in the great human institutions, the home, the school, the vocation, the state, and the church, is to be regarded fundamentally as a medium in which the educational process, as a unitary and continuous thing, is organized and directed. The policy of conserving the social order by means of a system of education is practically as old as society itself. The school as a form of institutional life is the special instrument devised by society for maintaining the existing standard of civilization by conferring upon the individual its spiritual possessions, and thereby enabling him to become a bearer of the social purpose.

2. As in the wider life of society, so in the school, the problem of education is the solution of the equation between the individual and society. The 'social personality' seems to represent the ideal. In other words, to repeat a little, the offering of the individual to the educational process, or to society, is a capacity (at first in the form of mere impulse or instinct, of course), a power of action; in other words, himself as an organ

or instrument; on the other hand, society's gift to the individual is (a) a method by which his impulses, instincts, etc., may be regulated and organized, and thereby his experience brought under control; (b) a worth, an interpretation, a significance, a value. Selfishness, of course, arises in the individual in so far as he regards any one of his powers or capacities as belonging to himself alone, and not as a medium for social functions; on the other hand, society treats the individual unjustly, causing his activity to become mechanical and deadening, when and where it withholds from him the quickening and expanding influence of its spiritual possessions, in the way of science, art, and literature. Thus the school, in society, must function in mediating the fund of spiritual values, interests, ideals, worths to the individual, and it must do this to the end that the individuals coming under its influence may be enabled to recognize — rather, to realize — the spiritual significance of their work. Education as a whole aims to saturate the activities and experiences of men and women with ideal values.

“Education,” writes Professor Welton in his latest volume, *The Psychology of Education*, p. 490, “especially school education, can do little directly. But it must do what it can, and here under ‘education,’ I include all personal agencies for the moral improvement and elevation of the people. Everything which strengthens self-respect and develops strength of purpose, which

increases knowledge pertinent to life and cultivates critical thought, which broadens the social outlook and deepens charity, has an influence in developing individual capacity and, through that development, in reducing the faults and in strengthening the virtues of that soul of the people on which alone the destinies of our country depend.”

§ XXXVI. The Social Organization of the School.

1. The reality of the school life consists in the reality of the social experience to be found there. The school represents a social method — a selected social tendency raised to consciousness, organized, and systematized for the more definite and adequate fulfillment of the social need in which it originated and which it attempted to meet. It has become, in a sense, a highly specialized organ in the wider system. Within it there is, so to speak, a concentration of social influences designed for the production of certain social results. The school selects and presents in a more conscious and organized way those forms of experience through which society attempts to reënforce the life of its members for more effective membership in the social order. Life in the school has thus its own meaning inhering in its own order as well as its relation to the wider order of society. It is a form of life as well as a preparation for life. Yet after all the reality of the school to its members exists

in the reality of the social experience within it. It is a social institution, a mode of community life.

2. Not only must the school be an instrument of social order, it must also become more and more an instrument of social progress. At the present time the danger is lest the emphasis be placed upon the school as an instrument to individual success, rather than as a force making for social order and progress. Just here it may be well to indicate in outline certain ways in which the school aims to realize the social purpose.

(a) It presents a more comprehensive social environment than the average home or neighborhood. It furnishes accordingly an opportunity for the widening of the individual's consciousness of kind and thus gives to his experience a more socialized character and inculcates the social disposition and habit. The school takes the child out of the narrower environment of his home or neighborhood and introduces him to a wider medium of assimilation. In addition to the wider personal contacts of the school he is brought into relation with typical forms or representations of a wider social life in which there is common activity and interest on the part of the group. While the school life is a preparation for the life to follow, it is nevertheless an actual community life in itself. In American life the school has become a unifying force akin to that of the church in the Middle Ages.

(b) The school in its various forms, elementary, secondary, higher, and by means of its manifold agencies, curriculum, method, discipline, organization, seeks to present existing social life in simpler and purer, *i.e.* more ideal, form. Were there no such socializing medium as the school, the individual, it is quite conceivable, would be distracted by the very multiplicity of the contacts, intellectual, practical, personal, of his complex environment. The school is selective; yet not in opposition to the conditions of actual social life; its aim is rather to embody that idea towards which actual social life is struggling. In this very fact, that it is selective, there emerges a tendency to change or vary — a tendency which, when organized, may make, or indeed has made, of the school the most effective instrument in the onward movement of society.

(c) Were there no such common meeting ground as the school, the individual would be forced into contact with only the members of his own group or social position. In the American public school there are to be found individuals of many and diverse nationalities, from many and diverse environments. The school thus becomes in a unique way a medium of assimilation, performing a work which could not be undertaken by either family, church, or state. It has been instinctively felt by the American people that only the school conceived as a social institution could unify its heterogeneous population. In the

school is the individual's first conscious knowledge of the meaning of a commonwealth. Learning to abide by a rule that is good for all individuals, they instinctively come to feel the reality of the social unity, the social spirit, the sense of human interdependence. From their first entrance to the school they have some inkling of that ever fruitful source of human blessing, the sense of human solidarity.

3. Certain advantages and dangers in school education may be noted:—

Advantages: (a) From the point of view of the state it is a legitimate form of self-preservation; it is a preparation for citizenship, through submission to authority, through respect for the rights of others, and through loyalty to some ideal. (b) Provision is made against the imperfection or contingency of private effort. (c) It provides a more complete social medium for the development of independence, emulation, leadership, than purely individual or private instruction. (d) It supplies the individual's first experience of public opinion and the reality of social judgment, justice, order, coöperation, fair play, etc.

Disadvantages or dangers: (a) The danger lest the school may fail to keep pace with the changing social life. The school, naturally conservative, may become inflexible, and fail to respond to the demands of life in curriculum, discipline, etc. (b) The danger that indi-

viduality may be submerged. The public school has been likened to a mold in which the state forms her future citizens. This danger has, perhaps, been over-emphasized. If there is individuality, it will assert itself, if not through, then in spite of, the school. It is essential, however, that in the school a balance be maintained between what may be called the individualization and the assimilation of the individual unit to the social process. (c) The danger from overpressure and fruitless or purposeless activity. It is a matter of great difficulty to organize a curriculum, a method of grading, a system of promotion, which will conform in a satisfactory way to the varied needs of the individual children. (d) The danger of the school's becoming an aggressor against the legitimate function of other institutions. The school must not become a disintegrating force in society; it must not undermine the influence or integrity of the home, the community, the state, or the church by assuming their rightful functions — functions, indeed, which only they can adequately perform.

4. It is, of course, not to be forgotten that to the teacher is committed the organization of the community life of the school. Herein lies the precise social significance of his work. The stimuli which reach the individual members of the group are in the last resort mediated by the teacher. From the spiritual quality of his work

the various features of the school life, the ideas, the ideals, the suggestions, the copy set, inevitably take form and color. It is through the medium of personal and human contacts that education proceeds. The function of the teacher is ultimately to assist and confirm the individual in his growing realization of the social purpose. Action in its highest sense, in teaching as elsewhere, is doing with adequate realization of the meaning of what we are doing.

REFERENCES. — In addition to the works in Sociology and Ethics referred to in previous chapters, the following may be consulted: Bosanquet, *Psychology of the Moral Self*; Barnett, *Common Sense in Education*; Bryant, *Educational Ends*; Cooley, *Social Organization*; Davidson, *Education of the Wage Earners*; Dewey, *The School and Society*, *The Educational Situation*, *Psychology and Social Practice*, also, *Moral Principles in Education*; Dutton, *Social Phases of Education*; Henderson, C. H., *Education and the Larger Life*; Henderson, E. N., *Principles of Education*; Hyde, *Practical Idealism*; Mark, *Individuality and the Moral Aim in Education*; Parker, *Concentration*; Rooper, *Studies and Addresses*; Scott, *Social Education*; Search, *An Ideal School*; Skrine, *Pastor Agnorum*; Thring, *Education and School*; Tompkins, *School Management*; Welton, *The Psychology of Education*; Young, *Isolation in the School*, also, *Ethics in the School*.

FURTHER PROBLEMS FOR STUDY. — 1. Individuality as an end in education. 2. The function of education in democratic society. 3. Isolation in the school. 4. The school as a selective agency in social life. 5. The private school in democratic society. 6. The public school as a social center. 7. The school as an instrument of social progress.

XI. THE INTELLECTUAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SCHOOL

§ XXXVII. The Interrelation of Subject Matter and Method.

1. IN coming to the question of the intellectual organization of the school, we encounter at once the problems of subject matter and method. What determines these two elements of the process within the school, and what are their mutual relations? It has been maintained that the course of study is the medium through which the methods and values inherent in social experience are communicated to the child. The subject matter of the school represents the corporate or interrelated aspects of the spiritual organism of social experience or activity. Method is the form of personal realization and penetration of the intellectual and moral order of the school. Studies as modes of self-realization involve: (a) instincts, interests, activities pointing to social life; (b) norms, interpretations, values conferred by society upon the individual. While it is difficult to make any rigid classification, the two groups of studies may be stated as: (a) the *sciences*, representing the processes (the control side) by which social life is sustained; (b) the *humanities*,

which interpret and determine the relative values (the appreciation side) of the various forms of social activity. The differing, and yet complementary, contributions of the sciences and the humanities form an organic unity in the upbuilding of the personal experience of the child. The process of instruction is the mediating between the intellectual order of the school and the mind of the pupil in such a way that the latter may conform to its law, not as a matter of constraint, but as the natural expression of his own mind.

2. A very persistent conception of the relation of subject matter to method may be stated thus: On the one hand, the subject matter is classified and arranged as a preëxisting objective material, ready to be imported into the mind. Method, on the other hand, is regarded as a purely formal affair, an altogether psychological matter, as though the mind were self-subsisting apart from its relations (or its environment), and had certain powers or modes of acting in and for itself. Just as for philosophic dualism there was an intrinsic separation between mind and matter, so, in much of the modern discussion of the course of study, there is implied an intrinsic separation between mind and subject matter. The relation of subject matter and method thus becomes as difficult of comprehension as the Cartesian dualism of matter and mind. If against the Cartesian view of mind it be maintained that the so-called *subject* (mind)

and the so-called *object* (the world) are equally the differentiated aspects or results of a unitary process, we are inevitably forced to the conclusion that subject matter and method are not completely isolable entities, but are fundamentally the *terminal or differentiated aspects of the process of development of a unitary experience*.

3. On the other hand, it is to be kept in mind that subject matter is not something hard and fixed, external to the mind. The educational process is not the outcome of a mind with preformed faculties exercising upon external material, nor is it the adaptation of the mind to a material completely predetermined. It is a process in which the organization of the material goes hand in hand with the organization of a self or person (compare the distinction between the *logical* versus the *psychological* view of studies). The constitutive and defining element in a study is the particular interest or impulse it represents in the organic unity of experience. Studies fundamentally represent constructions by the mind of the world within experience from particular points of view. They arise through the interests, attitudes, and tensions, in the process of self-maintenance and self-development. But they exist only in the process of the experience of individuals. As 'educational' material, so called, studies have existence only in the experience of some individual. The individual as subject of the experience, as the one through whom the movement of experience

takes place, is the ultimate center of differentiation and integration in which mental development consists. The soul at any stage is an organic whole, and analysis and synthesis (or differentiation and integration) are correlative elements in the one organic movement of experience. From this point of view, therefore, it must be maintained that the nature of the mind at its various levels is an indispensable element in the determination of the course of study. In other words, just as for the theory of knowledge, subject and object are but the terminal aspects of the unitary process, so the *mind of the individual* with its attitudes, interests, instincts, on the one side, and *studies*, on the other, are fundamentally the terminal aspects or limits of a unitary, educative experience-process. In the process of learning, the two are organically united.

§ XXXVIII. The Problem of the Course of Study.

1. Education as a social institution has been defined (Chapter II) as the method by which a particular generation endeavors to incorporate the vital elements of its civilization or culture into the life of the generation which succeeds it. The spiritual possessions of society are the outcome of the race-experience, and education is the method used by the race to enable its immature members to participate in their intellectual and moral inheritance. The problem, then, of the course of study is in reality the

problem of adjusting (*a*) the agent or person and (*b*) the demands and opportunities of his sphere of action. There is a sense in which the individual is the ultimate factor in the movement of the educative experience. That is, in order to be *educational*, facts, ideals, activities, must not only be appropriated, but transformed into the knowledge, purpose, or activity of the individual. This, however, does not mean that education is the product of the individual alone. For the requirements of the situation furnish the stimulus and control the response of the agent, and thus the direction of the movement of individual experience. In other words, *in the determination of the course of study, not the interests and activities of the individual, but the ideals, the requirements, the activities, of society constitute the final standard.*

2. The problem of the school is fundamentally the problem of securing the mental development of the child through supplying such materials as stimulate impulses which are in line with right habits. This mental development implies (*a*) a movement of experience, through the self-active principle inherent in it, of the child (as one element in the interaction process) from one level of experience to another, (*b*) an increasing control of experience, (*c*) an increasing realization of its meaning and significance. This movement of experience is a process at once of differentiation and integration or organization. In the school the process of social interaction, in which

education consists, is given form and direction by means of the so-called 'studies' which serve as stimuli. Studies may be regarded as plans of action for the interpretation and control by the individual of his crude and unformed experience. In estimating the value of a study the question is, What does such and such a study do towards deepening in both the control and appreciation the experience the child has had already, and in making this new control and appreciation an instrument of further experience? From one point of view a study may be looked upon as a symbol of some social activity; as such, studies are not independent entities, but aspects of one organism of experience, and in pursuing a study the child reproduces in imagination the social activity, of which it is the symbol, and learns something of its functional relation to the life about him.

3. Conceived in relation to the individual learner, studies represent phases in the movement or process of a unitary experience. This experience is continuous; it is also dynamic, transitional. Studies, then, must first of all appeal to the individual as continuous with his own experience. Studies represent, it has already been said, attempts towards a construction by the individual of the world of experience from particular points of view. They arise through the emergence in new situations of interests, attitudes, and tensions within the process of self-maintenance and self-development. From

this point of view, therefore, it is not entirely true that studies 'succeed' one another: the educative process is rather a continuous *re-formation* or *re-construction* of experience in the light of new interests and deepening appreciation of its significance.

§ XXXIX. The Making of the Course of Study.

The making of a course of study presents two main problems: (a) the question of selection; (b) the question of arrangement.

1. *Bases for the selection of school studies.*

(a) *Sociological.* — From the objective point of view the unity of the curriculum is ultimately to be found in the unity of social life. The various studies represent differentiated aspects of the organic unity of social life which the child is to come gradually to understand and appreciate. Does the study (as a group of facts or principles gathered together and systematized) embody some fundamental phase of social experience? Does it represent a fundamental manifestation or conviction in the spiritual life of the race? What great human interest is fundamental to it?

(b) *Psychological.* — The subjective principle of unity is afforded by the various interests and activities (instinctive, impulsive, habitual, or ideational) which emerge in the movement of individual experience, and which in the process of school activity should be organically united.

What part does the study play in helping the individual to interpret his crude experience and to control his powers with reference to social ends?

(1) It is not to be forgotten, of course, that these are phases or terminal aspects of one organic activity rather than separate or disparate processes. For example, it would be meaningless to select such and such a form of activity or interest for presentation to the child, were there no experience in some wise analogous to or the counterpart of this activity or interest within the experience of the child. While the studies selected must be as typical, as valuable, and as universal as possible, nevertheless, such study-material cannot be so remote as to make it impossible of apprehension and appreciation to some degree by means of analogous experiences in the life of the child.

(2) The final standard of educational values, it was maintained, is to be found, not in the interests, attitudes, and activities of the individual, but in the ideals, the values, the requirements, the activities, of social life. The movement of social experience is maintained through knowledge (science) and expression (art). Science, art, morality, are phases of the unitary, spiritual movement of social life. The curriculum affords (*a*) a method, (*b*) an interpretation or value, by which the individual learns the meaning of his capacities in their functional relation to the social order. Studies may be regarded as social

experience systematically organized as plans of action, by means of which the individual may master or interpret his own experience.

(3) The fundamental principle of the selection of educative material in the school will, therefore, be (a) from the objective point of view, social or institutional life, and (b) from the subjective point of view, the child with his various interests, attitudes, and activities conceived of as a member of the home, which is, in turn, in a process of increasing interaction with the other forms of institutional life, which constitute society — the school, the vocations, the state, the church. It will thus be recognized that by bringing together the child with his experiences, and society with its methods and values, its typical and universal activities, and the ideals towards which it is struggling, opportunity is provided for the form of social interaction in which the educational process consists.

2. *The problem of arrangement.*

As has been indicated above, there are two problems, one of differentiation (the problem of selection), one of integration (the problem of arrangement): How, on the one hand, shall the power of differentiation of the unitary experience into its inherently important forms be secured, and how, on the other hand, shall the various materials presented be arranged with reference to each other, so that the differentiation may be furthered, and yet the

unitary character of the learner's experience be preserved? This is the so-called problem of correlation. The arrangement of material should be controlled, it would appear, in accordance with the following principles: (a) Unity: the typical and universal activities or relationships of social life in a process of organization. (b) Continuity: the preservation of the continuity of experience. (c) Adaptation: the adjustment of the studies to the capacities of the child — of stimulus to response. (d) Reënforcement: the attempt to have the various activities in the school function together in the production of a unitary effect.

(1) The essential element in the problem of correlation is the *recognition of the psychological side of studies, i.e.* the recognition or realization of, *e.g.*, history or arithmetic from the child's point of view, what it is as a form or phase of living, present personal experience. Instead of assuming differentiation and moving backward, we should assume the organic unity of social experience, or the interrelation of studies (studies intrinsically related, since social experience is unitary), and move forward with the child. The difficulty lies, it would appear, in substituting the adult's consciousness for the consciousness of the child. The problem is: How out of a given unitary experience (a circle of thought, as Herbart would say, with which the child comes to school), through working it over, remaking, utilizing, defining it, there

gradually emerge the various studies. From this point of view, teacher and pupils coöperate in making the course of study.

(2) The doctrine of the social nature of consciousness has been perhaps sufficiently emphasized in previous sections. Here it is necessary, therefore, merely to indicate some of its more important implications in the theory of the course of study. These may be summarized as follows: (*a*) The necessity of continuity between the informal education of the home and the more formal education of the school. (*b*) The experience of the child, with its interests, activities, habits, forms the true center of correlation in the educational process, viewed from the psychological side. From the social point of view the principle is found in the typical social activities and interests. (*c*) (As a corollary of the preceding) Studies will have vital significance for the individual in the degree to which they can be related to the process of social life, and thus made, in turn, organic parts of the individual's needs, interests, purposes. (*d*) If social experience is unitary, it follows that there is but one subject matter, now emphasized from one point of view, and now from another, in accordance with the level of experience and ability attained by the pupils. (*e*) It is necessary to maintain organic connections or balance between the studies representing the facts or processes and those representing the ends or values of social life. (*f*) Char-

acter must be developed and trained, not so much through special instruction, as in the entire society of the school, individuals, studies, method, discipline, atmosphere.

3. If the curriculum as a whole is to be made an instrument of social progress, a means whereby the individual is to become, so to speak, socially efficient, it would appear that: (*a*) it must place emphasis upon the value of direct personal productive experience on the part of the individual; (*b*) throughout the entire school life it must give continuous opportunity for the close union of intelligence and will, of theory and practice; (*c*) it must provide for some personal intimacy with typical processes through which the society of the present is actually maintained and perpetuated.

§ XL. The Nature of Method.

1. The question of the relation of instruction to education is ultimately one with the question of the place of knowledge in experience. (See Chapter IV.) On the basis of a functional psychology it was maintained that the principles of social evolution are also the principles of individual development, that the same psychological principles or categories obtain in the organization of the knowledge, the conduct, and ideals of the individual as in the organization and evolution of human society. Accepting such an interpretation of the two processes, is it possible to find in the principles underlying the

evolutionary process the principles to be applied in the so-called method of instruction? Is it possible to discover in the process of instruction factors analogous to those in the process by which knowledge has been gained and built up from the biological point of view through the process of natural selection and survival, — factors such as may form the basis of an educational methodology?

2. How does thought emerge in the race, in the individual, and what is its function? Take again the example suggested in the paragraph on the place of knowledge in experience (Chapter IV). The organs of sense, it is maintained, had their origin in the problems of the life-process. Such chance variations (experimentations) as were of service in the life struggle were selected; others, offering no positive contribution, were discarded. The sense-organs were thus, in their origin, organs of adjustment, methods of economy; through natural selection their increasing perfection meant more perfect adjustment, *i.e.* increasing self-maintenance on the part of those possessing them. Thus, biologically, the knowledge mediated by the sense-organs had its origin in the needs of the life-process, and became an instrument of control in the preservation of life. Compare with this the emergence of thought in the individual. Referring again to Chapter IV, it was noted how, so long as experience flows smoothly, so long as habit suffices, there

is no occasion for the exercise of thought, since there is no problem to solve, no sense of failure, no stimulus to mental activity, no search for a better method, *i.e.* a better accommodation or adjustment. Just as soon as experience becomes problematic, that is, as soon as some break occurs in the adjustment process, thought in the form of discrimination, attention, and association emerges to secure a new accommodation (which is in reality of the nature of an experiment). An activity once successfully performed tends to be selected, to persist, to become a habit. Thus thought, knowledge, which had its origin in the activity of the life- or experience-process, becomes an instrument of control in the continuation of that life-process. Just here may be found the point of departure for the consideration of the so-called instruction process, which is essentially one of projection from one level of experience to another. Thought arises out of activity, and is ultimately for the sake of activity. Its function is the mediating between one level of experience to another by the substitution for an old habit (experience, activity), which has failed to satisfy, some new accommodation (which, if successful, will be selected and become a habit). The mind works by a process of experimentation, by trial and error, by the survival through selection of such variations as serve for the guidance of life and the mastery of environment. (See Chapter III.)

3. The method of instruction, it would appear accordingly, should conform to the laws and principles in accordance with which the human mind, whether in the child or the adult, works in the acquiring of experience. It consists of an interaction between the child (the individual), the studies, representing in simplified, but in organized, form the culture of the race (the environment), and the teacher as the organizer of the stimuli operative in this selected environment. In this process of interaction may be noted two phases: (a) one of presentation of materials or studies by the teacher; (b) one of assimilation or realization of the materials or studies in experience by the individual (the child). Method, accordingly, is ultimately the mode of the mind's activity in the realization and appropriation of the methods and values inherent in civilization.

4. What, then, is the nature of the learning process? Mental development, like development in any evolutionary process, is a process at once of differentiation and integration or organization. The question of development in the school is, How does the child's experience take shape and move on to organization? In the school this process is given form and direction by means of studies, which serve as stimuli to activity. The contribution of the children is instinctive or impulsive activities. Through the studies the teacher presents a stimulus. The first response is along the line of the

characteristic feature, or mode of action, suggested by the material or stimulus. This response takes some form of expression or activity, relative to the character of the stimulus; as such the response may be regarded as an experiment. (Compare above concerning the emergence of thought in the second paragraph of the present section.) Among the children (as in every form of life in a group) variations take place. These responses of the children to the presented material correspond to the variations among individuals in social life, and differ for the simple reason that individuals are born dissimilar. As variations, these responses are available by the teacher for the further projection of the experience of the individual members of the class. The valuable ones are consciously selected by the teacher on the basis of their approximation to, or manifestation of, a general principle or standard; by the comparison, emphasis, and idealization involved in this act of selection by the teacher, the children's activities are associated, raised to consciousness, and organized, and through imitation, suggestion, and reflection become the basis of new activities, a stimulus leading on to new types of response and activity. (Compare the formation of habit on the basis of an activity successfully performed.) *The expression of the child's idea, through technique of whatever nature, is gradually transformed through comparison, emphasis, selection, criticism, idealization, and reconstruction, and is thus*

made the source of a movement to a higher form, with a correspondingly increased control, a deepening appreciation, and a fuller realization of the meaning of the experience or the idea to which expression is given. The movement is through activity (always of the nature of an experiment) to selection, to higher activity through a ceaseless process of interpreting, organizing, extending, and reshaping experience.

Method, accordingly, as the realization and appropriation of experience involves: —

- (a) activity — in the sense of experimentation;*
- (b) selection of such activities as approximate to or manifest a general principle or standard;*
- (c) organization through emphasis, selection, imitation, suggestion, idealization, of class activities on the basis of selected products.*

5. The method of instruction in whatever grade, in whatever study, from the kindergarten to the university, should, it would seem, approximate to the general method of procedure thus outlined. The upward movement of experience is through individual experiment or contribution, its modification and improvement through the influence of the social criterion, its confirmation and maintenance through the social judgment. This attempt to make a statement of method is an endeavor to make a conscious formulation of tendencies which inevitably move more or less spontaneously in the experience of individuals

and the practice of the schoolroom. It is an attempt to raise to consciousness and to state in the form of an educational principle what is a matter of everyday experience and activity. While its application from time to time, from class to class, must change, the principle as a principle persists, and is capable of ever new variations of application under ever varying conditions. *Its central idea is that progress, whether in the natural or human orders, is always achieved through the individual variation.*

A few illustrations may be recalled in this connection. Take again the instance already given of the child learning to talk. (See Chapter VIII.) The child's contribution is the impulse to utter sound. This instinctive activity is at first unconscious and performed with no end in view. The result proving to any degree satisfactory, the activity is selected and the experiment repeated by the child. Consciously or unconsciously the mother selects and emphasizes by repetition those sounds which approximate to words of the spoken language (the standard). The child, through interest and attention, leading to an elementary type of discrimination, gradually comes to associate certain sounds with certain objects. His impulse to utter sound is thus rendered conscious, shaped to a degree, strengthened, organized, and made interpretative (after a fashion) of his experience, and thus instrumental to a higher type of activity.

Take as another illustration a kindergarten class already somewhat familiar with the use of the building blocks. On the suggestion of the teacher, or of the children on the basis of their previous experience with the blocks, the children each build a house. Here again the resources of the teacher in the instruction process are found in the variations (experimental) approximating to the type or standard. There is a certain pooling of the interests and experiments of all the individuals of the class. The teacher in the exercise of her criticism and appreciation of the contributions of the children may be said to represent the judgment or standard of society. In the comparison, emphasis, suggestion, criticism, discrimination, involved in this evaluation, which is made, probably, jointly by the class and the teacher, though the teacher is ultimately the interpreter of value, the attention of the class is called to the qualities possessed by or lacking in the various products of the children's activity. Through this class exercise the children have gained: (*a*) an increased facility with the material, due to increased muscular coördination; (*b*) the suggestion of possible further variations (a new copy, so to speak); and (*c*) the probable emergence of a new problem.

Another example may be found in a recitation in oral reading as frequently conducted in the primary grades. The recitation begins, perhaps, with a conversation preparatory to the presentation of the new material to the

class, followed by the silent reading of the lesson by the class. The difficult words (a stimulus to mental activity) are discussed and explained (an interaction process between the class and teacher, in which the different children contribute on the basis of past experience), leading to an increased mastery of the technique of words. This is followed by a reading aloud of the lesson by the various members of the class (again, of course, experimentation, with individual variations, and the opportunity for further re-shaping and re-making of experience through social criticism, suggestion, and confirmation). In conclusion the teacher may read again the selection (especially if deemed valuable), for purposes of summary or further interpretation and confirmation of the standard which had been approximated.

As an illustration in a college or university class, there may be taken the discussion concerning the meaning of certain philosophical concepts; for example, the meaning of the term 'society.' There is first of all the individual contributions by the members of the class of what they take to be the mental content covered by the term. It is this, and that, and the other thing. There is by some individual member a certain approximation to the social standard (a matter of appreciation and selection by the teacher). This is selected and made the matter of further study by the class. The experience of the class thus immediately becomes, perchance, on a

higher level and again essentially problematic, leading to further attempts at definition and further evaluation.

The method illustrated would appear to be not merely the method of instruction suggested by the process of the evolution of knowledge, but seems also to be in conformity with the so-called Socratic method in the formation of concepts. It also bears a likeness to philosophical method as employed by Herbart in viewing philosophy as essentially a criticism of categories or concepts.

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FURTHER PROBLEMS FOR STUDY. — 1. Adjustment of education to contemporary needs. 2. Is a permanently adequate definition of education possible? 3. Psychological *versus* logical aspects of the course of study. 4. Philosophy and the integration of studies in the curriculum. 5. Principles controlling the organization of the course of study.

Conclusion.

What was said in the preceding paragraphs was put forward merely in the way of suggestion toward a working statement of a course in the philosophy of education. As in philosophy, so in education, particular solutions will perish while the problems live on. While it is to be acknowledged that the final test of any study must be its effect upon our action, the conduct it will inspire, the degree to which it keeps the passion for humanity to the fore, it must be as freely acknowledged that the more valuable results of a theoretic study of education are not immediate; they are nevertheless quite as inevitable and far-reaching. With the increasing complexity of the spiritual life of man, the problem of education likewise becomes more complex. In this very fact the need of a theoretic study of its possibility and its significance becomes more manifest. Algernon Sidney held that there are but two things of vital importance — religion and politics. In its best sense, education is an integral part of both. In some future day education may take the ancient and honorable place once held by politics in the minds and hearts of citizens. To achieve and retain that position, the serious and reflective study of the problem of education — the study, which, according to Mr. Spencer, involves all other studies, and the study in which the education of every one should cul-

minate — in its organic unity and continuity with the other great movements of the human spirit, must take the place of mere kindliness of heart, or the intellectual inertia which mistakes enthusiasm for insight and premature opinion for reasoned experience.

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